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Deception is of major concern to society as illustrated by numerous cases of fraud in
companies (e.g., by car manufacturers or banks), politics, sports, and many other areas.
Deception has also drawn much attention in the philosophical, psychological, and econo-
mic literature. It has already been addressed by Homer and Plato, and later by David
Hume, Adam Smith, Immanuel Kant, and Sigmund Freud, among others. This disser-
tation aims at discovering the mechanisms which determine individuals’ proneness to
unethical behavior. Understanding these mechanisms might ultimately help to build and
maintain institutions that prevent misconduct.
This dissertation explores the economics of deception from three perspectives: micro,
macro, and applied to sovereign debt. First, the micro analysis investigates a mental tool
that people use to restructure their cognition when behaving unethically. Specifically, I
study how people engage in self-deception in order to legitimate their deceitful behavior.
Second, the macro approach addresses the selection of economic models from experimen-
tal data in the context of lying. It examines which preferences explain lying behavior
well and how these preferences are distributed within the population. Finally, the ap-
plied approach focuses on advanced governments’ incentives to borrow or deleverage in
times of high sovereign indebtedness and analyzes the welfare implications of two state-
contingent sovereign debt instruments. Each of the three independent research papers in
this dissertation covers one perspective.
My first paper When Self-Deception Promotes Unethical Advice: Biased Minds in In-
vestment Consulting studies self-deception as a self-serving device to promote unethical
behavior in the financial advisory industry. Fraudulent advisor behavior is widespread
and costly: 7.3% of the roughly 1.2 million financial advisors registered in the US between
2005 and 2015 have a record of misconduct whereas the median settlement paid in cases
of misconduct amounts to $40′000 (Egan et al. (2017)). In a first experiment on Amazon
Mechanical Turk, I analyze whether investment advisors engage in self-deception by dis-
torting their first-order beliefs about the likelihood that their behavior imposes harmful
consequences on their clients.
The experimental methodology of this paper allows to decompose the effect of biased
beliefs into two separate components: (i) a fundamental (incentive-independent) bias cau-
sed by an advisor’s inability to assess the client’s actual behavior and (ii) a self-deceptive
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bias due to motivated beliefs. I find advisors’ self-deceptive biases to be significantly
increasing in the magnitude of private benefits associated with a recommendation of an
unfavorable investment opportunity. Once incentives to behave unethically are substan-
tial, self-deception promotes dishonesty and leads to monetary gains for advisors at the
cost of their clients. By contrast, the fundamental bias is constant and implies monetary
losses for the advisor regardless of the direction of the bias.
A second experiment in a neutral strategic information transmission setting confirms
the findings and suggests that people’s engagement in self-deception has broad relevance
for unethical behavior. Thanks to the general structure of the experiments, this paper’s
findings may also transfer to many other areas where asymmetric information leads to
unethical behavior and people could engage in self-deception such as physicians proposing
a suboptimal treatment, car mechanics recommending unnecessary repairs, and many
more. Finally, the paper suggests that in an environment where the fundamental bias is
comparably small and the incentives to lie are substantial, simply providing descriptive
behavioral information to the informed party is enough to cost-efficiently foster ethical
behavior.
My second paper Model Selection from Experimental Data: Evidence from Individual
Lying Behavior is joint work with Joel Sobel and Alexander Wagner. We study how
researchers should select a model of preferences from experimental data in the specific
context of lying behavior. We show that offering a new model that organizes a particular
data set better than a given candidate model does not provide evidence that the new model
is useful in other situations. While the basic notion of a difference between in-sample fit
and out-of-sample prediction is well-known, its relevance for experimental research may
be underappreciated.
Using data from two different communication experiments, we run an empirical horse-
race between five broad behavioral models used to explain lying behavior in the literature.
Understanding the extent to which a narrow definition of utility fails to describe behavior
is a necessary first step to understanding how to build and maintain institutions that
lead to desirable outcomes even in the presence of temptations to lie. From a subset
of the data, we estimate model parameters and assign participants to types. Then, we
analyze how models that allow for multiple types fit the behavioral data in-sample and
out-of-sample.
We find that models that explain behavior well in-sample do not necessarily perform
well out-of-sample and vice versa. A model based on lying costs fits the data very well in-
sample if there are only few observations, but does poorly even in-sample once more data
are collected, and does very poorly compared to other models in predicting lying behavior
out-of-sample. Combining in-sample and out-of-sample performance, a model consisting
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of three types (concerns for descriptive social norms, lying costs, and reference-dependent
preferences) explains behavior best. We provide evidence that the share of each type
within the whole population is quite stable across the two situations we study. Overall,
our paper raises a caveat: Experimental research that bases results on an in-sample
analysis with possibly few decisions per individual might produce misleading conclusions.
My third paper Indebtedness, Interests, and Incentives: State-contingent Sovereign
Debt Revisited is joint work with Felix Fattinger. This paper studies state-contingent
debt as an alternative refinancing instrument for advanced economies. In times of high
sovereign indebtedness, increasing yields impose eminent debt roll-over risks. We analyze
the welfare implications of two state-contingent debt instruments: puttable and GDP-
to-debt-indexed bonds, both temporary in nature and intended to improve deleveraging
feasibility.
In return for an insurance premium, puttable bonds offer protection against sovereign
default, thereby internalizing the implicit risk-sharing mechanism inherited by the ECB’s
‘Outright Monetary Transactions’ program. Similar to GDP-linked debt, bonds indexed to
a country’s GDP-to-debt ratio, henceforth ‘GDR bonds’, allow for consumption smoothing
via state-contingent interest payments. In contrast to GDP-linked debt, GDR bonds
permit competitive risk-return profiles even in the face of pessimistic growth outlooks.
We find that, in the presence of default costs, state-contingent bonds allow for substan-
tial welfare improvements relative to standard sovereign debt. For risk-averse consumers,
the counter-cyclical fiscal leeway created by GDR bonds dominates the interest savings
provided by puttable bonds. We verify this preference order by calibrating our model to
the five Eurozone countries most heavily affected by the debt crisis: Portugal, Ireland,
Italy, Greece, and Spain. Finally, we discuss implied deleveraging incentives, limited
commitment, and practical implementation issues for GDR bonds.
The structure of the dissertation is as follows: My three research papers are found in






1 When Self-deception Promotes Unethical
Advice: Biased Minds in Investment Con-
sulting∗
“There is nothing worse than self-deception - when the deceiver is at home and always
with you” - Plato, Cratylus 428d
1.1 Introduction
Ideas of self-deception in various forms have already been studied by Homer and Plato,
and later by François de La Rochefoucauld, David Hume, Adam Smith, and Vilfredo
Pareto. When deciding about committing unethical behavior such as fraud, corruption,
deceptive communication or others, people trade off the monetary benefits that can be
achieved against their inherent moral costs imposed by unethical behavior. Moral costs
lead some people to act honestly even though this does not maximize their pecuniary
payoff. Consequently, it could be monetarily beneficial to have lower moral costs. As
Freud (1933) mentions, one way to relax the trade-off of monetary gains versus moral costs
is that people subconsciously restructure cognition in order to reduce negative emotions.
Consider the situation of investment advisors whose salary is linked to the sale of
some inferior financial products. By convincing themselves that clients are not going to
follow their investment recommendations they might reduce negative emotions in order to
legitimate unethical behavior. Egan et al. (2017) provide evidence that fraudulent advisor
behavior is widespread and costly: 7.3% of the roughly 1.2 million financial advisors
registered in the US between 2005 and 2015 have a record of misconduct whereas 29.3%
of the misconducts are caused by a misrepresentation or omission of key facts and 21.3%
by selling “unsuitable” investments. The median settlement paid in cases of misconduct
amounts to $40′000.
∗ I am grateful to Sascha Behnk, Uri Gneezy, Manuel Grieder, Ivan Petzev, Joel Sobel, Alexander
Wagner, Richard Zeckhauser, and participants at the ESA 2016 World Meeting, the Incentives and
Behavior Change conference, and the IMEBESS 2016 for very helpful comments and suggestions. Part
of this paper was developed while I was a visiting PhD student at the University of California, San
Diego and Harvard University. I thank the Swiss National Science Foundation for financial support.
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Similarly, CEOs who can increase the value of their stock holdings by announcing
better economic outlooks for their companies can make themselves believe that not all
analysts and investors will trust their overly optimistic forecast in order to feel better
about the announcement.1 There are several other fields where asymmetric information
leads to unethical behavior and people could engage in self-deception: physicians recom-
mending a suboptimal treatment, car mechanics suggesting unnecessary repairs, and many
more.2
Mele (1997) argues that these so-called motivated or self-serving beliefs are the key to
understanding the dynamics of self-deception. Following Akerlof (1989), who claims that
people process information such that they feel comfortable about themselves, economic
literature started to analyze how people strategically adjust their first-order beliefs in
order to pursue private goals. Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) find self-serving biases in
beliefs to play a prominent role in bargaining impasses. People adjust their own perception
about what they believe to be a fair outcome depending on the respective private benefits.
This paper studies self-deception, i.e., the usage of motivated beliefs, as a self-serving
device to promote unethical advice. Based on experimental data from Amazon Mechanical
Turk (mTurk), I analyze whether participants engage in self-deception by distorting their
first-order beliefs about the likelihood that their behavior imposes harmful consequences
on others. Motivated beliefs might lead to an under- or overestimation of the expected
payoff as well as the moral costs.
In a first experiment I consider the case of investment consulting. The investment ad-
visor is aware of the characteristics of several investments available. In addition to a fixed
wage for consulting, she might increase her compensation by recommending investment
opportunities that are linked to some private side payments. The advisor’s recommenda-
tion must state which investment opportunity is expected to perform best. As a result,
recommending a dominated investment is equal to telling a lie about expected future
payoffs.3 The advisor can hence trade off a higher compensation from recommending
suboptimal investments linked to private benefits against the personal harm of mislea-
ding the client. In order to provide incentives to lie, I specify the payoffs such that the
advisor has incentives not to recommend the best investment opportunity.
In decision stage AUT the advisor faces several investment consulting decisions. As
there is no information about the client’s behavior the advisor is expected to form her
1 In fact, Hutton et al. (2012) find that management forecasts are more accurate than analyst forecasts
only about 50% of the time.
2 Kerschbamer and Sutter (2017) provide an extensive meta-study covering lab and field experiments
about fraudulent behavior (such as overprovision or overcharging) in markets for credence goods.
3 For simplicity, there are only two qualitatively different investment opportunities whereas the worse
yields a lower expected return for the same risk. As a result, partial lying is not possible and it is
simple to determine the objectively better investment.
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first-order belief autonomously, thereby possibly engaging in self-deception.4 I elicit her
belief in two distinct ways: First, the stated belief is determined by directly asking the
advisor about her expectation of the client’s behavior. Second, I apply Andreoni and
Sanchez’ (2014) methodology to infer beliefs based on actions. The advisor is asked
to choose between the compensation of the investment game where the behavior of the
client is not yet known and several lotteries with the same possible payoffs but known
probabilities. Based on the characteristics of the lottery for which the advisor starts to
prefer the outcome of the game, I infer her revealed belief.5
In decision stage EX the advisor faces the same consulting situations as in AUT but
receives exogenous information about how often the client will choose the recommended
investment. By releasing information about the clients, the advisor is supposed to account
for it in her decision making process and to adjust her first-order belief such that it equals
the likelihood that a given client chooses the recommended investment. As a consequence,
there is no room to self-deceive since exogenous information about the client’s behavior
is provided. The design of EX allows to infer any advisor’s behavior for an extensive
range of possible first-order beliefs, i.e., I learn which investment the advisor is going
to recommend for any possible information she might have about her client’s behavior.
Three exogenously induced beliefs are particularly relevant: First, the actual rate at which
clients choose the investment recommended by the advisor (henceforth EX:A), second,
the advisor’s stated belief (EX:S), and third, her revealed belief (EX:R).6 Comparing the
advisor’s behavior in AUT, EX:A, EX:S, and EX:R allows to investigate a possible bias
in beliefs and its impact on behavior.
The experiment is conducted with a heterogeneous sample of 300 mTurk users in the
US. Consistent with prior studies I find that some participants tell the truth even though
doing so does not maximize their monetary payoff. In fact, 41.1% of all recommendations
made by advisors (in AUT) contain the outperforming investment opportunity. By con-
trast, 58.9% of all messages recommend a strictly dominated investment opportunity that
is linked to private benefits for the advisor. The number of unethical recommendations is
significantly increasing in the incentives provided to unethical behavior, i.e., the private
payment. These monetary incentives to lie are also called an advisor’s economic cost of
4 The advisor’s first-order belief corresponds to her assessment of the likelihood that the client is going
to pick the recommended investment opportunity. The higher the subjective probability, the larger
is the expected payoff of unethical behavior. However, an increased first-order belief also raises the
costs of behaving unethically as misleading the client may induce stronger negative emotions.
5 The first lottery always pays the highest payoff with certainty. Starting by choosing the lottery at
least once is thus a weakly dominant strategy.
6 In EX:A, the induced belief, i.e., the actual (average) following rate of the clients, is the same for all
advisors since it equals the correct belief of an unbiased advisor. Induced beliefs in EX:S and EX:R
are individual and correspond to every advisor’s elicited stated and revealed belief after AUT.
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stating the truth (henceforth ECOST).
Surprisingly, advisors do really poorly in estimating how often clients are going to
choose the recommended investment. On average clients follow, i.e., choose the investment
opportunity that is recommended by the advisor, in slightly more than 90% of all cases.
This is substantially more than advisors’ average stated belief (53%) and revealed belief
(47%), implying that advisors have biased beliefs.7 This bias in beliefs leads to distorted
behavior such that advisors behave unethically more (or possibly also less) often than if
they had perfect knowledge about the clients’ behavior. I call this discrepancy total bias.
The experimental methodology allows to decompose it into two separate components: (i)
a fundamental bias and (ii) a self-deceptive bias.8
The fundamental bias is the effect on truthfulness caused by the advisor’s general
inability to assess the client’s actual following rate. It is defined as the difference in
advisor behavior if she is informed that clients follow exactly as often as her prior first-
order belief (EX:S or EX:R)9 and her behavior if she knew the correct following rate
(EX:A). As a result, the fundamental bias corresponds to the general misperception of
client behavior and is computed as the difference EX:R−EX:A, i.e., behavior in EX:R
minus behavior in EX:A.
The self-deceptive bias is caused by an advisor who makes use of a motivated belief by
adjusting her first-order belief about the client’s behavior. In contrast to the fundamental
bias, the self-deceptive bias might depend on the private incentives. The self-deceptive
bias corresponds to the difference between behavior in AUT where no information about
the client’s behavior is provided and behavior in EX:R where the induced first-order belief
is identical to the elicited revealed belief. Since the advisor’s belief in AUT and EX:R
is, by construction, similar one would not necessarily expect different behavior. The self-
deceptive bias is hence computed as AUT−EX:R. Consequently, the total bias, which is
the sum of fundamental and self-deceptive bias, equals AUT−EX:A, i.e., the difference
in behavior between AUT where the advisor has no information and EX:A where she
possesses correct information about the client’s behavior.
I find the absolute effect of the advisors’ total bias on lying to be decreasing in ECOST.
The higher ECOST, the less biased are advisors and the less does behavior differ. The
7 Theoretically, advisors could be actively misstating their first-order beliefs, thereby causing a difference
between the actual following rate and the stated belief. However, by eliciting revealed beliefs, I control
for such misstatements and provide evidence that advisors indeed have biased beliefs.
8 The experimental methodology herein can also be applied to other settings where people make use of
motivated beliefs or, more generally, to any setting that analyzes how a change in the information set
alters behavior.
9 The difference between the stated and the revealed belief corresponds to the misstatement of a given
advisor. Since some people have a preference to look more ethical (e.g., Dufwenberg and Gneezy
(2000), Andreoni and Bernheim (2009)) people may pretend to do so by manipulating their stated
beliefs. I control for possible misstatements by focusing on revealed beliefs instead.
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fundamental bias is constant (and nonzero) indicating that advisors anticipate that clients’
behavior does not depend on their private benefits. This is reasonable as clients are not
informed about the advisor’s compensation and the private benefits. The decrease in the
total bias is caused by advisors’ self-deceptive bias, which is significantly increasing in the
magnitude of the private benefits associated with recommending suboptimal investment
opportunities.
The data imply that motivated beliefs form a self-deceptive bias that mitigates dis-
honest investment recommendations if incentives to lie are low and promotes unethical
behavior when incentives are high. Exogenously inducing the revealed first-order beliefs,
i.e., limiting self-deception, increases lying by 11 percentage points for very small private
payments and reduces the likelihood of telling a lie by up to 5 percentage points for high
ECOST levels compared to the baseline where advisors form beliefs autonomously.
I also find the biases to be payoff-relevant. For the lowest ECOST level of $0.20
each advisor loses $0.03 per decision while the client gains $0.18 due to self-deception.
Increasing ECOST inverts this relationship as the advisor’s self-deceptive bias is increasing
as well. As a result, at the maximum incentive level of $1.00, advisors gain $0.04 and
clients lose $0.03 per decision, respectively. These gains and losses relate to an average
payoff per decision of $1.31 ($0.85) for advisors (clients) and are hence quite substantial.
Given the payoff matrices in this study, the average total surplus (advisor plus client) is
U-shaped in ECOST and positive for most incentive levels. Advisors’ self-deceptive biases
increase combined surplus of advisors and clients. With regards to the fundamental bias,
I find that advisors with a fundamental bias lose money no matter in which direction they
are biased.
In order to analyze the general validity of the findings in the investment consulting
case, I conduct an additional experiment with a neutral framing. I use a sender-receiver
game similar to the one studied in Erat and Gneezy (2012) where nature rolls a 6-sided
die and the Sender privately observes the outcome from the roll of the die. Knowing
the payoffs the Sender must send a message about the actual outcome to the uninformed
Receiver. The payments to both players solely depend on whether the Receiver picks the
actual outcome or not. Payoffs are similar as in the investment advisory game implying
that the Sender is better off if the Receiver does not choose the actual outcome of the die
roll, thus providing incentives to lie.
The neutral framing yields slightly more dishonesty but all results regarding biases
and engagement in self-deception are confirmed and even more pronounced than in the
investment setting. The total bias is also non-linearly decreasing in ECOST because of
an increasing self-deceptive bias. Results from the neutral setting confirm that a Sender’s
payoff is significantly increasing in her self-deceptive bias. Self-deception increases the
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Sender’s payoff by $0.12 per decision for ECOST of $1.00 while the Receiver loses $0.07.
By contrast, the fundamental bias decreases success. To sum up, the findings suggest
that people’s engagement in self-deception has broad relevance for deception in various
environments.
To sum up, this paper makes four major contributions to the literature of self-deception
and unethical behavior: First, I provide an experimental methodology to decompose the
better-informed party’s bias about the behavior of the uninformed into two components:
(i) a fundamental bias, which is caused by the inability to assess the other person’s beha-
vior, and (ii) a self-deceptive bias caused by motivated beliefs. Second, I find people to
engage in self-deception and show the self-deceptive bias to be increasing in the magnitude
of private monetary benefits associated with unethical advice. Self-deception proves to be
payoff-increasing if the incentives to behave unethically are high and payoff-decreasing if
the incentives are low. Third, the fundamental bias does not depend on provided incen-
tives and leads to monetary losses regardless of the direction of the bias. Finally, I can
confirm the findings in a specifically framed setting where an investment consultant deci-
des about recommending an underperforming investment opportunity to a client in return
for a private payment as well as in a neutral strategic information transmission environ-
ment in the sense of Erat and Gneezy (2012). People’s engagement in self-deception thus
has broad relevance for the study of deception and lying. As a consequence, this paper
is able to propose situations in which altering people’s information set, e.g, releasing des-
criptive information about other people’s actions, implying that the better-informed party
knows how, on average, the less-informed party behaves, might foster ethical behavior.
This study builds on the broad literature that analyzes people’s instruments to sus-
tain a proper self-image when behaving unethically (e.g., Akerlof and Kranton (2000),
Schweitzer and Hsee (2002), Mazar et al. (2008), Bénabou and Tirole (2011), Chance
et al. (2011), Shalvi et al. (2015)) as well as experimental studies on lying and deception
in general (e.g., Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), Vanberg (2008), Bucciol et al. (2013),
Fischbacher and Heusi (2013)), and in sender-receiver games (e.g., Dickhaut et al. (1995),
Blume et al. (1998), Gneezy (2005), Cai and Wang (2006), Sánchez-Pagés and Vorsatz
(2007), Wang et al. (2010) among others).
Recently, Gneezy et al. (2015), Di Tella et al. (2015) and Schwardmann and van der
Weele (2016) provide experimental evidence that motivated self-deception leads to an
increase in unethical behavior. Schwardmann and van der Weele (2016) understand self-
deception as overconfidence about one’s own performance and show that participants who
are incentivized to convince others about their relative performance in fact self-deceive
themselves about their own performance and thereby become more successful in persua-
ding others. This paper analyzes self-deception with respect to motivated beliefs about
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other people’s behavior and its impact on unethical advice rather than overconfidence
about one’s own performance and its effect on the chances of successfully persuading
others.
Di Tella et al. (2015) study a corruption game and find people to make use of self-
serving biases about the kindness of others in order to behave selfishly. This paper is
different in several aspects. First, they analyze people’s selfish behavior in a modified
dictator game, whereas my focus is on people lying about the true state of the world
in a strategic information transmission setting. Second, in their context self-deception
considers a self-serving bias regarding the expected kindness of others implying that people
convince themselves to be matched with an unkind individual in order to act selfishly
without having the feeling of being unfair. I suppose people to engage in self-deception by
incorrectly assessing the likelihood that their unethical behavior imposes possibly harmful
consequences on others in order to legitimize dishonest reporting. Most importantly my
experimental methodology allows to decompose people’s biased beliefs into a fundamental
and a self-deceptive component while controlling for the fact that some people might
be actively misstating their first-order beliefs in the experiment. Thanks to the bias
decomposition, I am able to identify people who have fundamentally biased beliefs but
are not making use of motivated beliefs even though the effect on behavior could be
similar.
Most closely related to this study is Gneezy et al. (2015) who show that advisors
distort their judgment of an investment opportunity towards their private incentives if
being informed about these incentives in advance. Despite having a similar framing my
goal is different. Instead of relating self-deception to the attractivity of the investment
opportunities, I focus on the channel, i.e., advisors having biased beliefs about how their
clients behave, through which self-deception influences unethical behavior. I find that
advisors self-deceive themselves about the likelihood that their clients will choose the
recommended investment. Specifically, I show that the increase in unethical behavior is
caused by advisors having biased first-order beliefs about their clients’ behavior. Since
my experimental design allows to directly infer advisor behavior for all possible first-order
beliefs, I can then decompose this bias into a fundamental and a self-deceptive part in
order to disentangle the net effect of self-deception. In addition, I confirm my findings in
a neutral environment and thereby provide evidence that they may also be valid in more
general situations where lying takes place and not only in the specific case of investment
advisory.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 explains the design of
the investment consulting experiment. Section 1.3 describes the sample and its descriptive
statistics. Section 1.4 provides results and findings for the investment consulting setting
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and Section 1.5 for the experiment with a neutral framing. Section 1.6 is a conclusion.
1.2 Experimental Design
1.2.1 Investment Consulting
The first experiment consists of a two-player sender-receiver game in an investment con-
sulting setting. Participants are randomly assigned to either the role of an investment
advisor or a client. The participant taking the role of an investment advisor knows the
characteristics of all investment opportunities available to her client. There are six inves-
tment opportunities available.10 Without loss of generality, I make three simplifications:
(i) there are only two different expected returns, (ii) expected returns are always realized,
i.e., the client is paid exactly the expected return, and (iii) all investment opportunities
feature the same risk. As there is always one single investment opportunity with a strictly
higher expected return, these simplifications make it very easy for the advisor to assess
the most favorable investment.11
Given the characteristics of the investment opportunities and the compensation sche-
dule the advisor must send a message to the client. The message space consists of six
messages:12
1. “Investment 1 will yield the highest expected outcome.”
2. “Investment 2 will yield the highest expected outcome.”
3. “Investment 3 will yield the highest expected outcome.”
4. “Investment 4 will yield the highest expected outcome.”
5. “Investment 5 will yield the highest expected outcome.”
6. “Investment 6 will yield the highest expected outcome.”
The investment advisor receives a base salary for consulting the client. In addition, she
might increase her payment by recommending investment opportunities that are linked
10 Since there are six investment opportunities, deception trough telling the truth as propagated by
Sutter (2009) should not play an important role. As long as the advisor’s first order belief is at least
1/6, lying is the payoff-maximizing strategy. If it equals 1/6 the subjective probability to receive
the high payoff is 1/6 + 5/6 × 4/5 = 5/6 if telling a lie and 1 − 1/6 = 5/6 if reporting truthfully,
respectively. As a result, the two strategies yield the same expected payoff.
11 In addition, the setting allows for a direct comparison to more general strategic information transmis-
sion games such as the one studied in Erat and Gneezy (2012).
12 Given the wording of the messages behaving unethically is similar to telling a lie.
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to private benefits.13 The client is aware that one investment opportunity outperforms
the others from a risk-return perspective but has no additional information about the set
of investments. Based on the advisor’s recommendation the client consequently picks one
investment that determines his payoff as well as the advisor’s compensation.
1.2.2 Treatments
The experiment features a within-individual setting. All participants complete all stages.
There are two main decision stages and several smaller tasks in the following order:
1. Decision stage I: Autonomous belief forming (AUT)
2. Belief elicitation I: Stated belief
3. Belief elicitation II: Revealed belief
4. Logical test
5. Decision stage II: Exogenous belief induction (EX)
6. Questionnaire
In AUT the investment advisory game is played for 10 (randomly ordered) rounds
with altering payoff matrices.14 An important parameter is the advisor’s first-order be-
lief, i.e., her assessment of the likelihood that the client is going to pick the recommended
investment opportunity. In AUT the advisor is expected to form the first-order belief
autonomously, as there is no information provided about how clients behave. As a con-
sequence, the advisor might self-deceive herself by distorting her first-order belief.15 In
Appendix 1.A, I provide a simple model that accounts for the possibility to engage in self-
deception about the likelihood that the client will choose the recommended investment
opportunity while allowing for a broad range of individual-specific moral cost specificati-
ons that have been brought up in the literature.
After the 10 decisions in AUT, I elicit the advisor’s first-order belief in two different
ways. First, the stated belief is determined by directly asking the advisor about her expec-
tation of the client’s behavior.16 The stated belief elicitation is unincentivized in order to
13 In reality, these benefits range from direct commissions for each own product sold, a bonus for reaching
a certain amount of product sales from a specific brokerage firm, to a variable compensation part linked
to the employer’s profit.
14 Section 1.2.3 discusses the choice of the payoff matrices. They are displayed in Table 1.1.
15 I assume advisors to maximize the expected utility of lying conditional on being self-deceptively
biased rather than to set their level of self-deception strategically in order to maximize utility. As a
consequence, self-deception is rather an individual characteristic than a freely selectable parameter.
16 The exact wording of the stated belief elicitation is: “Out of 100 possible counterparts, how many do
you think will follow your messages (i.e., choose the investment you mention in your message)?”.
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prevent participants from hedging their compensation in the decision stage as suggested
by, e.g., Blanco et al. (2010).17 Second, I apply Andreoni and Sanchez’ (2014) methodo-
logy to infer beliefs based on actions, thereby controlling for possible misstatements by
advisors.
The advisor is asked, how she would prefer to receive her compensation. She is provi-
ded a list of 21 lotteries whereas all lotteries are characterized by the same two payoffs as
her possible payoffs in the consulting game. For each lottery she has to choose whether she
prefers the compensation of the investment game where the behavior of the client is not
yet known or the lottery with the same possible payoffs but known probabilities.18 In fact,
each of the 21 lotteries relates one-to-one to an implicit first-order belief between zero and
one in the investment advisory game. The first of the 21 lotteries always pays the higher
payoff with certainty. Consequently, it is a weakly dominant strategy to start by choosing
the lottery.19 Based on the characteristics of the lottery for which the advisor starts to
prefer the outcome of the game, I infer her revealed belief. The revealed belief elicitation
is framed as a question about how the advisor prefers to receive her compensation. As a
consequence, she is not aware that this stage actually elicits beliefs and hence will likely
not act in order to be consistent with her behavior in the stated belief elicitation task.
Moreover, due to the direct relation to compensation, the advisor is highly incentivized
to seriously indicate the marginal lottery for which she starts to prefer the outcome of the
game.
The logical test consists of 10 numerical patterns. Participants are asked to complete as
many as possible. Each correctly solved pattern adds $0.10 to the final payment. The time
limit for the task is 120 seconds. This task intends to assess the participants’ analytical
skills, which serve as a proxy for their strategic thinking capability. In addition, the task
separates the two treatments in time and prevents advisors from perfectly remembering
their behavior in AUT.
In EX, the advisor faces the same 10 investment rounds as in AUT but additionally
receives a list of 21 possible clients with whom she might be matched. She is told that
Client 1 never chooses the investment opportunity that she recommends, Client 2 chooses
the recommended investment opportunity in 5 out of 100 cases, Client 3 in 10 out of 100
17 In addition, as shown by Andreoni and Sanchez (2014) people might also misstate first-order beliefs
in order to foster their social image by trading off the monetary loss of a worse assessment against
decreased moral costs. In order to control for such misstatements, I base my analysis in Section 1.4
and Section 1.5 on revealed beliefs. Results for stated beliefs are provided in Appendix 1.B.
18 The advisor is also informed about the randomly selected round, the payoff matrix, and her recom-
mendation but not the client’s choice.
19 Only lying advisors with a belief equal to one or honest advisors with a belief equal to zero will
be indifferent between the outcome of the game and the lottery that pays the highest payoff with
certainty.
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cases, . . . , and Client 21 in 100 out of 100 cases.20 By releasing such information about
the clients, the advisor is supposed to take it into account by adjusting her belief such
that it equals the likelihood that a given client chooses the recommended investment. The
advisor is asked to send a recommendation to every possible client without knowing with
whom she will be matched. As a consequence, I am able to infer the advisor’s behavior
for an exhaustive range of exogenously induced first-order beliefs.21
Three (out of the 21) induced first-order beliefs receive special attention: (i) the actual
following rate, i.e., the first-order belief that equals the average likelihood that clients stick
to the advisor’s recommendation and choose the respective investment (EX:A), (ii) the
advisor’s revealed belief (EX:R), and (iii) the advisor’s stated belief (EX:S). Note that,
while the induced belief in EX:A, i.e., the average following rate of all clients, is the
same for all advisors, induced beliefs in EX:S and EX:R correspond to every advisor’s
individually elicited stated and revealed belief after AUT. By comparing the advisor’s
behavior for these three induced beliefs, I am able to detect the effect of a possible bias
in beliefs on behavior, and more importantly, to decompose this bias into a fundamental
(caused by the inability to assess the correct following rate) and a self-deceptive component
(caused by motivated first-order beliefs).22 To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the
first to analyze unethical behavior for an extensive range of possible first-order beliefs.
The experimental methodology and the respective bias decomposition could furthermore
be widely applied to other environments where people make use of motivated beliefs in
order to alter behavior.
Finally, a questionnaire eliciting demographic and socio-economic characteristics, pro-
tected values for honesty as in Tanner et al. (2009),23 and prosocial concerns completes
20 For Client 1, for example, the exact wording of the information provided is: “Participant 1 will choose
the investment which you send in your message with 0% probability. Which message would you send
Participant 1?”. Information about other clients is provided analogously.
21 Even though I cannot ensure that people actually believe the belief manipulation, there is convincing
evidence that they do. First, if they did not believe it they would not take the different induced beliefs
into account and behavior in EX would be roughly the same regardless of the induced belief. This is
not what the data unravels. Participants’ tendency to lie is monotonically increasing in the induced
belief. Second, regardless of the incentives provided to report dishonestly, participants on average
follow the respective payoff-maximizing strategy given a specific induced belief, indicating that they
take the beliefs into account. Figure 1.C.1 in Appendix 1.C displays the advisors’ behavior with
respect to induced first-order beliefs. Finally, for the sake of this paper, I only require participants to
self-deceive less in EX than in AUT and not necessarily that there is no self-deception at all in EX.
See the discussion of the degree of self-deception in Appendix 1.A for more details.
22 While this paper solely focuses on the effect of people’s biased beliefs on unethical behavior, one could
also analyze the bias in beliefs per se. However, in order to quantify such a bias, I needed to make
assumptions about the structural form of every participants’ moral costs. I leave this topic to further
research.
23 Gibson et al. (2013) find that this survey-based measure of protected values correlates with preferences
for truthfulness.
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the experiment.24 In the end, a lottery anonymously matches advisors and clients in both
treatments and randomly determines one round in AUT and one in EX to be relevant for
the payment. Participants are never matched with the same counterpart twice. They are
paid according to the outcomes in AUT, EX and the performance in the logical test.
Participants taking the role of clients basically follow the same experimental procedure.
However, there are two important differences: (i) In AUT, I apply a strategy-method such
that clients only decide once which investment to choose given all possible recommenda-
tions by the advisor. This is sufficient as clients have no information about the different
payoff matrices and hence the strategic decision situation does not vary across rounds.
(ii) In EX, clients are randomly assigned to the role of one of the 21 possible clients
that are shown to the advisor. As a result, each client is forced to follow the advisor’s
recommendation in a predetermined number of all cases.
The experiment is programmed and conducted with the experimental software oTree
(Chen et al. (2015)). Sessions were run from September to December 2016. The complete
set of experimental instructions is provided in Appendix 1.D.
1.2.3 Payoffs
I specify the payoffs such that the investment advisor has private incentives not to recom-
mend the outperforming investment opportunity, thus providing incentives to behave dis-
honestly. All investment opportunities, which are inferior from a risk-return perspective,
are associated with a private payment to the advisor. For simplicity, I assume the private
payment to the advisor to be similar for all inferior investments, hence implying two dif-
ferent possible levels of compensation. As there are also two possible return outcomes of
the investment opportunities the game features 2 × 2 payoff matrices. As a result, partial
lying is not possible and hence there are no different sizes of lies.
I alternate the incentives to lie, i.e., the private payment associated with inferior inves-
tment opportunities from round to round producing different strategic decision situations
for the investment advisor.25 There are five differing values of ECOST ranging from $0.20
to $1.00.26 Each ECOST level is used in two out of the 10 randomly ordered rounds.
Table 1.1 displays all payoff matrices.
24 I use a simple survey-based prosocial concerns measure as in Gibson et al. (2013). There are more
sophisticated prosocial concerns measures, e.g., Van Lange et al. (1997), which could be used if one
wanted to focus especially on the effects of prosociality.
25 In addition, the possible outcomes to advisor and client are slightly adjusted in order to keep the
difference in payoffs between both players constant in a given state. This allows me to control for any
effects of inequity aversion.
26 The effect on the hourly wage is substantial. For example, ECOST of $1.00 translates to an increase
in the hourly wage of $12.00 as both stages took participants approximately 5 minutes to complete.
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good investment bad investment good investment bad investment
$0.20 ($1.00, $1.70) ($1.20, $0.30) ($1.10, $1.80) ($1.30, $0.40)
$0.40 ($0.90, $1.60) ($1.30, $0.40) ($1.00, $1.70) ($1.40, $0.50)
$0.60 ($0.80, $1.50) ($1.40, $0.50) ($0.90, $1.60) ($1.50, $0.60)
$0.80 ($0.70, $1.40) ($1.50, $0.60) ($0.80, $1.50) ($1.60, $0.70)
$1.00 ($0.60, $1.30) ($1.60, $0.70) ($0.70, $1.40) ($1.70, $0.80)




denotes the advisor’s and the client’s
payoff, respectively. In the experiment, payoffs are displayed in experimental currency units. However,
they can also be interpreted as cents since one experimental currency unit in the experiment corresponds
to $0.01 real money. ECOST is not shown to participants. The client may either choose the good
investment opportunity or the bad investment opportunity. Selecting the bad investment opportunity
will trigger private payments to the advisor and hence lead to a higher advisor payoff.
As an illustration, one specific payoff matrix, which corresponds to the first matrix
depicted in the top row in Table 1.1, is displayed in Figure 1.1.
Client




Figure 1.1: Payoff matrix example
In this particular situation the advisor’s base compensation is $1.00. In addition,
she might achieve a private payment of $0.20 (= $1.20 − $1.00) if the client chooses
the bad investment opportunity. For the client the good investment opportunity will
yield $1.70 and the bad investment opportunity $0.30. Hence, the payoffs are ($1.00,
$1.70) if the client picks the good investment opportunity, i.e., $1.00 for the advisor and
$1.70 for the client and ($1.20, $0.30) if he picks the bad investment opportunity, i.e.,
$1.20 for the advisor ($1.00 plus a private payment of $0.20) and $0.30 for the client.
Consequently, the monetary incentives to behave unethically and to recommend a bad
investment opportunity amount to $0.20.
1.3 Data
I recruited 300 US participants on the crowdsourcing internet marketplace mTurk. In
order to guarantee participant validity, I require subjects to have successfully completed
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at least 1000 human intelligence tasks (HITs) on mTurk with an overall approval rate
of more than 95%.27 In addition, there are two understanding questions. 79% of all
participants solved the first understanding question correctly and 81% were able to answer
the second question adequately.28
The sample consists of 51% men and 49% women. The sample features an age range
from 18 to 68 years and a variety in highest completed education from elementary to
graduate school. The median participant is 31 years old, holds an undergraduate degree
and has a household income of $50′000.29
Participants’ earnings were a $0.25 show-up fee plus an average bonus of about $2.75
for advisors and $1.65 for clients. Given that the experiment took about 15 minutes for
advisors and 10 minutes for clients, advisors earned $12.00 (= 3.00/15 × 60) per hour
on average and clients $11.40 (= 1.90/10 × 60), respectively. Table 1.2 summarizes the
data’s descriptive statistics. The distribution of protected values and prosocial concerns
is consistent with Tanner et al. (2009) and Gibson et al. (2013).
The elicitation of participants’ revealed beliefs requires a clean-up of the data. First,
participants who switch multiple times between preferring the lottery and the outcome of
the game or start with preferring the outcome of the game and then switch to the lottery
are excluded as these strategies are strictly dominated and cannot be related to a specific
revealed belief.30 Second, participants who always prefer either of the two options are
excluded as this would imply a belief of zero or one. However, it could also indicate a lack
of understanding or attention. As a precaution, all participants who always prefer either
of the two options, except those that also state a belief of zero or one,31 are dropped.32 In
total 54 participants are excluded. Including these participants would confirm and even
strengthen my results.
27 There are several studies showing that mTurk experiments yield consistent results to common labo-
ratory settings even though the stakes are smaller (e.g., Paolacci et al. (2010), Horton et al. (2011),
Amir et al. (2012)).
28 Despite that the training questions are not solved perfectly, the results are robust to the exclusion of
those who did not solve them correctly.
29 Bohannon (2016) argues that, despite the heterogeneity of the sample, many participants on mTurk
are professional experiment takers just as in many laboratory environments where participants are
hired out of a pool of regular experiment takers.
30 Participants who commit one single mistake, i.e., switching to the other option for exactly one lottery
and then immediately switching back, are included and the respective action is reversed. My findings
are not sensitive to an exclusion of these participants.
31 In fact, there is only one participant who states a first-order belief of zero and one who reports a belief
of one.
32 Always preferring the lottery could indicate that an advisor is ambiguity averse and prefers to enter
a lottery with known probabilities despite a possibly smaller expected payoff. Similarly, participants
with a preference for ambiguity might always prefer to be paid the outcome of the game. Excluding
these participants prevents the measure of revealed beliefs to be distorted by such ambiguity aversion.
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Table 1.2: Descriptive statistics - Investment consulting
Mean Std. Min Max Obs.
Sex 0.51 0.50 0 1 300
Age 33.4 9.83 18 68 300
Education 2.67 0.68 1 4 300
Income 2.90 1.46 0 6 300
Religion 0.42 0.49 0 1 300
PV 4.46 1.16 1.67 7.00 300
Prosoc 3.44 1.83 1.00 7.00 300
Stated belief 0.53 0.25 0.00 1.00 150
Revealed belief 0.46 0.25 0.00 0.95 96
Numskill 1.5 1.16 0 6 300
Bonus 2.29 0.78 0.6 3.9 300
This table shows descriptive statistics for all advisors and clients. Sex is a binary variable taking the
value one if the participant reports to be male, and zero if female. Education corresponds to the highest
completed education stage and takes the following values: 0: No schooling, 1: Elementary school, 2:
High school, 3: Undergraduate degree, 4: Graduate school. Income reflects yearly household income and
takes the following values: 1: < $20′000, 2: $20′000 − 39′999, 3: $40′000 − 59′999, 4: $60′000 − 79′999,
5: $80′000 − 99′999, 6: > $100′000. Religion denotes a binary variable which takes the value one if
the participant indicates to belong either to Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism or a
Folk religion, and zero else. PV reflects an index of protected values for honesty borrowed from Tanner
et al. (2009). Prosoc is an index capturing prosocial concerns. The full set of questions is depicted in
Appendix 1.D. Stated belief is the advisor’s self-reported first-order belief about the client’s behavior.
Revealed belief reflects the action-implied first-order belief according to the methodology of Andreoni
and Sanchez (2014). Numskill is the number of correctly solved numerical patterns in the logical test.
Bonus corresponds to the variable payoff achieved.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 First-order Beliefs
I start by analyzing the distributions of the two first-order belief measures and their im-
plicit relationship. Figure 1.2 presents histograms for stated and revealed beliefs, whereas
the latter are derived according to Andreoni and Sanchez’ (2014) methodology. The dis-
tribution of stated beliefs features a peak at 1/2, which might be a focal point for many
advisors. The average stated belief equals 55% and is in line with those elicited by Rode
(2010) (51%) in a standard communication game.33 Revealed beliefs average 47% and
feature a smoother distribution. Figure 1.3 links the two measures in a scatter plot.
The overall relationship between stated and revealed beliefs is positive but the cor-
relation is small (0.07). However, there is a substantial difference between participants
33 Considering all participants, i.e., not eliminating participants with invalid revealed beliefs, the average
stated belief equals 53% (see Table 1.2).
24 When Self-deception Promotes Unethical Advice
















Figure 1.2: Histograms of stated (left) and revealed advisor beliefs (right). Sta-
ted beliefs are unincentivized and self-reported. Revealed beliefs are derived according to the
methodology of Andreoni and Sanchez (2014).












Figure 1.3: Stated versus revealed advisor beliefs. Plus markers indicate participants
who lie in at most 50% of all decisions. Circles mark participants who lie in more than 50% of
all decisions.
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who are rather honest and those who are not. While the correlation between stated and
revealed beliefs of participants who lie in more than 50% of all cases is 0.02, it is 0.34
for those who lie in 50% or less cases. Most honest participants overstate their stated
beliefs such that they end up below the 45-degree line in Figure 1.3. One motive is that
these individuals want to look particularly ethical by telling the truth because they claim
that they expect others to believe their recommendation (e.g., Dufwenberg and Gneezy
(2000), Andreoni and Bernheim (2009)).
Many dishonest participants, by contrast, underreport their belief and act as if they
thought that their unethical behavior would not hurt clients very often. However, some
even report values for which lying would no longer be the payoff-maximizing strategy, i.e.,
if the first-order belief is smaller than 1/6. Some dishonest advisors also overstate their
belief because they possibly want to highlight their capability to understand that lying
becomes more profitable the higher is their respective belief.
Advisors do really poorly in estimating how often clients are going to choose the
investment recommended. On average, clients stick to the advisor’s recommendation in
slightly more than 90% of all cases. 128 (of 150) clients are always credulous, 4 clients
never follow, and 18 elect the recommended investment sometimes. This is substantially
more than what advisors believe (regardless whether measured by stated or revealed
beliefs), hence indicating that advisors have biased beliefs.
1.4.2 Unethical Behavior
Consistent with studies conducted in the laboratory, I find participants to tell the truth
even though it does not maximize their monetary payoff. In fact, 41.1% of all recom-
mendations made by advisors in AUT contain the investment opportunity that really
outperforms all others. 58.9% of all messages recommend a dominated investment op-
portunity that is linked to private benefits for the advisor. The share of these unethical
recommendations is increasing in ECOST.34 Figure 1.4 displays the relationship between
ECOST and unethical advice in AUT.
Table 1.3 lists how demographics and socio-economic characteristics influence une-
thical investment recommendations in AUT. Lying most importantly depends on the
incentives to behave unethically, i.e., the private benefits from recommending an under-
performing investment opportunity. The proportion of lies is significantly increasing in
ECOST and decreasing in ECOST2. This is consistent with Figure 1.4 which illustrates
that the increase in lying is diminishing for higher levels of ECOST. Remarkably, neither
stated nor revealed beliefs explain a significant share of unethical behavior, indicating
34 This is consistent with Gneezy (2005) in another sender-receiver game and also Gibson et al. (2013)
in a non-strategic setting.
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Figure 1.4: Unethical investment recommendations across ECOST levels in AUT.
Each circle corresponds to the average proportion of lies in two situations with similar ECOST.
that beliefs affect both the advisor’s expected monetary payoff and her moral costs of
behaving unethically. If moral costs were independent of first-order beliefs, lying would
be significantly increasing in the respective beliefs as the expected monetary payoff of
lying grows in the advisor’s subjective assessment of the likelihood that the client will
choose the recommended investment.
The effect of demographic and socio-economic characteristics on lying is limited. Men
lie insignificantly more. Lying is also increasing in the advisor’s age. In contrast, religious
and well-educated participants tell the truth more often. The household income’s effect
on lying is ambiguous. Moreover, the higher a participant’s logical skills, as measured by
the number of numerical patterns solved, the lower is the proportion of lies. Finally, pre-
ferences for protected values for honesty are able to explain a share of the lying decisions.
The stronger an advisor’s protected values, the less likely she is going to recommend a
bad investment opportunity.
1.4.3 Bias Decomposition
The investment advisors’ assessment of their clients’ behavior in AUT is biased. Re-
gardless of the belief measure they expect clients to choose the recommended investment
opportunity less than what clients actually do. This bias in beliefs leads to a bias in
behavior implying that advisors behave unethically more (or conceivably also less) often
than they would if they had perfect knowledge about the clients’ behavior. I call this bias
total bias. It is determined by comparing behavior in AUT to behavior in EX:A when
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Table 1.3: Determinants of unethical advice in investment consulting
Dependent variable: Lie
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ECOST 1.493*** 4.989*** 1.499*** 4.962*** 1.754*** 7.400***
(0.235) (1.892) (0.236) (1.883) (0.311) (2.737)
ECOST2 -1.810*** -1.819*** -1.714**
(0.632) (0.634) (0.810)
Stated belief -0.364 -0.360
(0.376) (0.378)
Revealed belief 0.260 0.272
(0.606) (0.615)
Sex 0.345 0.349 0.301 0.305 0.389 0.396
(0.264) (0.265) (0.266) (0.267) (0.348) (0.350)
Age 0.016 0.017 0.015 0.015 0.003 0.004
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.021) (0.021)
Education -0.101 -0.100 -0.105 -0.104 -0.063 -0.062
(0.216) (0.217) (0.217) (0.218) (0.251) (0.252)
Income -0.122 -0.123 -0.122 -0.123 0.040 0.040
(0.108) (0.108) (0.109) (0.109) (0.128) (0.129)
Religion -0.305 -0.306 -0.296 -0.297 -0.418 -0.421
(0.257) (0.258) (0.258) (0.259) (0.322) (0.324)
PV -0.590*** -0.434** -0.599*** -0.451** -0.718*** -0.362
(0.165) (0.181) (0.161) (0.181) (0.223) (0.252)
ECOST × PV -0.270 -0.258 -0.629*
(0.267) (0.266) (0.375)
Prosoc -0.060 -0.029 -0.065 -0.032 -0.080 0.067
(0.088) (0.116) (0.088) (0.115) (0.112) (0.169)
ECOST × Prosoc -0.056 -0.060 -0.264
(0.179) (0.177) (0.251)
Numskill -0.011 -0.011 -0.021 -0.021 -0.034 -0.035
(0.124) (0.125) (0.123) (0.124) (0.155) (0.156)
Constant 2.437** 1.167 2.740*** 1.489 2.706** 0.171
(0.989) (1.244) (1.040) (1.316) (1.256) (1.714)
Observations 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 960 960
Number of participants 150 150 150 150 96 96
(Pseudo) R2 0.097 0.100 0.099 0.102 0.119 0.126
This table presents coefficients of logit regressions in AUT. The dependent variable is the binary variable
Lie which takes the value one if the advisor behaves unethically, and zero else. ECOST denotes economic
costs of stating the truth, i.e., the monetary incentives to recommend a bad investment opportunity.
Stated belief reflects the advisor’s self-reported first-order belief about the likelihood that the client will
choose the recommended investment. Revealed belief denotes the advisor’s first-order belief as implied
by the methodology of Andreoni and Sanchez (2014). Sex is a binary variable taking the value one if
the participant reports to be male, and zero if female. Education takes the following values: 0: No
schooling, 1: Elementary school, 2: High school, 3: Undergraduate degree, 4: Graduate school. Income
reflects yearly household income and takes the following values: 1: < $20′000, 2: $20′000 − 39′999, 3:
$40′000 − 59′999, 4: $60′000 − 79′999, 5: $80′000 − 99′999, 6: > $100′000. Religion denotes a binary
variable which takes the value one if the participant indicates to belong either to Christianity, Islam,
Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism or a Folk religion, and zero else. PV reflects an index of protected values
for honesty. Prosoc captures prosocial concerns. Numskill is the number of correctly solved numerical
patterns in the logical test. Robust standard errors are obtained by clustering at the individual level and
appear in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
28 When Self-deception Promotes Unethical Advice
the correct belief (90.3%), which corresponds to the actual following rate, is induced.35
Figure 1.5 displays advisors’ average total bias across ECOST.
















Figure 1.5: Unethical behavior in AUT and EX:A (left), and advisors’ total bias
in investment consulting (right). Circles indicate the proportion of lies for given ECOST
in AUT. Crosses correspond to the proportion of lies in EX:A when the actual following rate
(90%) is exogenously induced. The total bias equals the difference between the proportion of
lies in AUT and EX:A.
If advisors know the actual following rate, recommending a bad investment opportu-
nity becomes more popular as it is very likely that the client will choose the recommended
investment. Hence, Figure 1.5 provides evidence that investment advisors’ assessment of
the clients’ behavior diverges from their real behavior since the former would have no
incentive to behave differently in AUT compared to EX:A if they had the same expec-
tation. I observe the absolute level of the total bias to be decreasing in ECOST. The
higher ECOST, the less biased are the advisors and the less does behavior between the
two treatments differ. Overall the total bias is substantial, decreasing from 25 percentage
points if ECOST equals $0.20 to 10 percentage points if ECOST amounts to $1.00.
Thanks to the experimental methodology, I am able to decompose the total bias into
two separate components: (i) a fundamental bias and (ii) a self-deceptive bias. The
fundamental and the self-deceptive bias always add up to the total bias.
The fundamental bias is the effect on truthfulness caused by an advisor’s general
inability to assess the client’s actual following rate. Technically speaking, it corresponds
35 Since I only have behavioral data for 21 different induced beliefs, I use the induced belief that is closest
to the actual following rate. The closest available induced belief is 90%.
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to the difference between behavior in EX:R where the induced first-order belief equals her
prior first-order belief and EX:A where it corresponds to the actual following rate. Since
the client does not know the advisor’s compensation and especially the private benefits,
the fundamental bias should be independent of the incentives provided to the advisor.
The self-deceptive bias is caused by an advisor’s use of motivated beliefs. This advisor
engages in self-deception by adjusting her first-order belief about the client’s behavior. In
contrast to the fundamental bias, the self-deceptive bias might depend on the incentives
to behave unethically. Stronger incentives might tempt the advisor to bias beliefs in
order to restructure her cognition. The self-deceptive bias corresponds to the difference
between behavior in AUT when no information about the clients’ behavior is provided and
behavior in EX:R where the previously elicited first-order belief is induced.36 If advisors
did not engage in self-deception, behavior in AUT would be expected to be similar to
behavior in EX:R as advisors have the same beliefs about their clients’ behavior.37
Figure 1.6 displays the proportion of lies in AUT where advisors might self-deceive,
EX:A where the correct following rate is stated, and EX:R where each advisor’s revealed
belief is induced. The total bias equals AUT−EX:A, the fundamental bias EX:R−EX:A,
and the self-deceptive bias reflects AUT−EX:R.
Figure 1.6 shows that advisors’ motivated beliefs lead to a negative self-deceptive bias
if incentives to behave unethically are low and positive if incentives are high. While
a negative self-deceptive bias implies that the advisor mitigates dishonest investment
recommendations in AUT, a positive bias leads to more unethical behavior when forming
beliefs autonomously. Exogenously inducing the revealed first-order beliefs, i.e., limiting
self-deception, increases lying by 11 percentage points for the lowest private payment and
reduces the likelihood of telling a lie by up to 5 percentage points for high ECOST levels
compared to AUT where advisors can engage in self-deception.
As the fundamental bias (the general misperception of client behavior) is roughly
constant, the absolute decrease in the total bias is caused by advisors’ self-deceptive
biases, which decrease lying in AUT for low levels of ECOST and increase lying for high
36 E.g., in case advisor A revealed in the belief elicitation that she expects her client to follow with 60%
probability in AUT, I compare her behavior in AUT with her behavior in EX:R, where the client will
actually follow with 60% probability.
37 To control for some advisors possibly strategically misstating their beliefs, I base the analysis on
revealed beliefs. However, all the subsequent findings also hold if one considered behavior in EX:S
where stated first-order beliefs were induced instead. Even though the correlation between stated
and revealed beliefs is low, both measures provide qualitatively similar findings. The low correlation
suggests that participants are not strategically misstating their beliefs in order to obscure their self-
deceptive tendencies in which case I could not observe a self-deceptive bias by analyzing stated beliefs.
In addition, most participants’ stated and revealed beliefs are both far off the actual following rate,
indicating that also the fundamental bias persists. All results and findings based on stated beliefs are
displayed in Appendix 1.B.
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Figure 1.6: Unethical behavior in AUT, EX:A and EX:R (left), and the bias de-
composition in investment consulting (right). Circles indicate the proportion of lies for
given ECOST in AUT. Crosses correspond to the proportion of lies in EX:A, and asterisks de-
note the proportion of lies in EX:R. The fundamental bias is computed as EX:R−EX:A. The
self-deceptive bias corresponds to AUT−EX:R. The total bias equals the sum of fundamental
and self-deceptive bias.
levels of ECOST. Having a constant fundamental bias indicates that advisors anticipate
that the clients’ behavior does not depend on private benefits. This is reasonable as clients
are neither informed about the advisor’s compensation nor the private benefits.
Table 1.4, which analyzes the determinants of the total bias, the fundamental bias, and
the self-deceptive bias, empirically confirms the indicative evidence provided in Figure 1.6
that the absolute level of the total bias is decreasing in ECOST because advisors’ self-
deceptive bias is significantly increasing in the value of the private benefits associated with
recommending underperforming investment opportunities. A $0.10 increase (at the mean)
of the incentives provided to recommend a bad investment project leads to an increase
in the self-deceptive bias of 2.1 (= 0.1 · (0.619 − 2 · 0.344 · 0.6)) percentage points ceteris
paribus. This translates one-to-one to a 2.1 percentage point increase in the proportion
of lies even without considering the effect of an incentive increase on lying per se.
In addition, the absolute level of the fundamental bias is shown to be positive and
independent of private incentives. Advisors with strong protected values for honesty and
prosocial concerns are slightly less fundamentally biased than their peers. Socio-economic
and demographic characteristics hardly have an effect on the magnitude of the biases
except that religious people are significantly more (negatively) biased in total.
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Table 1.4: Determinants of the bias decomposition in investment consulting
Dependent variable: Total bias Fundamental bias Self-deceptive bias
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ECOST 0.734*** 1.208*** 0.115 0.105 0.619** 1.103**
(0.263) (0.413) (0.230) (0.455) (0.284) (0.485)
ECOST2 -0.446** -0.446** -0.102 -0.102 -0.344 -0.344
(0.197) (0.197) (0.167) (0.167) (0.214) (0.215)
Sex 0.007 0.007 0.037 0.037 -0.030 -0.030
(0.053) (0.053) (0.082) (0.082) (0.088) (0.088)
Age 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 -0.002 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Education -0.048 -0.048 -0.046 -0.046 -0.002 -0.002
(0.037) (0.037) (0.052) (0.052) (0.056) (0.056)
Income 0.018 0.018 0.021 0.021 -0.003 -0.003
(0.019) (0.019) (0.027) (0.027) (0.032) (0.032)
Religion -0.123** -0.123** 0.019 0.019 -0.142 -0.142
(0.056) (0.056) (0.089) (0.089) (0.092) (0.092)
PV 0.039 0.080* 0.065* 0.068 -0.026 0.011
(0.026) (0.043) (0.036) (0.042) (0.041) (0.047)
ECOST × PV -0.067 -0.005 -0.062
(0.048) (0.041) (0.052)
Prosoc 0.006 0.040 0.044 0.038 -0.038 0.002
(0.014) (0.028) (0.028) (0.036) (0.029) (0.037)
ECOST × Prosoc -0.057* 0.010 -0.067
(0.033) (0.036) (0.044)
Numskill -0.026 -0.026 -0.008 -0.008 -0.017 -0.017
(0.023) (0.024) (0.031) (0.031) (0.036) (0.036)
Constant -0.484** -0.769** -0.656** -0.650* 0.172 -0.119
(0.202) (0.299) (0.254) (0.328) (0.262) (0.315)
Observations 960 960 960 960 960 960
Number of participants 96 96 96 96 96 96
R-squared 0.051 0.054 0.044 0.044 0.034 0.036
This table presents coefficients of OLS regressions. The dependent variables are the total bias in columns
(1) and (2), the fundamental bias in columns (3) and (4), and the self-deceptive bias in columns (5) and
(6). The total bias is computed as AUT−EX:A, the fundamental bias as EX:R−EX:A, and the self-
deceptive bias as AUT−EX:R. ECOST denotes economic costs of stating the truth, i.e., the monetary
incentives to recommend a bad investment opportunity. Sex is a binary variable taking the value one
if the participant reports to be male, and zero if female. Education takes the following values: 0: No
schooling, 1: Elementary school, 2: High school, 3: Undergraduate degree, 4: Graduate school. Income
reflects yearly household income and takes the following values: 1: < $20′000, 2: $20′000 − 39′999, 3:
$40′000 − 59′999, 4: $60′000 − 79′999, 5: $80′000 − 99′999, 6: > $100′000. Religion denotes a binary
variable which takes the value one if the participant indicates to belong either to Christianity, Islam,
Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism or a Folk religion, and zero else. PV reflects an index of protected values
for honesty. Prosoc captures prosocial concerns. Numskill is the number of correctly solved numerical
patterns in the logical test. Robust standard errors are obtained by clustering at the individual level and
appear in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Figure 1.7 provides the cross-section of self-deceptive biases within the population
aggregated over all decisions (in AUT) and incentive levels. I find the distribution to
peak at zero and to have a slightly negative mean. On average 30% of the advisors do
not feature self-deceptive tendencies.
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Figure 1.7: Cross-section of self-deceptive biases in investment consulting. The self-
deceptive bias is computed as the difference between behavior in AUT and EX:R averaged over
all ECOST levels.
In order to further investigate participants’ engagement in self-deception, I now analyze
the effect of restricting self-deception. I compare lying in AUT where self-deception
is possible to lying in EX:R where it is limited. Table 1.5 provides evidence that the
induction of every advisor’s individual revealed belief increases lying for low ECOST and
decreases lying for high levels of ECOST. In other words, advisors engage in self-deception
in AUT if they are allowed to form their first-order beliefs about clients autonomously.
As a consequence of self-deception, they recommend bad investments that are linked to
private benefits less often if the private incentives are low but more if the incentives to
do so are high compared to the situation where they are informed that clients will choose
the recommended investment opportunity exactly as often as they think.
From a social perspective it might be interesting to analyze whether providing better-
informed parties with information about descriptive average behavior of the less-informed
party is welfare enhancing. Providing this would be easy and cost-efficient in many
settings. However, whether exogenously inducing the correct first-order belief per se
might reduce lying depends on the sign of the total bias. If the total bias is positive,
making the actual following rate of the uninformed party public will reduce unethical
behavior overall. This might be the case either if the fundamental bias is positive or if the
self-deceptive bias is positive. In this investment consulting setting the effect of limiting
self-deception (self-deceptive bias) would be dominated by the effect of people correcting
their beliefs for the fundamental bias once accurate descriptive information about clients’
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Table 1.5: Limiting self-deception in investment consulting
Dependent variable: Lie
(1) (2) (3)
ECOST 2.600*** 3.079*** 4.779**
(0.828) (0.867) (2.035)
ECOST2 -1.164** -1.151* -1.047*
(0.593) (0.594) (0.570)
EX:R 0.070 0.639*** 0.632***
(0.196) (0.226) (0.219)
ECOST × EX:R -0.978*** -0.977***
(0.301) (0.307)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Interactions No No Yes
Observations 1,920 1,920 1,920
Number of participants 96 96 96
(Pseudo) R2 0.090 0.093 0.095
This table presents coefficients of logit regressions. The dependent variable is the binary variable Lie which
takes the value one if the advisor behaves unethically, and zero else. ECOST denotes economic costs of
stating the truth, i.e., the monetary incentives to recommend a bad investment opportunity. EX:R is a
binary variable variable which takes the value one in EX:R where every advisor’s revealed belief is induced.
Controls include Sex, Age, Education, Income, Religion, PV, Prosoc, and Numskill. Interactions indicates
interaction terms of PV and Prosoc with ECOST. Robust standard errors are obtained by clustering at
the individual level and appear in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
behavior was released. Despite the positive self-deceptive bias for high ECOST levels, the
fundamental bias is still too pronounced implying the total bias to be negative. Hence,
making descriptive information about average behavior of clients public still leads to an
increase in deceitful investment recommendations. However, this must not necessarily be
the case in other environments where people behave unethically. This study suggests that
releasing descriptive information about the actual behavior of the uninformed party to
have a positive effect on truth-telling whenever the better-informed party’s fundamental
bias is not too big and incentives to behave unethically are substantial.
1.4.4 Payoff Implications
Does advisors’ engagement in self-deception increase their payoff? There are two main
drivers that might trigger advisors to use motivated beliefs: on the one hand, the chance
of a higher expected payoff and, on the other hand, smaller ethical concerns. While
I am able to measure the likelihood of a higher payoff, I cannot directly assess moral
costs without postulating assumptions about the functional specification. As a result, I
focus on analyzing the effect of self-deception on compensation. I measure the effect on
economic success in two ways: (i) a binary variable (High Payoff AUT) that captures
whether the advisor ended up in the high payoff state, and (ii) the advisor’s behavior-
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implied compensation in AUT (Payoff AUT). Whereas (i) controls for the specifics of
the herein considered payoff matrices, (ii) allows to infer the absolute effect on monetary
compensation.
Table 1.6 provides evidence that engaging in self-deception significantly increases ad-
visors’ chance of ending up in the most favorable state and hence also their payoff. The
effect of the self-deceptive bias on people’s payoff is positive and slightly concave. For
advisors with a positive self-deceptive bias, an additional increase of their bias implies a
smaller payoff gain than the same increase for an unbiased advisor. For advisors expe-
riencing a negative self-deceptive bias, however, further enlarging their bias is costly.
With regards to the fundamental bias, I find the coefficient on the squared term to be
negative and statistically significant implying that advisors with a non-zero fundamental
bias lose money regardless of the direction of the bias. The greater the absolute magnitude
of the fundamental bias, the lower is the achieved payoff. Similarly, advisors with strong
protected values for honesty are earning significantly less because they report honestly
more often. An increase of one unit in the 7-point Likert scale leads to a payoff reduction
of up to $0.10.
Next, I analyze the effective impact of self-deception on participants’ payoffs. I match
advisor behavior in EX:R, where self-deception is limited, to client behavior in AUT and
derive the resulting payoffs. As a consequence, I can compare the payoffs of advisors and
clients in AUT to the payoffs they would have achieved if the advisors played the same
decisions without any self-deceptive bias. The resulting differences in payoffs and the
different chances of ending up with a higher payoff per se are shown in Figure 1.8.
The left-hand side of Figure 1.8 plots the differences in payoffs due to self-deception
for advisors and clients. For the lowest ECOST level of $0.20 each advisor loses $0.03 per
decision while the client gains $0.18. Increasing ECOST shifts this relationship as advis-
ors’ self-deceptive bias is increasing as well. As a result, if ECOST equals $1.00 advisors
gain $0.04 and clients lose $0.03 per decision, respectively. However, this asymmetric ten-
dency between advisor and client payoffs is caused by the choice of the payoff matrices,
which hold the differences between advisor and client payoffs constant across all ECOST
levels in order to control for possible inequity aversion of the advisor. This implies that
the client’s potential gains are negatively related to the advisor’s and are also larger in
magnitude. As a consequence, the average total payoff (advisor plus client) exhibits a
U-shape in ECOST and is positive for most levels of the private incentives to recommend
a bad investment opportunity. Advisors’ engagement in self-deception is hence welfare
enhancing in this experiment. Whether this effect is solely driven by the specific payoff
matrices used in this experiment or whether people engage in self-deception specifically
to enhance welfare may be addressed in future research.
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Figure 1.8: Payoff implications of self-deception in investment consulting. The left
plot shows the differences in payoffs due to self-deception for advisors and clients. The right
plot depicts the percentage of decisions in which a higher payoff is attained.
By contrast, considering the likelihood to be successful in achieving the high payoff,
there is, by construction, a symmetric relationship between what the advisor gains and
the client loses or vice versa (see right-hand side of Figure 1.8). On average, advisors
(clients) end up with a lower (higher) payoff in additional 12.5% of the decisions, i.e., in
every eighth decision if ECOST equals $0.20.38 For the highest ECOST level advisors
(clients) engagement in self-deception yields a higher (lower) payoff in additional 4.2%
of all decisions or differently stated in approximately every 24th decision. Since people
usually make countless decisions every day such a slight increase or decrease in payoffs
might accumulate to a substantial gain or loss.
38 Since there are only two states in this setting, the claim to end up with a lower (higher) payoff is
equivalent to ending up in the low (high) state.
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Table 1.6: Payoff implications of self-deception in investment consulting
Logit OLS
Dependent variable: High Payoff AUT Payoff AUT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ECOST -1.158 -1.342 -2.963 39.296*** 38.713*** 21.601
(1.121) (1.143) (2.301) (13.444) (13.205) (23.549)
ECOST2 0.774 0.840 0.869 -34.669*** -34.947*** -34.837***
(0.884) (0.896) (0.908) (11.357) (11.167) (11.184)
Fundamental bias -0.008 -0.345 -0.339 -0.062 -4.156 -4.088
(0.327) (0.301) (0.299) (4.200) (4.073) (4.046)
(Fundamental bias)2 -0.744** -0.762** -7.616* -7.760*
(0.314) (0.309) (4.293) (4.250)
Self-deceptive bias 0.489* 0.507* 0.526* 7.921** 7.669** 7.839**
(0.251) (0.270) (0.269) (3.282) (3.414) (3.384)
(Self-deceptive bias)2 -0.170 -0.162 -3.096 -3.006
(0.255) (0.255) (3.238) (3.254)
Sex 0.254 0.246 0.245 2.670 2.472 2.467
(0.305) (0.298) (0.298) (3.912) (3.799) (3.798)
Age -0.001 -0.006 -0.006 -0.012 -0.066 -0.066
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.230) (0.228) (0.227)
Education -0.065 -0.110 -0.111 -1.066 -1.577 -1.576
(0.232) (0.227) (0.227) (2.936) (2.849) (2.849)
Income 0.100 0.104 0.104 1.040 1.117 1.118
(0.115) (0.114) (0.114) (1.485) (1.438) (1.438)
Religion -0.236 -0.185 -0.185 -2.802 -2.164 -2.146
(0.293) (0.289) (0.290) (3.709) (3.604) (3.608)
PV -0.611*** -0.592*** -0.684** -8.489*** -8.075*** -9.301***
(0.173) (0.174) (0.289) (2.054) (2.091) (3.516)
ECOST × PV 0.151 2.045
(0.305) (3.117)
Prosoc -0.053 -0.033 -0.206 -0.880 -0.638 -2.142
(0.093) (0.089) (0.166) (1.251) (1.138) (2.228)
ECOST × Prosoc 0.288 2.515
(0.187) (2.190)
Numskill -0.040 -0.066 -0.067 0.144 -0.231 -0.232
(0.133) (0.138) (0.139) (1.664) (1.688) (1.689)
Constant 3.710*** 4.135*** 5.112*** 156.435*** 160.121*** 170.345***
(1.148) (1.152) (1.690) (14.654) (14.276) (20.153)
Observations 960 960 960 960 960 960
Number of participants 96 96 96 96 96 96
R-squared 0.084 0.099 0.101 0.109 0.122 0.123
This table presents coefficients of logit regressions in columns (1), (2) and (3), and OLS regressions in
columns (4), (5) and (6). The dependent variable in columns (1), (2) and (3) is High Payoff AUT which is
a binary variable that takes the value one whenever the advisor ended up in the high payoff state in AUT,
and zero else. The dependent variable in columns (4), (5) and (6) is the payoff in cents in each round in
AUT. ECOST denotes economic costs of stating the truth, i.e., the monetary incentives to recommend
a bad investment opportunity. The fundamental bias corresponds to EX:R−EX:A and the self-deceptive
bias to AUT−EX:R. Sex, Education, Income, and Religion are as defined above. PV reflects an index
of protected values for honesty. Prosoc captures prosocial concerns. Numskill is the number of correctly
solved numerical patterns in the logical test. Robust standard errors are obtained by clustering at the




In order to test the general validity of the findings in the investment consulting setting, I
conduct a second experiment with a neutral framing.
1.5.1 Experimental Design
I slightly adapt a well-established sender-receiver game from the literature. À la Erat and
Gneezy (2012), nature rolls a 6-sided die in the beginning. The better-informed party (the
Sender) privately observes the outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die. In addition, the
Sender is informed about the two payoff options: Option X if the uninformed party (the
Receiver) chooses a number that coincides with the actual number from the roll of the
die, and Option Y if the Receiver chooses any number different from the actual outcome
of the roll of the 6-sided die. Knowing the payoff matrix, the Sender must send a message
about the actual outcome to the Receiver. The message space consists of six messages:
1. “The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 1.”
2. “The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 2.”
3. “The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 3.”
4. “The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 4.”
5. “The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 5.”
6. “The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 6.”
The Receiver does not (and will never) know the payoffs. He chooses one number upon
receiving the Sender’s message. The payments to both players solely depend on whether
the Receiver picked the actual outcome of the roll of the die or not.
All payoffs as well as the experimental procedure including the decision stages are
similar to the investment consulting setting in order to facilitate comparability. The
Sender’s payoff is maximized if the Receiver chooses any other number than the actual
outcome of the roll of the die, hence she has incentives to tell a wrong number and thereby
lie in order to maximize her payoff.
1.5.2 Data
I recruited 300 additional US participants on mTurk. The subjects are required to have
similar qualifications as in the investment consulting experiment, i.e., successfully com-
pleted at least 1000 human intelligence tasks (HITs) with an overall approval rate of more
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than 95%. In addition, there are two understanding questions. The first understanding
question was adequately solved by 63% of all participants. 97% were able to answer the
second question correctly and thereby showed that they understood the mechanisms of
the game perfectly.39
The sample consists of 54% men and 46% women from 19 to 67 years with highest
completed education from high school to graduate school. The median participant is
33 years old, holds an undergraduate degree and has a household income of $50′000
just like in the investment consulting experiment. Participants’ earnings were a $0.25
show-up fee plus an average bonus of about $2.86 for advisors and $1.73 for clients.
Table 1.7 summarizes the sample’s descriptive statistics. In order to derive revealed
first-order beliefs according to the methodology of Andreoni and Sanchez (2014), I apply
similar exclusion criteria to refine the sample as in the investment consulting experiment,
i.e., I drop participants who switch multiple times between preferring the lottery and
the outcome of the game, and those who always prefer the lottery or the outcome of
the game. In total, 37 participants are excluded. For the sake of brevity, I do neither
discuss descriptive statistics of stated and revealed beliefs nor their relationship in the
neutral setting but refer to Figure 1.C.3 and Figure 1.C.4 in Appendix 1.C for a detailed
illustration.
1.5.3 Unethical Behavior in the Neutral Setting
Overall, dishonesty in AUT ranges from 50.4% for ECOST of $0.20 to 81.9% for ECOST
of $1.00 (see Figure 1.9). This compares to a proportion of lies between 43.2% and
72.9% in the investment consulting experiment in Section 1.4. Lying is also slightly more
pronounced than in Erat and Gneezy’s (2012) underlying study, which observes lying rates
from 43% to 76% depending on the considered payoff matrices. However, they find the
lowest proportion of lies (43%) in the case of altruistic white lies, i.e., when the Sender
lies (at a small cost) in order to increase the Receiver’s payoff by a substantial amount.
The payoff matrices in this paper do not consider white lies. It is therefore unsurprising
that I find slightly more lying than Erat and Gneezy (2012). The proportion of lies is
increasing in ECOST and flattening for higher incentive levels.
Table 1.8 confirms the evidence of the investment consulting setting. Lying is signi-
ficantly increasing and concave in the incentives provided to lying. In addition, I find
lying to be significantly decreasing in the Sender’s stated first-order belief indicating that
lying costs might be increasing in the first-order belief. If the first-order belief did not
have an effect on lying costs, a Sender’s expected payoff would be increasing in the first-
39 All findings are robust to the exclusion of participants who did not answer the understanding questions
adequately.
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Table 1.7: Descriptive statistics - Neutral setting
Mean Std. Min Max Obs.
Sex 0.54 0.50 0 1 300
Age 35.50 10.39 19 67 300
Education 2.77 0.64 2 4 300
Income 2.91 1.45 0 6 300
Religion 0.46 0.50 0 1 300
PV 4.28 1.09 1.56 7.00 300
Prosoc 3.49 1.83 1.00 7.00 300
Stated belief 0.49 0.26 0.00 1.00 150
Revealed belief 0.46 0.24 0.00 1.00 113
Numskill 1.6 1.31 0 6 300
Bonus 2.29 0.78 0.60 3.90 300
This table shows descriptive statistics for all Senders and Receivers. Sex is a binary variable taking the
value one if the participant reports to be male, and zero if female. Education corresponds to the highest
completed education stage and takes the following values: 0: No schooling, 1: Elementary school, 2:
High school, 3: Undergraduate degree, 4: Graduate school. Income reflects yearly household income and
takes the following values: 1: < $20′000, 2: $20′000 − 39′999, 3: $40′000 − 59′999, 4: $60′000 − 79′999,
5: $80′000 − 99′999, 6: > $100′000. Religion denotes a binary variable which takes the value one if
the participant indicates to belong either to Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism or a
Folk religion, and zero else. PV reflects an index of protected values for honesty borrowed from Tanner
et al. (2009). Prosoc is an index capturing prosocial concerns. The full set of questions is depicted in
Appendix 1.D. Stated belief is the advisor’s self-reported first-order belief about the client’s behavior.
Revealed belief reflects the action-implied first-order belief according to the methodology of Andreoni
and Sanchez (2014). Numskill is the number of correctly solved numerical patterns in the logical test.
Bonus corresponds to the variable payoff achieved.







Figure 1.9: Lying in AUT across ECOST levels in the neutral setting. Each circle
corresponds to the average proportion of lies in two situations with similar ECOST.
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Table 1.8: Determinants of lying behavior in the neutral setting
Dependent variable: Lie
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ECOST 1.735*** 6.271*** 1.819*** 6.238*** 2.006*** 8.162***
(0.240) (1.767) (0.254) (1.844) (0.309) (2.270)
ECOST2 -2.224*** -2.349*** -3.541***
(0.837) (0.878) (0.957)
Stated belief -1.525*** -1.531***
(0.454) (0.457)
Revealed belief 0.646 0.642
(0.557) (0.564)
Sex -0.251 -0.253 -0.191 -0.192 -0.302 -0.305
(0.282) (0.284) (0.284) (0.286) (0.320) (0.325)
Age -0.032** -0.032** -0.031** -0.031** -0.037** -0.038**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017)
Education -0.247 -0.253 -0.241 -0.248 -0.060 -0.065
(0.234) (0.236) (0.211) (0.214) (0.272) (0.277)
Income 0.047 0.049 0.003 0.004 -0.019 -0.020
(0.099) (0.100) (0.103) (0.103) (0.108) (0.110)
Religion -0.277 -0.276 -0.093 -0.092 -0.158 -0.153
(0.286) (0.288) (0.289) (0.290) (0.320) (0.325)
PV -0.561*** -0.278 -0.552*** -0.290 -0.627*** -0.282
(0.190) (0.194) (0.184) (0.203) (0.225) (0.250)
ECOST × PV -0.510* -0.470 -0.637*
(0.283) (0.298) (0.373)
Prosoc -0.044 -0.060 -0.085 -0.115 -0.116 -0.201
(0.105) (0.114) (0.106) (0.120) (0.107) (0.156)
ECOST × Prosoc 0.030 0.057 0.151
(0.157) (0.164) (0.198)
Numskill 0.064 0.068 0.038 0.042 0.094 0.101
(0.092) (0.093) (0.090) (0.091) (0.103) (0.106)
Constant 4.126*** 2.486* 4.915*** 3.379** 4.042*** 2.082
(1.216) (1.331) (1.179) (1.377) (1.314) (1.615)
Observations 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,130 1,130
Number of participants 150 150 150 150 113 113
(Pseudo) R2 0.092 0.098 0.126 0.131 0.106 0.119
This table presents coefficients of logit regressions in AUT. The dependent variable is the binary variable
Lie which takes the value one if the Sender tells a lie, and zero else. ECOST denotes economic costs of
stating the truth, i.e., the monetary incentives to lie. Stated belief reflects the Sender’s stated first-order
belief about the likelihood that the client’s action will match the message received. Revealed belief denotes
the Sender’s first-order belief as implied by the methodology of Andreoni and Sanchez (2014). Sex is a
binary variable taking the value one if the participant reports to be male, and zero if female. Education
takes the following values: 0: No schooling, 1: Elementary school, 2: High school, 3: Undergraduate
degree, 4: Graduate school. Income reflects yearly household Income and takes the following values:
1: < $20′000, 2: $20′000 − 39′999, 3: $40′000 − 59′999, 4: $60′000 − 79′999, 5: $80′000 − 99′999, 6:
> $100′000. Religion denotes a binary variable which takes the value one if the participant indicates
to belong either to Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism or a Folk religion, and zero else.
Numskill is the number of correctly solved numerical patterns in the logical test. PV reflects an index of
protected values for honesty. Prosoc captures prosocial concerns. Robust standard errors are obtained
by clustering at the individual level and appear in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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order belief and hence one would also expect lying to be increasing in the belief. Another
possibility is that Senders actively misstate their beliefs in order to pretend to be more
ethical. As a result, Senders who lie often would state low beliefs and honest Senders
high beliefs, hence yielding the negative relationship between first-order beliefs and lying.
The positive (but not significant) effect of the revealed first-order belief on lying indicates
that, in fact, people misstate their beliefs, leading to an inverse relation between lying
and stated beliefs.
Moreover, the proportion of lies is decreasing in age suggesting that older Senders
lie less often. By contrast, in the investment consulting setting older advisors do not
behave unethically less often. Protected values, the interaction term with ECOST, and
preferences for prosocial concerns are negatively related to lying.
1.5.4 Bias Decomposition in the Neutral Setting
In Figure 1.10, I conduct the bias decomposition based on behavior for the three relevant
cases: AUT where Senders might self-deceive, EX:A where the correct following rate
(89.4%) is stated,40 and EX:R where each Sender’s revealed belief is induced. The total
bias equals AUT−EX:A, the fundamental bias is EX:R−EX:A, and the self-deceptive bias
reflects AUT−EX:R.
Figure 1.10 shows similar but slightly more pronounced patterns as Figure 1.6 in the
investment consulting case. While the total bias decreases from 25.7 to 5.3 percentage
points in absolute terms, the self-deceptive bias increases from −13.7 to 12.0 percentage
points being significantly different from zero at both ends. The fundamental bias stays
roughly constant around minus 15 percentage points.
Table 1.9 further generalizes the findings from the investment consulting experiment.
The total bias is non-linearly decreasing in ECOST because of an increasing self-deceptive
bias whose effect slightly dampens for greater levels of ECOST. As predicted, the funda-
mental bias is not sensitive to the incentives provided to lie as the payoffs are unknown
to the Receiver. Overall, the results in the neutral setting are more pronounced than in
investment consulting. Presumably, the investment consulting setting is more complex to
understand producing slightly more noise.
In addition, I find the self-deceptive bias to be decreasing in the degree of education and
religious beliefs. Well-educated and religious participants are less prone to self-deceptive
practices (if incentives are large). Measures for protected values for honesty and preferen-
ces for prosocial concerns have no significant impact. The distribution of self-deceptive
40 Since I only have behavioral data for 21 different induced beliefs, I use the induced belief that is closest
to the actual following rate. The closest available induced belief is 90%.
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Figure 1.10: Lying in AUT, EX:A and EX:R (left), and the bias decomposition
in the neutral setting (right). Circles indicate the proportion of lies for given ECOST in
AUT. Crosses correspond to the proportion of lies in EX:A, and asterisks denote the proportion
of lies in EX:R. The fundamental bias is computed as EX:R−EX:A. The self-deceptive bias
corresponds to AUT−EX:R. The total bias equals the sum of fundamental and self-deceptive
bias.
biases is illustrated in Figure 1.11. Almost 30% of the Senders have on average no self-
deceptive bias.
Finally, I analyze the effect of limiting self-deception on lying by comparing behavior
in AUT and EX:R. Table 1.10 provides additional evidence that the Senders engage in
self-deception by distorting their first-order beliefs about the Receivers’ behavior. The
effect of inducing the revealed first-order belief on lying is slightly positive for small
incentives but decreases sharply for higher ECOST. If incentives are moderate the effect
on lying is significantly negative. As a result, self-deception leads to increased dishonesty
if incentives to behave unethically are substantial.
1.5.5 Payoff Implications in the Neutral Setting
Table 1.11 analyzes the impact of self-deception on participants’ success and consequently
their compensation. The first dependent variable “High Payoff AUT” measures whether
the Sender managed to receive the maximum payoff, i.e., whether the Sender’s message
led the Receiver to choose a wrong number. It takes the value one whenever the Sender is
successful in maximizing her payoff, and zero else. The second dependent variable “Payoff
AUT” denotes the effective payoff the Sender achieved in AUT.
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Table 1.9: Determinants of the bias decomposition in the neutral setting
Dependent variable: Total bias Fundamental bias Self-deceptive bias
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ECOST 0.856*** 1.060** -0.120 -0.145 0.976*** 1.204**
(0.259) (0.432) (0.159) (0.325) (0.263) (0.480)
ECOST2 -0.521*** -0.521*** 0.063 0.063 -0.585*** -0.585***
(0.196) (0.196) (0.116) (0.116) (0.197) (0.198)
Sex 0.030 0.030 0.098 0.098 -0.068 -0.068
(0.055) (0.055) (0.074) (0.074) (0.073) (0.073)
Age -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Education -0.023 -0.023 0.090 0.090 -0.114* -0.114*
(0.035) (0.035) (0.055) (0.055) (0.060) (0.060)
Income -0.003 -0.003 -0.000 -0.000 -0.003 -0.003
(0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021)
Religion 0.010 0.010 0.150** 0.150** -0.140** -0.140**
(0.058) (0.058) (0.072) (0.072) (0.069) (0.069)
PV 0.003 0.027 0.049 0.053 -0.046 -0.025
(0.024) (0.048) (0.043) (0.050) (0.042) (0.053)
ECOST × PV -0.041 -0.007 -0.034
(0.059) (0.045) (0.063)
Prosoc -0.006 0.002 -0.022 -0.031 0.016 0.034
(0.019) (0.028) (0.022) (0.027) (0.024) (0.034)
ECOST × Prosoc -0.014 0.015 -0.029
(0.034) (0.033) (0.046)
Numskill 0.006 0.006 -0.027 -0.027 0.033 0.033
(0.015) (0.015) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027)
Constant -0.198 -0.320 -0.450 -0.436 0.253 0.116
(0.243) (0.337) (0.334) (0.367) (0.346) (0.398)
Observations 1,130 1,130 1,130 1,130 1,130 1,130
Number of participants 113 113 113 113 113 113
R-squared 0.039 0.039 0.065 0.066 0.078 0.079
This table presents coefficients of OLS regressions. The dependent variables are the total bias in columns
(1) and (2), the fundamental bias in columns (3) and (4), and the self-deceptive bias in columns (5) and
(6). The total bias is computed as AUT−EX:A, the fundamental bias as EX:R−EX:A, and the self-
deceptive bias as AUT−EX:R. ECOST denotes economic costs of stating the truth, i.e., the monetary
incentives to lie. Sex is a binary variable taking the value one if the participant reports to be male, and
zero if female. Education takes the following values: 0: No schooling, 1: Elementary school, 2: High
school, 3: Undergraduate degree, 4: Graduate school. Income reflects yearly household income and takes
the following values: 1: < $20′000, 2: $20′000 − 39′999, 3: $40′000 − 59′999, 4: $60′000 − 79′999, 5:
$80′000 − 99′999, 6: > $100′000. Religion denotes a binary variable which takes the value one if the
participant indicates to belong either to Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism or a Folk
religion, and zero else. PV reflects an index of protected values for honesty. Prosoc captures prosocial
concerns. Numskill is the number of correctly solved numerical patterns in the logical test. Robust
standard errors are obtained by clustering at the individual level and appear in parentheses. ***, **, and
* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 1.11 provides evidence that a Sender’s payoff is significantly increasing in her
self-deceptive bias. By contrast, a large fundamental bias in absolute terms leads to a
decrease in success since it is negative for most Senders and incentive levels. I also find
that people who lie less often, i.e., older and those with strong protected values for honesty,
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Figure 1.11: Cross-section of self-deceptive biases in the neutral setting. The self-
deceptive bias is computed as the difference between behavior in AUT and EX:R averaged over
all ECOST levels.
Table 1.10: Limiting self-deception in the neutral setting
Dependent variable: Lie
(1) (2) (3)
ECOST 3.765*** 4.411*** 4.943***
(0.708) (0.727) (1.320)
ECOST2 -2.253*** -2.139*** -2.079***
(0.535) (0.543) (0.540)
EX:R -0.205 0.630*** 0.634***
(0.183) (0.227) (0.225)
ECOST × EX:R -1.471*** -1.487***
(0.306) (0.307)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Interactions No No Yes
Observations 2,260 2,260 2,260
Number of participants 113 113 113
(Pseudo) R2 0.054 0.061 0.064
This table presents coefficients of logit regressions. The dependent variable is the binary variable Lie
which takes the value one if the Sender tells a lie, and zero else. ECOST denotes economic costs of
stating the truth, i.e., the monetary incentives to lie. EX:R is a binary variable variable which takes the
value one in EX:R where every Sender’s revealed belief is induced. Controls include Sex, Age, Education,
Income, Religion, PV, Prosoc, and Numskill. Interactions indicates interaction terms of PV and Prosoc
with ECOST. Robust standard errors are obtained by clustering at the individual level and appear in
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
achieve lower payoffs due to the characteristics of the payoff matrices. In order to provide
incentives to behave unethically, the expected return of lying is positive as long as the
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first-order belief is greater than 1/6.
Next, I match Sender behavior in EX:R to Receiver behavior in AUT and derive the
resulting payoffs. As a consequence, I can compare the payoffs in AUT to the payoffs
they would have achieved if they played without any self-deceptive bias, i.e., as in EX:R.
Figure 1.12 shows the differences in payoffs between AUT and EX:R, and the effect of
self-deception on the compensation of Senders and Receivers.












Figure 1.12: Payoff implications of self-deception in the neutral setting. The left plot
shows the differences in payoffs due to self-deception for Senders and Receivers. The right plot
depicts the percentage of decisions in which a higher payoff is attained.
Self-deception decreases the Sender’s payoff by $0.03 per decision if ECOST is $0.20
and increases it by $0.12 if ECOST equals $1.00. In contrast, the Receiver gains $0.17
per decision for the lowest ECOST level and loses $0.07 for the highest incentive level.
Combined, self-deception increases the total surplus for very low and very high incentives
to lie. Analogously, by engaging in self-deception the Sender ends up in the best state in
additional 12.4% of all decisions with ECOST of $1.00, i.e., in every eight decision.
Since all results regarding biases and engagement in self-deception are consistent with
the investment advisory setting, the findings in the neutral setting suggest that all results
may also be valid in more general situations where lying takes place and not only in the
specific case of investment advisory. Thanks to the general structure of the experiments,
this paper’s findings may also transfer to many other applications with a similar envi-
ronment such as dishonest communication of CEOs, physicians recommending specific
medication or a salesperson selling credence goods.
46 When Self-deception Promotes Unethical Advice
Table 1.11: Payoff implications of self-deception in the neutral setting
Logit OLS
Dependent variable: High Payoff AUT Payoff AUT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ECOST -3.186*** -3.289*** -3.774** 36.067*** 35.930*** 33.933**
(1.215) (1.247) (1.848) (11.872) (11.940) (16.478)
ECOST2 2.152** 2.218** 2.230** -34.379*** -34.312*** -34.348***
(0.962) (0.983) (0.985) (9.820) (9.848) (9.856)
Fundamental bias 0.645** 0.508* 0.512* 7.355** 6.630** 6.684**
(0.305) (0.282) (0.282) (3.352) (3.249) (3.244)
(Fundamental bias)2 -0.402 -0.406 -3.020 -3.043
(0.268) (0.267) (2.823) (2.816)
Self-deceptive bias 0.696*** 0.790*** 0.795*** 8.484*** 9.220*** 9.231***
(0.242) (0.281) (0.281) (2.814) (3.037) (3.032)
(Self-deceptive bias)2 0.096 0.104 1.330 1.435
(0.257) (0.258) (2.727) (2.738)
Sex -0.220 -0.206 -0.205 -1.922 -1.825 -1.827
(0.282) (0.281) (0.281) (3.178) (3.173) (3.175)
Age -0.033** -0.032** -0.032** -0.335* -0.329* -0.329*
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.178) (0.179) (0.180)
Education -0.065 -0.064 -0.064 -0.943 -0.937 -0.940
(0.253) (0.258) (0.258) (2.753) (2.765) (2.767)
Income -0.038 -0.034 -0.033 -0.512 -0.459 -0.458
(0.096) (0.094) (0.094) (1.082) (1.081) (1.082)
Religion -0.240 -0.218 -0.217 -2.299 -2.133 -2.138
(0.288) (0.285) (0.285) (3.267) (3.235) (3.238)
PV -0.547*** -0.563*** -0.656** -6.460** -6.503** -7.372**
(0.210) (0.211) (0.292) (2.581) (2.569) (3.432)
ECOST × PV 0.151 1.455
(0.235) (2.304)
Prosoc -0.043 -0.047 -0.022 -0.178 -0.188 0.446
(0.094) (0.092) (0.137) (1.007) (0.990) (1.349)
ECOST × Prosoc -0.041 -1.057
(0.152) (1.284)
Numskill 0.101 0.097 0.097 1.193 1.156 1.157
(0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.957) (0.958) (0.959)
Constant 5.925*** 6.017*** 6.307*** 167.313*** 167.277*** 168.478***
(1.184) (1.193) (1.499) (13.634) (13.612) (16.250)
Observations 1,130 1,130 1,130 1,130 1,130 1,130
Number of participants 113 113 113 113 113 113
R-squared 0.073 0.076 0.076 0.077 0.078 0.079
This table presents coefficients of logit regressions in columns (1), (2) and (3), and OLS regressions in
columns (4), (5) and (6). The dependent variable in columns (1), (2) and (3) is High Payoff AUT which is
a binary variable that takes the value one whenever the Sender ended up in the high payoff state in AUT,
and zero else. The dependent variable in columns (4), (5) and (6) is the payoff in cents in each round
from AUT. The fundamental bias corresponds to EX:R−EX:A and the self-deceptive bias to AUT−EX:R.
ECOST denotes economic costs of stating the truth, i.e., the monetary incentives to lie. Sex, Education,
Income, and Religion are as defined above. PV reflects an index of protected values for honesty. Prosoc
captures prosocial concerns. Numskill is the number of correctly solved numerical patterns in the logical
test. Robust standard errors are obtained by clustering at the individual level and appear in parentheses.
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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1.6 Conclusion
This paper studies self-deception to promote unethical advice by distorting one’s own
belief about how other people behave. My findings provide evidence that people’s beliefs
are biased and that these biases influence unethical behavior. In order to investigate
whether people’s biases are caused by the general inability to assess others’ behavior
per se or by people self-deceiving themselves by using motivated beliefs, I construct an
experimental methodology to decompose this bias into two components: a fundamental
(incentive-independent) bias, which is caused by lack of knowledge, and a self-deceptive
bias, which is caused by motivated beliefs and might depend on the magnitude of private
monetary benefits associated with unethical behavior.
I find that people engage in self-deception and show the self-deceptive bias to be
increasing in the private incentives provided to behave unethically. By engaging in self-
deception, the deceiver gains money in every decision if the monetary incentives to lie
are high and loses if the incentives are small. Being fundamentally biased leads to fi-
nancial losses regardless of the direction of the bias. Setting up an environment where
self-deception is limited might thus promote truth-telling among individuals. Whether
releasing descriptive information about behavior per se reduces lying also depends on the
average fundamental bias of the population. This paper suggests that in an environment
where the fundamental bias is comparably small and the incentives to lie are relatively
high, simply providing descriptive behavioral information to the informed party is enough
to cost-efficiently foster ethical behavior.
This study’s findings hold in a general strategic information transmission setting as
well as in a specific application to investment consulting and hence suggest that self-
deceptive biases are important in a broad range of environments where lying and more
generally unethical behavior takes place. Although I find self-deception to have a signifi-
cant and economically relevant effect on truth-telling, this experimental design does not
allow to quantify the degree to which individuals bias their beliefs as this needed further
assumptions on the structural form of people’s moral costs. I leave the quantification of
the adjustments in individual beliefs to further research.
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Appendices
1.A Appendix A: A Model of Self-deception
My model builds on a simplified setting of Crawford and Sobel’s (1982) strategic informa-
tion transmission framework. I assume that after the better-informed player (the advisor
or more generally, and henceforth, the Sender) privately learns the state of the world,
she is allowed to send a message about the state to the uninformed player (the client or
more generally the Receiver) before the latter takes an action which determines the payoff
of both players. The Sender is said to lie if her statement does not match her private
information. In the investment consulting experiment this corresponds to an advisor not
recommending the investment, which she knows to dominate the other investment op-
portunities. People supposedly trade off the monetary benefits of lying against the moral
costs of unethical behavior when making their decisions. I propose an extended utility
specification capturing moral costs, which can be separated into two terms: First, the
cost of behaving unethically per se and second, a term that derives from the negative
consequences imposed on others. The structure allows for many popular specifications in
the literature.
Intuitively, the higher the probability that the Receiver will believe the Sender’s mes-
sage and choose the corresponding action, the more painful it is for a Sender to tell a lie.
The Sender’s estimate of this probability is her first-order belief. Due to the subjectivity
of this first-order belief, a Sender may engage in self-deception by under- or overestima-
ting the respective probability. The model allows for such self-deceptive strategies while
not drastically restricting the composition of moral costs.41
1.A.1 Strategic Information Transmission
I focus on strategic information transmission games with two players. Each game features
a 2-by-2 payoff matrix only known to the Sender. The information structure of the game
(in contrast to the payoff structure) is common knowledge. Let Θ, M, and A be discrete
and finite sets. The Sender privately observes a realization θ ∈ Θ. Then, the Sender is
asked to transmit a single message m ∈ M to the Receiver. By definition, any message
in M is non-binding and non-verifiable. Based on this message, the Receiver takes an
action a ∈ A which determines the welfare of all parties. The mapping σ : Θ → M is a
41 The model is related to Rabin (1995) who studies self-serving biases in the context of fairness concerns
and argues that an individual may engage in costly self-deception in order to legitimize selfish behavior.
However, the model does not feature strategic information transmission between players.
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strategy for the Sender and α : M → A for the Receiver. Let the Sender enjoy utility
U (a, θ,m, ω, β) = ΠS(a, θ) − Ψ (a, θ,m, ω, β)✶m6=θ,
where ΠS denotes the Sender’s payoff function in a given state. For convenience utility
is assumed to be continuous and twice-differentiable in its arguments. I posit a simple
linear and additively separable utility function. The term Ψ(·)✶m6=θ corresponds to the
total moral costs a Sender incurs if she reports dishonestly. The indicator function is
equal to one if message m does not coincide with the state θ (i.e., if she tells a lie), and
zero else. Note that Ψ(·) does not necessarily depend on m and might also depend on
additional parameters.
1.A.2 Moral Costs
I consider the total moral or lying costs Ψ(·) to be additively separable in two terms: (i)
the cost of behaving unethically per se and (ii) the cost of misleading other players. While
(i), once a player has chosen to lie, only depends on the structural form of the moral costs,
(ii) adds an additional cost, which depends on the subjective probability that the message
will indeed mislead the other player and thus impose pain on others.42
I postulate the following structural form
Ψ(a, θ,m, ω, β) = ω ψ (a, θ,m)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(i)
+(1 − ω) f (β(α(m) = m), ψ (a, θ,m))︸ ︷︷ ︸
(ii)
, (1.A.1)
where ψ(·) denotes individual-specific moral costs and f(·) is a function of the first-order
belief and the individual-specific moral costs with ∂f(·)/∂β > 0. ω ∈ [0, 1] denotes the
weight she puts on term (i) relative to (ii), and β(α(m) = m) ∈ [0, 1] the first-order belief
the Sender assigns to the Receiver’s strategy α(m) = m, i.e., the probability the Sender
expects the Receiver to be credulous and to choose a = m, conditional on the reception
of m. I simplify β := β(α(m) = m). If ω = 1, Eq. (1.A.1) reduces to any given moral
cost specification in the literature.
I do not assume a specific form of the individual moral costs ψ(·).43 This setting
allows for a variety of possible preferences that come up in the literature. Abeler et al.
(2016) provide an extensive meta-study of existing explanations of lying. Most of these
motivations consider lying costs, reputation, social norms or a combination of those. Based
42 The cost of misleading the Receiver depends on the subjective probability rather than the Receiver’s
actual behavior, i.e., if he is indeed misled, as the Sender does not know whether the Receiver is going
to match her message.
43 Depending on the specification of the moral costs, several parameters may determine the structural
form. For notational simplicity, I abstract from including an exhaustive list of possible arguments.
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on an econometric analysis Bögli et al. (2017) find a combination of the same motivations
and reference-dependent preferences to explain lying behavior best in-sample and also
out-of-sample.
1.A.3 Self-deception
If there is no information about the behavior of the uninformed party, i.e., as long as the
Sender forms her belief autonomously, she might engage in self-deception by under- or
overestimating the likelihood that her behavior will mislead people. Due to the first-order
belief’s subjectivity the Sender may engage in self-deception by taking a misstated belief
β = δβ̂ for her utility computation instead. Parameter δ ∈ R+ reflects the degree of self-
deception the Sender imposes on her belief of misleading the Receiver and might depend
on several variables such as the incentives to lie or other characteristics of the decision
environment. I assume people to maximize utility conditional on being self-deceptively
biased rather than to maximize utility with respect to their degree of self-deception.
Obviously, δ < 1 (δ > 1) reflects an undervaluation (overvaluation) of the subjective
first-order belief β̂.
If δ < 1, the intuition is that the Sender underestimates the probability that the
Receiver will be misled by her message in order to reduce the expected pain her behavior
imposes on the Receiver. This will have two opposing effects: On the one hand, the
expected monetary payoff of lying per se will decrease due to the lower chance that the
Receiver chooses what the Sender recommends. On the other hand, moral costs will be
lower, as the expected harm imposed on the Receiver will be smaller. Similarly, if δ > 1
the expected monetary payoff will be higher but also the moral costs. As a result, the
net effect of self-deception depends on the characteristics of a given game and a player’s
individual preferences.
As long as there is uncertainty about the actual following rate as in AUT where
the Sender does not have any exogenous information about the actual strategy of the
other player, she may incorporate this uncertainty by self-deceiving and distorting her
(subjective) belief in order to assess the total lying costs. In case beliefs are not assessed
subjectively but provided exogenously, i.e., in EX where the Receiver’s strategy is known
to the Sender, self-deception is not supposed to take place to the same extent due to
the lack of uncertainty about the correct belief and consequently δ ≈ 1.44 Table 1.A.1
44 The parameter δ might not be exactly equal to one if first-order beliefs are provided exogenously
as people could still engage in self-deception to some degree. However, I assume the room for self-
deception to be limited once exogenous first-order beliefs are in place. This allows me to assume
without loss of generality that δ = 1. Note that, for the purpose of this paper, it would be sufficient
to assume that |δ − 1| is smaller once uncertainty is released, i.e., the parameter of self-deception is
closer to one if beliefs are provided exogenously.
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summarizes the belief formation in AUT, EX:A, and EX:R.45
Table 1.A.1: Belief formation
Self-deception Elicited/Induced belief Effective belief
δ β̂ β
AUT δ ∈ R+ β̂ = β̂rev βAUT = δβ̂rev
EX:A δ = 1 β̂ = q βEX:A = q
EX:R δ = 1 β̂ = β̂rev βEX:R = β̂rev
This table presents the belief formation in AUT, EX:A, and EX:R. δ denotes the degree of self-deception
whereas δ = 1 indicates that no self-deception takes place. β̂ corresponds to the Sender’s elicited or
induced first-order belief, i.e., the revealed belief in AUT and the induced beliefs in EX. β is the Sender’s
effective belief used to derive expected utilities. In AUT, it corresponds to the motivated belief, i.e.,
the distorted elicited belief. β̂rev denotes the Sender’s revealed belief and q equals the Receivers’ actual
following rate, i.e., the probability that the Receiver will be credulous.
Having the effective first-order belief, I now define the bias in beliefs and decompose
it into a fundamental and a self-deceptive component. Let the total bias be
∆tot ≡ βAUT − βEX:A = δβ̂rev − q, (1.A.2)
where β̂rev denotes the Sender’s revealed first-order belief and q the Receivers’ average
following rate, i.e., the probability that the Receiver chooses the action recommended in
the Sender’s message. The fundamental bias then corresponds to
∆fun ≡ βEX:R − βEX:A = β̂rev − q, (1.A.3)
i.e., the difference between the Sender’s revealed belief and the correct following rate.
Finally, the self-deceptive bias is computed as
∆sd ≡ βAUT − βEX:R = (δ − 1)β̂rev. (1.A.4)
Note that the bias in beliefs and its effect on unethical behavior must not necessarily
be parallel. A biased belief enters the expected utility maximization twice: it influences
the expected monetary payoff and it affects moral costs. Depending on the structural
form of the Sender’s moral costs, the impact of a biased belief on unethical behavior
is determined. I illustrate a possible bias decomposition where the bias in beliefs and
its effect on unethical behavior is not parallel in Figure 1.A.1. Therefore, I assume the
second partial derivative of f(·) with respect to the first-order belief to be negative, i.e.,
∂2f(·)/∂2β < 0. Given the characteristics of f(·) the proportion of lies is then U-shaped
45 Belief formation EX:S happens analogously to EX:R but with the Sender’s stated first-order belief
instead.
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in her first-order belief. As a result, the direction of the bias in beliefs is not similar to
















Figure 1.A.1: Decomposition of the bias in beliefs. The graph assigns a Sender’s effective
first-order belief β to the corresponding proportion of lies λ. ∆tot, ∆fun, and ∆sd denote the





correspond to the effect of the total, fundamental, and self-deceptive bias in beliefs on the
proportion of lies. The total bias is defined in Eq. (1.A.2), the fundamental bias in Eq. (1.A.3),
and the self-deceptive bias in Eq. (1.A.4).
In Figure 1.A.1, the Sender underestimates her first-order belief, i.e., δ < 1. As βAUT
and βEX:R are both smaller than β⋆, βAUT < βEX:R implies λAUT > λEX:R where λAUT
(λEX:R) denotes the proportion of lies in AUT (EX:R). Consequently, self-deception leads
to more lying in AUT compared to EX:R. The resulting self-deceptive bias is positive.
However, other assumptions on f(·) will produce different results.
1.A.4 Utility Maximization
I assume players to maximize expected utility with respect to their strategies. The Sen-
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When considering to lie people supposedly trade-off the economic cost of stating the
truth (Ξ or ECOST), or equivalently the marginal benefit of lying against the individual
moral costs of unethical behavior. I compute the Sender’s expected ECOST to equal
Ξ(β) :=β
(
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, (1.A.5)
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P (a = θ|a 6= m, m 6= θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:P1




where P1 (P2) is the conditional probability that the Receiver chooses a = θ (a 6= θ) given
that the Receiver does not follow and the Sender transmits message m 6= θ (m = θ),
respectively. These two probabilities depend on the characteristics of a specific game.46
The likelihood that the Sender tells a lie depends on the difference in expected utility
between lying and telling the truth as given by
Eβ
[









46 For example, the game considered in this paper features probabilities P1 = 1/5 and P2 = 1 as there
exist six messages and also six possible actions implying that even if the Receiver does not follow and
the Sender transmits a message not corresponding to the true state, the Receiver’s action will coincide
with the true state with probability one fifth only. It follows directly from Eq. (1.A.6) that lying is
expected to be less pronounced in games with high P1 + P2 as this reduces the incentives to lie. This
is consistent with the findings of Gneezy (2005) whose game features P1 = P2 = 1.
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which is equal to
Ξ(β) − Ψ (a, θ,m, ω, β) ,
and can be rewritten as
Ξ̃ (1 − (1 − β) (P1 + P2)) − ωψ(a, θ,m) − (1 − ω) f (β, ψ(a, θ,m)) .
The greater this expression, the more often will the Sender lie. As a consequence, the
sensitivity of the decision to lie with respect to the degree of self-deception is given by
∂
∂δ




which is positive if and only if




Intuitively, for individuals with ω = 1, a higher degree of self-deception will increase lying,
as it only influences the expected monetary payoff. However, if ω < 1 the structural forms
of f(·) and ψ(·) need to be known in order to determine the marginal effect of an increase
in δ.
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1.B Appendix B: Robustness: Stated First-order Be-
liefs
In order to test the robustness of the findings, I also run the whole analysis for sta-
ted instead of revealed beliefs. Taking stated beliefs as the true beliefs ignores possible
strategic misstatement of beliefs.
1.B.1 Investment Consulting
1.B.1.1 Bias Decomposition
















Figure 1.B.1: Unethical behavior in AUT, EX:A, and EX:S (left) and the bias de-
composition in investment consulting based on stated beliefs (right). Circles indicate
the proportion of lies for given ECOST in AUT. Crosses correspond to the proportion of lies in
EX:A, and squares denote the proportion of lies in EX:S. The fundamental bias is computed as
EX:S−EX:A. The self-deceptive bias corresponds to AUT−EX:S. The total bias equals the sum
of fundamental and self-deceptive bias.
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Table 1.B.1: Determinants of the biases in investment consulting based on stated
beliefs
Dependent variable: Total bias Fundamental bias Self-deceptive bias
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ECOST 0.734*** 1.208*** -0.320* -0.552* 1.054*** 1.760***
(0.263) (0.413) (0.179) (0.314) (0.268) (0.461)
ECOST2 -0.446** -0.446** 0.223* 0.223* -0.670*** -0.670***
(0.197) (0.197) (0.128) (0.128) (0.191) (0.191)
Sex 0.007 0.007 0.114** 0.114** -0.107 -0.107
(0.053) (0.053) (0.055) (0.056) (0.069) (0.069)
Age 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Education -0.048 -0.048 -0.016 -0.016 -0.032 -0.032
(0.037) (0.037) (0.053) (0.053) (0.057) (0.057)
Income 0.018 0.018 0.002 0.002 0.016 0.016
(0.019) (0.019) (0.014) (0.014) (0.021) (0.021)
Religion -0.123** -0.123** 0.019 0.019 -0.142* -0.142*
(0.056) (0.056) (0.060) (0.060) (0.072) (0.072)
PV 0.039 0.080* 0.050** 0.030 -0.011 0.050
(0.026) (0.043) (0.023) (0.027) (0.031) (0.042)
ECOST × PV -0.067 0.033 -0.101*
(0.048) (0.028) (0.056)
Prosoc 0.006 0.040 0.005 -0.011 0.000 0.051*
(0.014) (0.028) (0.018) (0.017) (0.021) (0.030)
ECOST × Prosoc -0.057* 0.028 -0.084**
(0.033) (0.019) (0.038)
Numskill -0.026 -0.026 0.037* 0.037* -0.062** -0.062**
(0.023) (0.024) (0.020) (0.020) (0.029) (0.029)
Constant -0.484** -0.769** -0.373* -0.234 -0.111 -0.535*
(0.202) (0.299) (0.204) (0.229) (0.226) (0.287)
Observations 960 960 960 960 960 960
Number of participants 96 96 96 96 96 96
R-squared 0.051 0.054 0.067 0.068 0.063 0.069
This table presents coefficients of OLS regressions. The dependent variables are the total bias in columns
(1) and (2), the fundamental bias in columns (3) and (4), and the self-deceptive bias in columns (5)
and (6). The total bias is computed as AUT−EX:A, the fundamental bias as EX:S−EX:A, and the self-
deceptive bias as AUT−EX:S. ECOST denotes economic costs of stating the truth, i.e., the monetary
incentives to recommend a bad investment opportunity. Sex is a binary variable taking the value one
if the participant reports to be male, and zero if female. Education takes the following values: 0: No
schooling, 1: Elementary school, 2: High school, 3: Undergraduate degree, 4: Graduate school. Income
reflects yearly household income and takes the following values: 1: < $20′000, 2: $20′000 − 39′999, 3:
$40′000 − 59′999, 4: $60′000 − 79′999, 5: $80′000 − 99′999, 6: > $100′000. Religion denotes a binary
variable which takes the value one if the participant indicates to belong either to Christianity, Islam,
Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism or a Folk religion, and zero else. PV reflects an index of protected values
for honesty. Prosoc captures prosocial concerns. Numskill is the number of correctly solved numerical
patterns in the logical test. Robust standard errors are obtained by clustering at the individual level and
appear in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Figure 1.B.2: Cross-section of self-deceptive biases in investment consulting based
on stated beliefs. The self-deceptive bias is computed as the difference between behavior in
AUT and EX:S averaged over all ECOST levels.
Table 1.B.2: Limiting self-deception in investment consulting based on stated beliefs
Dependent variable: Lie
(1) (2) (3)
ECOST 1.633** 2.213*** 3.623*
(0.780) (0.841) (2.012)
ECOST2 -0.401 -0.390 -0.301
(0.594) (0.593) (0.578)
EX:S 0.248 0.943*** 0.928***
(0.167) (0.216) (0.211)
ECOST × EX:S -1.197*** -1.183***
(0.311) (0.316)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Interactions No No Yes
Observations 1,920 1,920 1,920
Number of participants 96 96 96
(Pseudo) R2 0.103 0.108 0.109
This table presents coefficients of logit regressions. The dependent variable is the binary variable Lie which
takes the value one if the advisor behaves unethically, and zero else. ECOST denotes economic costs of
stating the truth, i.e., the monetary incentives to recommend a bad investment opportunity. EX:S is a
binary variable variable which takes the value one in EX:S where every advisor’s stated belief is induced.
Controls include Sex, Age, Education, Income, Religion, PV, Prosoc, and Numskill. Interactions indicates
interaction terms of PV and Prosoc with ECOST. Robust standard errors are obtained by clustering at
the individual level and appear in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
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1.B.1.2 Payoff Implications
















Figure 1.B.3: Payoff implications of self-deception in investment consulting based
on stated beliefs. The left plot shows the differences in payoffs due to self-deception for
advisors and clients. The right plot depicts the percentage of decisions in which a higher payoff
is attained.
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Table 1.B.3: Payoff implications in investment consulting based on stated beliefs
Logit OLS
Dependent variable: High Payoff AUT Payoff AUT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ECOST -1.027 -1.117 -2.330 39.820*** 39.162*** 24.241
(1.099) (1.087) (2.143) (13.460) (13.335) (22.880)
ECOST2 0.706 0.767 0.793 -34.728*** -34.300*** -34.166***
(0.872) (0.862) (0.871) (11.394) (11.278) (11.302)
Fundamental bias 0.634 0.313 0.304 5.859 3.740 3.643
(0.417) (0.359) (0.355) (5.417) (5.137) (5.129)
(Fundamental bias)2 -0.415 -0.436 -2.845 -3.051
(0.338) (0.333) (4.235) (4.207)
Self-deceptive bias 0.330 0.327 0.343 5.926* 5.902* 6.063*
(0.244) (0.250) (0.247) (3.181) (3.390) (3.342)
(Self-deceptive bias)2 -0.049 -0.045 -0.388 -0.332
(0.240) (0.238) (3.379) (3.364)
Sex 0.217 0.207 0.208 2.396 2.301 2.308
(0.315) (0.313) (0.314) (4.136) (4.119) (4.122)
Age -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.038 -0.041 -0.041
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.242) (0.242) (0.242)
Education -0.044 -0.055 -0.056 -0.797 -0.876 -0.880
(0.232) (0.232) (0.232) (2.960) (2.944) (2.942)
Income 0.092 0.101 0.102 0.905 0.971 0.971
(0.121) (0.121) (0.122) (1.568) (1.573) (1.574)
Religion -0.270 -0.287 -0.287 -3.196 -3.313 -3.307
(0.300) (0.301) (0.301) (3.872) (3.894) (3.897)
PV -0.664*** -0.677*** -0.732** -8.928*** -9.001*** -10.053***
(0.185) (0.187) (0.292) (2.154) (2.164) (3.545)
ECOST × PV 0.089 1.751
(0.285) (2.982)
Prosoc -0.081 -0.081 -0.227 -1.220 -1.214 -2.546
(0.101) (0.102) (0.167) (1.361) (1.361) (2.343)
ECOST × Prosoc 0.244 2.220
(0.165) (2.039)
Numskill -0.049 -0.050 -0.050 0.161 0.163 0.171
(0.140) (0.139) (0.139) (1.743) (1.741) (1.742)
Constant 4.113*** 4.263*** 4.993*** 160.679*** 161.656*** 170.559***
(1.200) (1.225) (1.714) (14.889) (14.932) (20.508)
Observations 960 960 960 960 960 960
Number of participants 96 96 96 96 96 96
R-squared 0.077 0.079 0.080 0.096 0.096 0.097
This table presents coefficients of logit regressions in columns (1), (2) and (3), and OLS regressions in
columns (4), (5) and (6). The dependent variable in columns (1), (2) and (3) is High Payoff AUT which
is a binary variable that takes the value one whenever the advisor ended up in the high payoff state in
AUT, and zero else. The dependent variable in columns (4), (5) and (6) is the payoff in cents in each
round from AUT. ECOST denotes economic costs of stating the truth, i.e., the monetary incentives to
recommend a bad investment opportunity. The fundamental bias corresponds to EX:S−EX:A and the
self-deceptive bias to AUT−EX:S. Sex, Education, Income, and Religion are as defined above. PV reflects
an index of protected values for honesty. Prosoc captures prosocial concerns. Numskill is the number of
correctly solved numerical patterns in the logical test. Robust standard errors are obtained by clustering
at the individual level and appear in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
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1.B.2 Neutral Setting
1.B.2.1 Bias Decomposition
















Figure 1.B.4: Lying in AUT, EX:A, and EX:S (left) and the bias decomposition in
the neutral setting based on stated beliefs (right). Circles indicate the proportion of lies
for given ECOST in AUT. Crosses correspond to the proportion of lies in EX:A, and squares
denote the proportion of lies in EX:S. The fundamental bias is computed as EX:S−EX:A. The
self-deceptive bias corresponds to AUT−EX:S. The total bias equals the sum of fundamental
and self-deceptive bias.
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Table 1.B.4: Determinants of the biases in the neutral setting based on stated
beliefs
Dependent variable: Total bias Fundamental bias Self-deceptive bias
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ECOST 0.856*** 1.060** 0.122 0.082 0.734*** 0.977**
(0.259) (0.432) (0.138) (0.220) (0.264) (0.436)
ECOST2 -0.521*** -0.521*** -0.119 -0.119 -0.403** -0.403**
(0.196) (0.196) (0.108) (0.109) (0.202) (0.202)
Sex 0.030 0.030 0.083 0.083 -0.053 -0.053
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.067) (0.067)
Age -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Education -0.023 -0.023 -0.022 -0.022 -0.001 -0.001
(0.035) (0.035) (0.058) (0.058) (0.066) (0.066)
Income -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 0.001 0.001
(0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Religion 0.010 0.010 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.066) (0.066)
PV 0.003 0.027 -0.003 0.001 0.006 0.027
(0.024) (0.048) (0.032) (0.038) (0.036) (0.049)
ECOST × PV -0.041 -0.007 -0.034
(0.059) (0.033) (0.058)
Prosoc -0.006 0.002 0.021 0.009 -0.027 -0.007
(0.019) (0.028) (0.017) (0.021) (0.019) (0.028)
ECOST × Prosoc -0.014 0.019 -0.033
(0.034) (0.019) (0.034)
Numskill 0.006 0.006 0.042** 0.042** -0.036* -0.036*
(0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Constant -0.198 -0.320 -0.187 -0.163 -0.011 -0.157
(0.243) (0.337) (0.272) (0.294) (0.291) (0.350)
Observations 1,130 1,130 1,130 1,130 1,130 1,130
Number of participants 113 113 113 113 113 113
R-squared 0.039 0.039 0.041 0.041 0.040 0.041
This table presents coefficients of OLS regressions. The dependent variables are the total bias in columns
(1) and (2), the fundamental bias in columns (3) and (4), and the self-deceptive bias in columns (5)
and (6). The total bias is computed as AUT−EX:A, the fundamental bias as EX:S−EX:A, and the self-
deceptive bias as AUT−EX:S. ECOST denotes economic costs of stating the truth, i.e., the monetary
incentives to lie. Sex is a binary variable taking the value one if the participant reports to be male, and
zero if female. Education takes the following values: 0: No schooling, 1: Elementary school, 2: High
school, 3: Undergraduate degree, 4: Graduate school. Income reflects yearly household income and takes
the following values: 1: < $20′000, 2: $20′000 − 39′999, 3: $40′000 − 59′999, 4: $60′000 − 79′999, 5:
$80′000 − 99′999, 6: > $100′000. Religion denotes a binary variable which takes the value one if the
participant indicates to belong either to Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism or a Folk
religion, and zero else. Numskill is the number of correctly solved numerical patterns in the logical test.
PV reflects an index of protected values for honesty. Prosoc captures prosocial concerns. Robust standard
errors are obtained by clustering at the individual level and appear in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Figure 1.B.5: Cross-section of self-deceptive biases in the neutral setting based on
stated beliefs. The self-deceptive bias is computed as the difference between behavior in AUT
and EX:S averaged over all ECOST levels.
Table 1.B.5: Limiting self-deception in the neutral setting based on stated beliefs
Dependent variable: Lie
(1) (2) (3)
ECOST 4.761*** 5.372*** 5.972***
(0.701) (0.739) (1.514)
ECOST2 -2.947*** -2.891*** -2.731***
(0.526) (0.528) (0.531)
EX:S 0.107 0.864*** 0.858***
(0.190) (0.241) (0.235)
ECOST × EX:S -1.342*** -1.349***
(0.316) (0.322)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Interactions No No Yes
Observations 2,260 2,260 2,260
Number of participants 113 113 113
(Pseudo) R2 0.091 0.097 0.102
This table presents coefficients of logit regressions. The dependent variable is the binary variable Lie
which takes the value one if the Sender tells a lie, and zero else. ECOST denotes economic costs of
stating the truth, i.e., the monetary incentives to lie. EX:S is a binary variable variable which takes the
value one in EX:S where every Sender’s stated belief is induced. Controls include Sex, Age, Education,
Income, Religion, PV, Prosoc, and Numskill. Interactions indicates interaction terms of PV and Prosoc
with ECOST. Robust standard errors are obtained by clustering at the individual level and appear in
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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1.B.2.2 Payoff Implications












Figure 1.B.6: Payoff implications of self-deception in the neutral setting based on
stated beliefs. The left plot shows the differences in payoffs due to self-deception for Senders
and Receivers. The right plot depicts the percentage of decisions in which a higher payoff is
attained.
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Table 1.B.6: Payoff implications in the neutral setting based on stated beliefs
Logit OLS
Dependent variable: High Payoff AUT Payoff AUT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ECOST -3.234*** -3.322*** -3.745** 36.325*** 35.554*** 33.882**
(1.234) (1.259) (1.846) (11.938) (12.105) (16.467)
ECOST2 2.168** 2.213** 2.223** -34.641*** -34.285*** -34.315***
(0.979) (0.994) (0.995) (9.873) (9.970) (9.978)
Fundamental bias 0.387 0.184 0.188 6.085* 3.819 3.883
(0.332) (0.330) (0.331) (3.469) (3.640) (3.647)
(Fundamental bias)2 -0.406 -0.407 -4.073 -4.103
(0.334) (0.335) (3.528) (3.540)
Self-deceptive bias 0.764*** 0.781*** 0.784*** 8.717*** 8.956*** 8.978***
(0.239) (0.289) (0.289) (2.911) (3.077) (3.074)
(Self-deceptive bias)2 -0.115 -0.111 -1.478 -1.380
(0.297) (0.299) (3.112) (3.142)
Sex -0.200 -0.194 -0.194 -1.822 -1.777 -1.782
(0.279) (0.278) (0.278) (3.182) (3.145) (3.148)
Age -0.033** -0.032** -0.032** -0.334* -0.325* -0.325*
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.176) (0.172) (0.172)
Education -0.077 -0.049 -0.049 -1.097 -0.852 -0.851
(0.247) (0.253) (0.253) (2.697) (2.722) (2.725)
Income -0.038 -0.033 -0.033 -0.523 -0.465 -0.465
(0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (1.080) (1.073) (1.074)
Religion -0.245 -0.217 -0.216 -2.457 -2.191 -2.192
(0.281) (0.277) (0.277) (3.173) (3.116) (3.120)
PV -0.555*** -0.567*** -0.644** -6.525** -6.602** -7.342**
(0.208) (0.211) (0.295) (2.558) (2.571) (3.460)
ECOST × PV 0.125 1.243
(0.237) (2.307)
Prosoc -0.033 -0.037 -0.020 -0.096 -0.117 0.429
(0.092) (0.090) (0.136) (0.993) (0.965) (1.332)
ECOST × Prosoc -0.028 -0.912
(0.151) (1.272)
Numskill 0.118 0.100 0.100 1.332 1.130 1.130
(0.099) (0.103) (0.103) (0.967) (1.007) (1.008)
Constant 5.924*** 5.996*** 6.250*** 167.376*** 167.917*** 168.913***
(1.182) (1.210) (1.531) (13.502) (13.855) (16.663)
Observations 1,130 1,130 1,130 1,130 1,130 1,130
Number of participants 113 113 113 113 113 113
R-squared 0.076 0.079 0.080 0.078 0.081 0.081
This table presents coefficients of logit regressions in columns (1), (2) and (3), and OLS regressions in
columns (4), (5) and (6). The dependent variable in columns (1), (2) and (3) is High Payoff AUT which is
a binary variable that takes the value one whenever the Sender ended up in the high payoff state in AUT,
and zero else. The dependent variable in columns (4), (5) and (6) is the payoff in cents in each round
from AUT. ECOST denotes economic costs of stating the truth, i.e., the monetary incentives to lie. The
fundamental bias corresponds to EX:S−EX:A and the self-deceptive bias to AUT−EX:S. Sex, Education,
Income, and Religion are as defined above. PV reflects an index of protected values for honesty. Prosoc
captures prosocial concerns. Numskill is the number of correctly solved numerical patterns in the logical
test. Robust standard errors are obtained by clustering at the individual level and appear in parentheses.
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Chapter 1 65
1.C Appendix C: Additional Figures












Figure 1.C.1: Unethical behavior across induced first-order beliefs in investment
consulting. Upward-pointing triangles denote ECOST equal to $1.00, asterisks $0.80, circles
$0.60, crosses $0.40, and downward-pointing triangles $0.20












Figure 1.C.2: Unethical behavior across induced first-order beliefs in the neutral
setting. Upward-pointing triangles denote ECOST equal to $1.00, asterisks $0.80, circles $0.60,
crosses $0.40, and downward-pointing triangles $0.20
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Figure 1.C.3: Histograms of stated (left) and revealed advisor beliefs in the neutral
setting (right). Stated beliefs are unincentivized and self-reported. Revealed beliefs are derived
according to the methodology of Andreoni and Sanchez (2014).












Figure 1.C.4: Stated versus revealed advisor beliefs in the neutral setting. Plus
markers indicate participants who lie in at most 50% of all decisions. Circles mark participants
who lie in more than 50% of all decisions.
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1.D Appendix D: Experimental Instructions
1.D.1 Investment Consulting Experiment
1.D.1.1 Advisor
Introduction
In this study you will play a decision making experiment that includes several
tasks. Please read the instructions carefully. You may earn a considerable sum of
money, depending on the decisions you make in the experiment.
In this experiment you will earn experimental points which will be converted to real
money at the end. The conversion rate is set such that 100 points in the experiment
correspond to $1.00 (i.e., $0.01 per point in the experiment). The accumulated money
you earn in these tasks will be paid to you at the end of the experiment in addition
to a fixed amount of $0.25 for participation.
Keep in mind that you will only be paid if you fully complete the study until the
end.
Task 1
In this task you will play 10 rounds of an investment advisory game. Please read
the instructions carefully. You may earn a considerable sum of money, depending on
the decisions you make.
In the end, one of the 10 rounds will be randomly selected and you will be randomly
matched with another (anonymous) participant. Neither of you will know the identity
of the other. The money you earn in this particular round will be paid to you at the
end of the experiment in addition to the money you earn in the other tasks as well
as a fixed amount of $0.25 for participation. The conversion rate is set such that 100
points in the experiment correspond to $1.00 (i.e., $0.01 per point in the experiment).
Instructions
You are in the role of an investment advisor who interacts with a client who is
going to choose an investment. There are six possible investment opportunities. The
other participant will not be informed about the characteristics of these investments.
However, he or she will be told that you have been informed about the characteristics
of the investments. In every round, you will be asked to send a message to the other
participant. The message will correspond to one of the six investments. There are six
possible messages:
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• Message 1: "Investment 1 will yield the highest expected outcome."
• Message 2: "Investment 2 will yield the highest expected outcome."
• Message 3: "Investment 3 will yield the highest expected outcome."
• Message 4: "Investment 4 will yield the highest expected outcome."
• Message 5: "Investment 5 will yield the highest expected outcome."
• Message 6: "Investment 6 will yield the highest expected outcome."
Your message will be shown to the other participant, and then he or she will be asked
to choose one investment.
The choice of the investment by the other participant will determine the payments
in this task. For example the investments might be characterized as follows:
• Investment 1 has an expected outcome of 25 points, all other investments will
yield an expected outcome of 32 points. The risk of all investments is the same.
• Your compensation will be 35 points if the other participant chooses Investment
1, and 28 points if he or she chooses any other investment.
Note that the characteristics of the investments as well as your possible compensation
will change from round to round.
Finally, only you will be informed of the expected outcome of each particular
investment. The other participant will not be informed. However, he or she will be
told that you have been informed of the characteristics of each investment opportunity.
For your convenience, these instructions will remain available to you on all subse-
quent screens of this task.
On the next pages, you will have to answer two questions to make sure you under-
stand the instructions correctly. Keep in mind that you will only be paid if you fully
complete the study until the end.
Understanding Question [1-2] of 2
In this understanding question the investment opportunities are characterized as
follows:
• Investment [ ] has an expected outcome of [Client Low Payoff] points, all other
investments will yield an expected outcome of [Client High Payoff] points. The
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risk of all investments is the same.
• Your compensation will be [Advisor High Payoff] points if the other participant
chooses Investment [ ] and [Advisor Low Payoff] points if he or she chooses any
other investment.
Suppose you send the message: "Investment 5 will yield the highest expected outcome."
and he or she chooses "Investment 2". Which of the following will be the result of that
round?
Round [1-10] of 10
We ask you to send a message to the other participant. This message is the only
information he or she will receive. He or she will neither be informed about the
monetary consequences of each investment opportunity nor your compensation. In
this round the monetary consequences are as follows:
• Investment [ ] has an expected outcome of [Client High Payoff] points, all other
investments will yield an expected outcome of [Client Low Payoff] points. The
risk of all investments is the same.
• Your compensation will be [Advisor Low Payoff] points if the other participant
chooses Investment [ ], and [Advisor High Payoff] points if he or she chooses any
other investment.
The message I will send is:
• Message 1: "Investment 1 will yield the highest expected outcome."
• Message 2: "Investment 2 will yield the highest expected outcome."
• Message 3: "Investment 3 will yield the highest expected outcome."
• Message 4: "Investment 4 will yield the highest expected outcome."
• Message 5: "Investment 5 will yield the highest expected outcome."
• Message 6: "Investment 6 will yield the highest expected outcome."
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Question regarding your decisions
Out of 100 possible counterparts, how many do you think will follow your messages
(i.e., choose the investment you mention in your message)?
Question regarding your preferred way of payment
Task 1 summary
The round randomly drawn to be played with an anonymous counterpart is: Round
[ ]
In this round the investment opportunities are characterized as follows:
• Investment [ ] has an expected outcome of [Client High Payoff] points, all other
investments will yield an expected outcome of [Client Low Payoff] points. The
risk of all investments is the same.
• Your compensation will be [Advisor Low Payoff] points if the other participant
chooses Investment [ ], and [Advisor High Payoff] points if he or she chooses any
other investment.
You have sent the following message to the other player: Message [ ]: "Investment
[ ] will yield the highest expected outcome."
We are now asking how you would like to be paid for this task. You have the
choice between the outcome of the real game selected above whereas the other player
has not yet chosen an investment or a lottery with known probabilities and the same
two possible outcomes.
Below you will find a list of 21 possible lotteries. Please indicate for each lottery
whether you prefer to receive the outcome from the selected round above (which is
either [Advisor Low Payoff] or [Advisor High Payoff] points depending on the choice
of the other player) or the outcome from the lottery. The lotteries are designed such
that Lottery 1 will always pay you the highest possible outcome of the game, and
Lottery 21 will always pay you less (in expectation) than the outcome of the game
regardless of the other participant’s decisions. The expected payoffs of Lotteries 2-20
lie between Lottery 1 (the best lottery) and Lottery 21 (the worst lottery).
As a result most people begin by preferring the lottery and then switch to the
outcome of the game. Thus one way to view this task is to determine the best row
to stop checking the box for the lottery and start checking the box for the outcome
of the game. In the end one lottery corresponding to one row below will be randomly
selected and you will be paid according to your indicated preference. The other player
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will receive the payment according to the game above regardless of your decision.
Preferring the lottery will affect your payment only.
Lottery 1: It pays [Advisor Low Payoff] points with 0% probability (0 in 100) and
[Advisor High Payoff] points with 100% probability (100 in 100).
• I prefer Lottery 1. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
Lottery 2: It pays [Advisor Low Payoff] points with 5% probability (5 in 100) and
[Advisor High Payoff] points with 95% probability (95 in 100).47
• I prefer Lottery 2. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
Lottery 3: It pays [Advisor Low Payoff] points with 10% probability (10 in 100)
and [Advisor High Payoff] points with 90% probability (90 in 100).
• I prefer Lottery 3. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
Lottery 4: It pays [Advisor Low Payoff] points with 15% probability (15 in 100)
and [Advisor High Payoff] points with 85% probability (85 in 100).
• I prefer Lottery 4. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
Lottery 5: It pays [Advisor Low Payoff] points with 20% probability (20 in 100)
and [Advisor High Payoff] points with 80% probability (80 in 100).
• I prefer Lottery 5. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
Lottery 6: It pays [Advisor Low Payoff] points with 25% probability (25 in 100)
and [Advisor High Payoff] points with 75% probability (75 in 100).
• I prefer Lottery 6. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
Lottery 7: It pays [Advisor Low Payoff] points with 30% probability (30 in 100)
and [Advisor High Payoff] points with 70% probability (70 in 100).
• I prefer Lottery 7. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
Lottery 8: It pays [Advisor Low Payoff] points with 35% probability (35 in 100)
and [Advisor High Payoff] points with 65% probability (65 in 100).
• I prefer Lottery 8. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
Lottery 9: It pays [Advisor Low Payoff] points with 40% probability (40 in 100)
and [Advisor High Payoff] points with 60% probability (60 in 100).
• I prefer Lottery 9. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
Lottery 10: It pays [Advisor Low Payoff] points with 45% probability (45 in 100)
and [Advisor High Payoff] points with 55% probability (55 in 100).
• I prefer Lottery 10. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
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Lottery 11: It pays [Advisor Low Payoff] points with 50% probability (50 in 100)
and [Advisor High Payoff] points with 50% probability (50 in 100).
• I prefer Lottery 11. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
Lottery 12: It pays [Advisor Low Payoff] points with 55% probability (55 in 100)
and [Advisor High Payoff] points with 45% probability (45 in 100).
• I prefer Lottery 12. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
Lottery 13: It pays [Advisor Low Payoff] points with 60% probability (60 in 100)
and [Advisor High Payoff] points with 40% probability (40 in 100).
• I prefer Lottery 13. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
Lottery 14: It pays [Advisor Low Payoff] points with 65% probability (65 in 100)
and [Advisor High Payoff] points with 35% probability (35 in 100).
• I prefer Lottery 14. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
Lottery 15: It pays [Advisor Low Payoff] points with 70% probability (70 in 100)
and [Advisor High Payoff] points with 30% probability (30 in 100).
• I prefer Lottery 15. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
Lottery 16: It pays [Advisor Low Payoff] points with 75% probability (75 in 100)
and [Advisor High Payoff] points with 25% probability (25 in 100).
• I prefer Lottery 16. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
Lottery 17: It pays [Advisor Low Payoff] points with 80% probability (80 in 100)
and [Advisor High Payoff] points with 20% probability (20 in 100).
• I prefer Lottery 17. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
Lottery 18: It pays [Advisor Low Payoff] points with 85% probability (85 in 100)
and [Advisor High Payoff] points with 15% probability (15 in 100).
• I prefer Lottery 18. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
Lottery 19: It pays [Advisor Low Payoff] points with 90% probability (90 in 100)
and [Advisor High Payoff] points with 10% probability (10 in 100).
• I prefer Lottery 19. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
Lottery 20: It pays [Advisor Low Payoff] points with 95% probability (95 in 100)
and [Advisor High Payoff] points with 5% probability (5 in 100).
• I prefer Lottery 20. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
Lottery 21: It pays [Advisor Low Payoff] points with 100% probability (100 in 100)
and [Advisor High Payoff] points with 0% probability (0 in 100).
• I prefer Lottery 21. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
47 The probabilities depicted here correspond to the case when a round is drawn in which the advisor’s
message was truthful. If a round with a deceitful message is randomly chosen the probabilities are
adjusted such that the lotteries again reflect the full range of possible first-order beliefs the advisor
might have in the game.
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Task 2
In this task you will have to complete numerical patterns. You will see 10 patterns
and your task will be to determine the number that comes next in each series.
For each correctly solved pattern you will earn 10 points towards your total pay-
ment at the end of the experiment. The conversion rate is set such that 100 points in
the experiment correspond to $1.00 (i.e., $0.01 per point in the experiment).
You have 120 seconds to determine as many missing numbers as possible. Once
time is over you will be automatically redirected to the next page. You may start the
clock by clicking on the button below.
Task 2
Time left to complete this page: [mm:ss]
Pattern 1: Determine which number comes next: 13, 17, 19, 23, 29, ?
Pattern 2: Determine which number comes next: 1, 4, 9, 16, 25, ?
Pattern 3: Determine which number comes next: 3, 18, 9, 54, 27, ?
Pattern 4: Determine which number comes next: 3, 4, 8, 11, 44, ?
Pattern 5: Determine which number comes next: 2, 5, 10, 17, 28, ?
Pattern 6: Determine which number comes next: 1, 1, 2, 6, 24, ?
Pattern 7: Determine which number comes next: 62, 54, 57, 49, 52, ?
Pattern 8: Determine which number comes next: 4, 12, 3, 9, 0, ?
Pattern 9: Determine which number comes next: 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, ?
Pattern 10: Determine which number comes next: 43, 32, 64, 53, 106, ?
Task 3
In this task you will play 10 rounds of an investment advisory game. In each round
you have to make several decisions. Please read the instructions carefully. You may
earn a considerable sum of money, depending on the decisions you make.
In the end, one of the 10 rounds will be randomly selected and you will be randomly
matched with another (anonymous) participant. You will never be matched with the
same participant as in Task 1. Neither of you will know the identity of the other.
The money you earn in this particular round will be paid to you at the end of the
experiment in addition to your earnings from the other tasks and a fixed amount
for participation. The conversion rate is set such that 100 points in the experiment
correspond to $1.00 (i.e., $0.01 per point in the experiment).
Instructions
74 When Self-deception Promotes Unethical Advice
You are in the role of an investment advisor who interacts with a client who is
going to choose an investment. There are six possible investment opportunities. The
other participant will not be informed about the characteristics of these investments.
However, he or she will be told that you have been informed about the characteristics
of the investments. In every round, you will be asked to send a message to the other
participant. The message will correspond to one of the six investments. There are six
possible messages:
• Message 1: "Investment 1 will yield the highest expected outcome."
• Message 2: "Investment 2 will yield the highest expected outcome."
• Message 3: "Investment 3 will yield the highest expected outcome."
• Message 4: "Investment 4 will yield the highest expected outcome."
• Message 5: "Investment 5 will yield the highest expected outcome."
• Message 6: "Investment 6 will yield the highest expected outcome."
Your message will be shown to the other participant, and then he or she will be asked
to choose one investment.
The choice of the investment by the other participant will determine the payments
in this task. For example the investments might be characterized as follows:
• Investment [ ] has an expected outcome of [Client High Payoff] points, all other
investments will yield an expected outcome of [Client Low Payoff] points. The
risk of all investments is the same.
• Your compensation will be [Advisor Low Payoff] points if the other participant
chooses Investment [ ], and [Advisor High Payoff] points if he or she chooses any
other investment.
Note that the characteristics of the investments as well as your possible compensation
will change from round to round.
Again, only you will be informed of the expected outcome of each particular in-
vestment. The other participant will not be informed. However, he or she will be told
that you have been informed of the characteristics of each investment opportunity.
In addition, you will always see a list of different participants with which you
might be matched. You will know exactly how often these participants will choose
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the investment that you state in your message. You will have to indicate the message
that you would like to send to each possible counterpart.
For your convenience, these instructions will remain available to you on all subse-
quent screens of this task.
Round [1-10] of 10
We ask you to send a message to all possible counterparts. This message is the
only information he or she will receive. He or she will neither be informed about the
monetary consequences of each investment opportunity nor your compensation. In
this round the monetary consequences are as follows:
• Investment [ ] has an expected outcome of [Client High Payoff] points, all other
investments will yield an expected outcome of [Client Low Payoff] points. The
risk of all investments is the same.
• Your compensation will be [Advisor Low Payoff] points if the other participant
chooses Investment [ ], and [Advisor High Payoff] points if he or she chooses any
other investment.
Below you will find a list of the 21 participants with whom you might be matched.
In addition there is information how each of them will play.
Please indicate for each participant which message you would like to send him or
her. You will find the six possible messages which correspond to the six investments
in the instructions below. In the end one participant will be randomly selected and
you will be paid according to your decisions.
Participant 1 will choose the investment that you send in your message with 0%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 1?
• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
Participant 2 will choose the investment that you send in your message with 5%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 2?
• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
Participant 3 will choose the investment that you send in your message with 10%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 3?
• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
Participant 4 will choose the investment that you send in your message with 15%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 4?
• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
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Participant 5 will choose the investment that you send in your message with 20%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 5?
• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
Participant 6 will choose the investment that you send in your message with 25%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 6?
• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
Participant 7 will choose the investment that you send in your message with 30%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 7?
• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
Participant 8 will choose the investment that you send in your message with 35%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 8?
• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
Participant 9 will choose the investment that you send in your message with 40%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 9?
• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
Participant 10 will choose the investment that you send in your message with 45%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 10?
• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
Participant 11 will choose the investment that you send in your message with 50%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 11?
• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
Participant 12 will choose the investment that you send in your message with 55%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 12?
• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
Participant 13 will choose the investment that you send in your message with 60%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 13?
• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
Participant 14 will choose the investment that you send in your message with 65%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 14?
• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
Participant 15 will choose the investment that you send in your message with 70%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 15?
• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
Participant 16 will choose the investment that you send in your message with 75%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 16?
• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
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Participant 17 will choose the investment that you send in your message with 80%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 17?
• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
Participant 18 will choose the investment that you send in your message with 85%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 18?
• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
Participant 19 will choose the investment that you send in your message with 90%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 19?
• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
Participant 20 will choose the investment that you send in your message with 95%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 20?
• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
Participant 21 will choose the investment that you send in your message with 100%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 21?
• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
Questionnaire
Question 1: Please indicate your gender:
• Female • Male
Question 2: Please indicate your age:
Question 3: What is the highest degree/level of education you have completed?
• No schooling • Elementary school • Middle school • High school • Undergraduate
school • Graduate school
Question 4: What is your average yearly household income (in USD)?
• < 20‘000 • 20‘001 - 40‘000 • 40‘001 - 60‘000 • 60‘001 - 80‘000 • 80‘001 - 100‘000
• > 100‘000 • I do not want to say
Question 5: To which religion do you belong?
• Christianity • Islam • Hinduism • Buddhism • Judaism • Folk religion • No
religion • Other
Question 6: Suppose that Investment 5 yields the highest expected outcome. To
what extent do you judge the decision to send something other than Message 5:
"Investment 5 will yield the highest expected outcome." as:48
48 The measure Prosoc is computed based on subquestions 2 and 4 while 1 and 3 serve as consistency
check.
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• 1: Very dishonest ... 7: Very honest
• 1: Very manipulative ... 7: Not at all manipulative
• 1: Strongly associated with personal gains ... 7: Not at all associated with
personal gains
• 1: Strongly hurting the other participant ... 7: Not at all hurting the other
participant
Question 7: Consider the choices of the player who sent a message. To what extent
do you judge the decision to send something other than the truthful message as:49
• 1: Very immoral ... 7: Very moral
• 1: Not at all praiseworthy ... 7: Very praiseworthy
• 1: Not at all blameworthy ... 7: Very blameworthy
• 1: Not at all outrageous ... 7: Very outrageous
• 1: Not at all acceptable ... 7: Very acceptable
Question 8: Individuals have an opportunity to choose which information they
provide to their audience, and they can modify information they obtain before pas-
sing this information on to others. Some view such modification as a violation of
truthfulness; others regard it as acceptable protection of personal interests. What do
you think about the value of truthfulness in such a situation? Truthfulness is about
something...
• ... that one should not sacrifice, no matter what the (material or other) benefits.
[1: Strongly Disagree ... 7: Strongly Agree]
• ... for which I think it is right to make a cost-benefit analysis. [1: Strongly
Disagree ... 7: Strongly Agree]
49 In Questions 7 and 8, I restate some variables such that a large number always corresponds to strong
protected values for honesty.
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• ... that cannot be measured in monetary terms. [1: Strongly Disagree ... 7:
• ... about which I can be flexible if the situation demands it. [1: Strongly
Disagree ... 7: Strongly Agree]
Thank you!
You have completed the experiment session. Thank you for doing our study!
Very soon you will receive the fixed fee of $0.25. In the next hours we will randomly
match you with a player for Task 1 and another player for Task 3 and also pay the
bonus that you have earned depending on the rounds selected by the lotteries as well
as the other participants’ choices. In addition you will receive the money you have
earned in Task 2. We usually manage to pay participants within 24 hours.
Do you have any comments or feedback regarding this experiment?
• Yes • No
1.D.1.2 Client
Introduction
In this study you will play a decision making experiment that includes three tasks.
Please read the instructions carefully. You may earn a considerable sum of money,
depending on the decisions you make in the experiment.
In this experiment you will earn experimental points which will be converted to real
money at the end. The conversion rate is set such that 100 points in the experiment
correspond to $1.00 (i.e., $0.01 per point in the experiment). The money you earn
in these tasks will be paid to you at the end of the experiment in addition to a fixed
amount of $0.25 for participation.
Keep in mind that you will only be paid if you fully complete the study until the
end.
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Task 1
Instructions
In this task you will play a short decision making game. Please read the instructi-
ons carefully. You may earn a considerable sum of money, depending on the decisions
you make in the experiment.
You will be randomly matched with another (anonymous) participant in this task.
Neither of you will know the identity of the other.
There are six possible investment opportunities. The other participant knows the
expected outcome of all of them, but we are not going to tell it to you.
After being informed about the characteristics of the six investments, the other
participant will send a message to you. The message corresponds to a recommendation
for one of the investments. There are six possible messages:
• Message 1: "Investment 1 will yield the highest expected outcome."
• Message 2: "Investment 2 will yield the highest expected outcome."
• Message 3: "Investment 3 will yield the highest expected outcome."
• Message 4: "Investment 4 will yield the highest expected outcome."
• Message 5: "Investment 5 will yield the highest expected outcome."
• Message 6: "Investment 6 will yield the highest expected outcome."
We will ask you to choose one of the six investments. The message you receive is
the only information you will have regarding the expected outcomes. Your choice of
an investment will determine the payments according to two different options, known
only to the other participant.
One investment will pay you more than the other investments. For your conve-
nience, these instructions will remain available to you on all subsequent screens of this
task.
Decisions
The other participant will send you a message. For every possible message we ask
you to choose one of the six investment opportunities. Your choice will determine the
payments to both of you.
Decision 1: Suppose the other participant sent you: Message 1: "Investment 1 will
yield the highest expected outcome."
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Given this message the investment I choose is:
• Investment 1 • Investment 2 • Investment 3 • Investment 4 • Investment 5 •
Investment 6
Decision 2: Suppose the other participant sent you: Message 2: "Investment 2 will
yield the highest expected outcome."
Given this message the investment I choose is:
• Investment 1 • Investment 2 • Investment 3 • Investment 4 • Investment 5 •
Investment 6
Decision 3: Suppose the other participant sent you: Message 3: "Investment 3 will
yield the highest expected outcome."
Given this message the investment I choose is:
• Investment 1 • Investment 2 • Investment 3 • Investment 4 • Investment 5 •
Investment 6
Decision 4: Suppose the other participant sent you: Message 4: "Investment 4 will
yield the highest expected outcome."
Given this message the investment I choose is:
• Investment 1 • Investment 2 • Investment 3 • Investment 4 • Investment 5 •
Investment 6
Decision 5: Suppose the other participant sent you: Message 5: "Investment 5 will
yield the highest expected outcome."
Given this message the investment I choose is:
• Investment 1 • Investment 2 • Investment 3 • Investment 4 • Investment 5 •
Investment 6
Decision 6: Suppose the other participant sent you: Message 6: "Investment 6 will
yield the highest expected outcome."
Given this message the investment I choose is:
• Investment 1 • Investment 2 • Investment 3 • Investment 4 • Investment 5 •
Investment 6
Question regarding your decisions
Out of 100 possible counterparts, how many do you think will send you a truthful
message (i.e., send the message with the investment that yields the highest expected
outcome)?
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Task 2
In this task you will have to complete numerical patterns. You will see 10 patterns
and your task will be to determine the number that comes next in each series.
For each correctly solved pattern you will earn 10 points towards your total pay-
ment at the end of the experiment. The conversion rate is set such that 100 points in
the experiment correspond to $1.00 (i.e., $0.01 per point in the experiment).
You have 120 seconds to determine as many missing numbers as possible. Once
time is over you will be automatically redirected to the next page. You may start the
clock by clicking on the button below.
This task is followed by some general questions.
Task 2
Time left to complete this page: [mm:ss]
Pattern 1: Determine which number comes next: 13, 17, 19, 23, 29, ?
Pattern 2: Determine which number comes next: 1, 4, 9, 16, 25, ?
Pattern 3: Determine which number comes next: 3, 18, 9, 54, 27, ?
Pattern 4: Determine which number comes next: 3, 4, 8, 11, 44, ?
Pattern 5: Determine which number comes next: 2, 5, 10, 17, 28, ?
Pattern 6: Determine which number comes next: 1, 1, 2, 6, 24, ?
Pattern 7: Determine which number comes next: 62, 54, 57, 49, 52, ?
Pattern 8: Determine which number comes next: 4, 12, 3, 9, 0, ?
Pattern 9: Determine which number comes next: 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, ?
Pattern 10: Determine which number comes next: 43, 32, 64, 53, 106, ?
Task 3
Instructions
Please read the instructions carefully. You may earn a considerable sum of money,
depending on the decisions you make in this task.
In this task you will face decision situations with 10 anonymous participants.
Neither of you will know the identity of the other.
There are six possible investment opportunities. The other participant knows the
expected outcome of all of them, but we are not going to tell it to you.
After being informed about the characteristics of the six investments, the other
participant will send a message to you. The message corresponds to a recommendation
for one of the investments. There are six possible messages:
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• Message 1: "Investment 1 will yield the highest expected outcome."
• Message 2: "Investment 2 will yield the highest expected outcome."
• Message 3: "Investment 3 will yield the highest expected outcome."
• Message 4: "Investment 4 will yield the highest expected outcome."
• Message 5: "Investment 5 will yield the highest expected outcome."
• Message 6: "Investment 6 will yield the highest expected outcome."
The message you receive is the only information you will have regarding the expected
outcomes. We will ask you to choose one of the six investments. In addition, you are
forced to choose the investment that was stated in the message exactly [ ] times in
total (out of 60 decisions).
In the end a lottery will randomly determine with which of the 10 participants you
will be matched. Your choice of an investment will determine the payments according
to two different options, known only to the other participant. One investment will
pay you more than the other investments.
For your convenience, these instructions will remain available to you on all subse-
quent screens of this task.
Decisions for participant [1-10]
Participant [1-10] will send you a message. For every possible message we ask you
to choose one of the six numbers. Your choice will determine the payments to both of
you.
Keep in mind that you must choose the same number as the one in the message
in exactly [ ] out of the 60 cases in total.
You have already chosen a number equal to the number stated in the message [ ]
times. This means that you must do so in [ ] more cases.
Decision 1: Suppose the other participant sent you: Message 1: "Investment 1 will
yield the highest expected outcome."
Given this message the number I choose is:
• Investment 1 • Investment 2 • Investment 3 • Investment 4 • Investment 5 •
Investment 6
Decision 2: Suppose the other participant sent you: Message 2: "Investment 2 will
yield the highest expected outcome."
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Given this message the number I choose is:
• Investment 1 • Investment 2 • Investment 3 • Investment 4 • Investment 5 •
Investment 6
Decision 3: Suppose the other participant sent you: Message 3: "Investment 3 will
yield the highest expected outcome."
Given this message the number I choose is:
• Investment 1 • Investment 2 • Investment 3 • Investment 4 • Investment 5 •
Investment 6
Decision 4: Suppose the other participant sent you: Message 4: "Investment 4 will
yield the highest expected outcome."
Given this message the number I choose is:
• Investment 1 • Investment 2 • Investment 3 • Investment 4 • Investment 5 •
Investment 6
Decision 5: Suppose the other participant sent you: Message 5: "Investment 5 will
yield the highest expected outcome."
Given this message the number I choose is:
• Investment 1 • Investment 2 • Investment 3 • Investment 4 • Investment 5 •
Investment 6
Decision 6: Suppose the other participant sent you: Message 6: "Investment 6 will
yield the highest expected outcome."
Given this message the number I choose is:
• Investment 1 • Investment 2 • Investment 3 • Investment 4 • Investment 5 •
Investment 6
Questionnaire
Question 1: Please indicate your gender:
• Female • Male
Question 2: Please indicate your age:
Question 3: What is the highest degree/level of education you have completed?
• No schooling • Elementary school • Middle school • High school • Undergraduate
school • Graduate school
Question 4: What is your average yearly household income (in USD)?
• < 20‘000 • 20‘001 - 40‘000 • 40‘001 - 60‘000 • 60‘001 - 80‘000 • 80‘001 - 100‘000
• > 100‘000 • I do not want to say
Question 5: To which religion do you belong?
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• Christianity • Islam • Hinduism • Buddhism • Judaism • Folk religion • No
religion • Other
Question 6: Suppose Investment 5 yields the highest expected outcome. To what
extent do you judge the decision to send something other than Message 5: "Investment
5 will yield the highest expected outcome." as:
• 1: Very dishonest ... 7: Very honest
• 1: Very manipulative ... 7: Not at all manipulative
• 1: Strongly associated with personal gains ... 7: Not at all associated with
personal gains
• 1: Strongly hurting the other participant ... 7: Not at all hurting the other
participant
Question 7: Consider the choices of the player who sent you a message. To what
extent do you judge the decision to send something other than the truthful message
as:
• 1: Very immoral ... 7: Very moral
• 1: Not at all praiseworthy ... 7: Very praiseworthy
• 1: Not at all blameworthy ... 7: Very blameworthy
• 1: Not at all outrageous ... 7: Very outrageous
• 1: Not at all acceptable ... 7: Very acceptable
Question 8: Individuals have an opportunity to choose which information they
provide to their audience, and they can modify information they obtain before pas-
sing this information on to others. Some view such modification as a violation of
truthfulness; others regard it as acceptable protection of personal interests. What do
you think about the value of truthfulness in such a situation? Truthfulness is about
something...
• ... that one should not sacrifice, no matter what the (material or other) benefits.
[1: Strongly Disagree ... 7: Strongly Agree]
• ... for which I think it is right to make a cost-benefit analysis. [1: Strongly
Disagree ... 7: Strongly Agree]
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• ... that cannot be measured in monetary terms. [1: Strongly Disagree ... 7:
• ... about which I can be flexible if the situation demands it. [1: Strongly
Disagree ... 7: Strongly Agree]
Thank you!
You have completed the experiment. Thank you for doing our study!
Very soon you will receive the fixed fee of $0.25. In the next hours we will randomly
match you with a player for Task 1 and another player for Task 3 and also pay the
bonus that you have earned depending on the rounds selected by the lotteries as well
as the other player’s choice. In addition you will receive the money you have earned
in Task 2. We usually manage to pay participants within 24 hours.
Do you have any comments or feedback regarding this experiment?





In this study you will play a decision making experiment that includes several
tasks. Please read the instructions carefully. You may earn a considerable sum of
money, depending on the decisions you make in the experiment.
In this experiment you will earn experimental points which will be converted to real
money at the end. The conversion rate is set such that 100 points in the experiment
correspond to $1.00 (i.e., $0.01 per point in the experiment). The accumulated money
you earn in these tasks will be paid to you at the end of the experiment in addition
to a fixed amount of $0.25 for participation.
Keep in mind that you will only be paid if you fully complete the study until the
end.
Task 1
In this task you will play 10 rounds of a short decision making game. Please read
the instructions carefully. You may earn a considerable sum of money, depending on
the decisions you make.
In the end, one of the 10 rounds will be randomly selected and you will be randomly
matched with another (anonymous) participant. Neither of you will know the identity
of the other. The money you earn in this particular round will be paid to you at the
end of the experiment in addition to the money you earn in the other tasks as well
as a fixed amount of $0.25 for participation. The conversion rate is set such that 100
points in the experiment correspond to $1.00 (i.e., $0.01 per point in the experiment).
Instructions
Before every round, we will roll a 6-sided die. The other participant will not be
informed about the outcome of the die roll. However, he or she will be told that you
have been informed about the outcome of the die roll. In every round, you will be
asked to send a message to the other participant. The message will correspond to a
number from 1 to 6. There are six possible messages:
• Message 1: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 1."
• Message 2: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 2."
• Message 3: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 3."
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• Message 4: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 4."
• Message 5: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 5."
• Message 6: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 6."
Your message will be shown to the other participant, and then he or she will be asked
to choose a number between 1 and 6.
The choice of the number by the other participant will determine the payments in
this task. For example:
• If he or she chooses the actual outcome of the roll of the die, then you will receive
35 points and he or she will receive 25 points.
• If he or she chooses a number different than the actual outcome, you will receive
28 points and he or she will receive 32 points.
Note that the monetary payments will change from round to round.
Finally, only you will be informed of the particular monetary value connected to
each number. The other participant will not be informed of these monetary values.
However, he or she will be told that you have been informed of the monetary value
connected to each number.
For your convenience, these instructions will remain available to you on all subse-
quent screens of this task.
On the next pages, you will have to answer two questions to make sure you under-
stand the instructions correctly. Keep in mind that you will only be paid if you fully
complete the study until the end.
Understanding Question [1-2] of 2
In this understanding question the monetary consequences are as follows:
• If he or she chooses the actual outcome of the roll of the die, then you will
receive [Sender Low Payoff] points and he or she will receive [Receiver High
Payoff] points.
• If he or she chooses a number different than the actual outcome of the roll of
the die, you will receive [Sender High Payoff] points and he or she will receive
[Receiver Low Payoff] points.
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The actual outcome of the die roll, which was conducted before starting this example
round, is "2".
Suppose you send the message: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is
5." and he or she chooses "2".
Which of the following will be the result of that round?
Round [1-10] of 10
Before starting this round, we have rolled a 6-sided die, and obtained the outcome
3. We ask you to send a message to the other participant. This message is the only
information he or she will receive. He or she will not be informed about the monetary
consequences of each option. In this round the monetary consequences are as follows:
• If he or she chooses the actual outcome of the roll of the die, then you will
receive [Sender Low Payoff] points and he or she will receive [Receiver High
Payoff] points.
• If he or she chooses a number different than the actual outcome of the roll of
the die, you will receive [Sender High Payoff] points and he or she will receive
[Receiver Low Payoff] points.
The message I will send is:
• Message 1: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 1."
• Message 2: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 2."
• Message 3: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 3."
• Message 4: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 4."
• Message 5: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 5."
• Message 6: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 6."
Question regarding your decisions
Out of 100 possible counterparts, how many do you think will follow your messages
(i.e., choose the number you mention in your message)?
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Question regarding your preferred way of payment
Task 1 summary
The round randomly drawn to be played with an anonymous counterpart is: Round
[ ]
In this round the actual outcome of the 6-sided die is: [ ] The associated monetary
consequences are:
• If he or she chooses the actual outcome of the roll of the die, then you will
receive [Sender Low Payoff] points and he or she will receive [Receiver High
Payoff] points.
• If he or she chooses a number different than the actual outcome of the roll of
the die, you will receive [Sender High Payoff] points and he or she will receive
[Receiver Low Payoff] points.
You have sent the following message to the other player: Message [ ]: "The outcome
from the roll of the 6-sided die is [ ]."
We are now asking how you would like to be paid for this task. You have the
choice between the outcome of the real game selected above whereas the other player
has not yet chosen a number or a lottery with known probabilities and the same two
possible outcomes.
Below you will find a list of 21 possible lotteries. Please indicate for each lottery
whether you prefer to receive the outcome from the selected round above (which is
either [Sender Low Payoff] or [Sender High Payoff] points depending on the action of
the other player) or the outcome from the lottery. The lotteries are designed such that
Lottery 1 will always pay you the highest possible outcome of the game, and Lottery
21 will always pay you less (in expectation) than the outcome of the game regardless
of the other participant’s decisions. The expected payoffs of Lotteries 2-20 lie between
Lottery 1 (the best lottery) and Lottery 21 (the worst lottery).
As a result most people begin by preferring the lottery and then switch to the
outcome of the game. Thus one way to view this task is to determine the best row
to stop checking the box for the lottery and start checking the box for the outcome
of the game. In the end one lottery corresponding to one row below will be randomly
selected and you will be paid according to your indicated preference. The other player
will receive the payment according to the game above regardless of your decision.
Preferring the lottery will affect your payment only.
Lottery 1: It pays [Sender Low Payoff] points with 0% probability (0 in 100) and
[Sender High Payoff] points with 100% probability (100 in 100).
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• I prefer Lottery 1. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
Lottery 2: It pays [Sender Low Payoff] points with 5% probability (5 in 100) and
[Sender High Payoff] points with 95% probability (95 in 100).50
• I prefer Lottery 2. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
Lottery 3: It pays [Sender Low Payoff] points with 10% probability (10 in 100)
and [Sender High Payoff] points with 90% probability (90 in 100).
• I prefer Lottery 3. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
Lottery 4: It pays [Sender Low Payoff] points with 15% probability (15 in 100)
and [Sender High Payoff] points with 85% probability (85 in 100).
• I prefer Lottery 4. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
Lottery 5: It pays [Sender Low Payoff] points with 20% probability (20 in 100)
and [Sender High Payoff] points with 80% probability (80 in 100).
• I prefer Lottery 5. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
Lottery 6: It pays [Sender Low Payoff] points with 25% probability (25 in 100)
and [Sender High Payoff] points with 75% probability (75 in 100).
• I prefer Lottery 6. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
Lottery 7: It pays [Sender Low Payoff] points with 30% probability (30 in 100)
and [Sender High Payoff] points with 70% probability (70 in 100).
• I prefer Lottery 7. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
Lottery 8: It pays [Sender Low Payoff] points with 35% probability (35 in 100)
and [Sender High Payoff] points with 65% probability (65 in 100).
• I prefer Lottery 8. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
Lottery 9: It pays [Sender Low Payoff] points with 40% probability (40 in 100)
and [Sender High Payoff] points with 60% probability (60 in 100).
• I prefer Lottery 9. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
Lottery 10: It pays [Sender Low Payoff] points with 45% probability (45 in 100)
and [Sender High Payoff] points with 55% probability (55 in 100).
• I prefer Lottery 10. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
Lottery 11: It pays [Sender Low Payoff] points with 50% probability (50 in 100)
and [Sender High Payoff] points with 50% probability (50 in 100).
• I prefer Lottery 11. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
50 The probabilities depicted here correspond to the case when a round is drawn in which the Sender’s
message was truthful. If a round with a deceitful message is randomly chosen the probabilities are
adjusted such that the lotteries again reflect the full range of possible first-order beliefs the Sender
might have in the game.
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Lottery 12: It pays [Sender Low Payoff] points with 55% probability (55 in 100)
and [Sender High Payoff] points with 45% probability (45 in 100).
• I prefer Lottery 12. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
Lottery 13: It pays [Sender Low Payoff] points with 60% probability (60 in 100)
and [Sender High Payoff] points with 40% probability (40 in 100).
• I prefer Lottery 13. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
Lottery 14: It pays [Sender Low Payoff] points with 65% probability (65 in 100)
and [Sender High Payoff] points with 35% probability (35 in 100).
• I prefer Lottery 14. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
Lottery 15: It pays [Sender Low Payoff] points with 70% probability (70 in 100)
and [Sender High Payoff] points with 30% probability (30 in 100).
• I prefer Lottery 15. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
Lottery 16: It pays [Sender Low Payoff] points with 75% probability (75 in 100)
and [Sender High Payoff] points with 25% probability (25 in 100).
• I prefer Lottery 16. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
Lottery 17: It pays [Sender Low Payoff] points with 80% probability (80 in 100)
and [Sender High Payoff] points with 20% probability (20 in 100).
• I prefer Lottery 17. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
Lottery 18: It pays [Sender Low Payoff] points with 85% probability (85 in 100)
and [Sender High Payoff] points with 15% probability (15 in 100).
• I prefer Lottery 18. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
Lottery 19: It pays [Sender Low Payoff] points with 90% probability (90 in 100)
and [Sender High Payoff] points with 10% probability (10 in 100).
• I prefer Lottery 19. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
Lottery 20: It pays [Sender Low Payoff] points with 95% probability (95 in 100)
and [Sender High Payoff] points with 5% probability (5 in 100).
• I prefer Lottery 20. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
Lottery 21: It pays [Sender Low Payoff] points with 100% probability (100 in 100)
and [Sender High Payoff] points with 0% probability (0 in 100).
• I prefer Lottery 21. • I prefer to obtain the outcome of the game above.
Task 2
In this task you will have to complete numerical patterns. You will see 10 patterns
and your task will be to determine the number that comes next in each series.
For each correctly solved pattern you will earn 10 points towards your total pay-
ment at the end of the experiment. The conversion rate is set such that 100 points in
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the experiment correspond to $1.00 (i.e., $0.01 per point in the experiment).
You have 120 seconds to determine as many missing numbers as possible. Once
time is over you will be automatically redirected to the next page. You may start the
clock by clicking on the button below.
Task 2
Time left to complete this page: [mm:ss]
Pattern 1: Determine which number comes next: 13, 17, 19, 23, 29, ?
Pattern 2: Determine which number comes next: 1, 4, 9, 16, 25, ?
Pattern 3: Determine which number comes next: 3, 18, 9, 54, 27, ?
Pattern 4: Determine which number comes next: 3, 4, 8, 11, 44, ?
Pattern 5: Determine which number comes next: 2, 5, 10, 17, 28, ?
Pattern 6: Determine which number comes next: 1, 1, 2, 6, 24, ?
Pattern 7: Determine which number comes next: 62, 54, 57, 49, 52, ?
Pattern 8: Determine which number comes next: 4, 12, 3, 9, 0, ?
Pattern 9: Determine which number comes next: 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, ?
Pattern 10: Determine which number comes next: 43, 32, 64, 53, 106, ?
Task 3
In this task you will play 10 rounds of a decision making game. In each round you
have to make several decisions. Please read the instructions carefully. You may earn
a considerable sum of money, depending on the decisions you make.
In the end, one of the 10 rounds will be randomly selected and you will be randomly
matched with another (anonymous) participant. You will never be matched with the
same participant as in Task 1. Neither of you will know the identity of the other.
The money you earn in this particular round will be paid to you at the end of the
experiment in addition to your earnings from the other tasks and a fixed amount
for participation. The conversion rate is set such that 100 points in the experiment
correspond to $1.00 (i.e., $0.01 per point in the experiment).
Instructions
Before every round, we will roll a 6-sided die. The other participant will not be
informed about the outcome of the die roll. However, he or she will be told that you
have been informed the outcome of the die roll. In every round, you will be asked to
send a message to the other participant. The message will correspond to a number
from 1 to 6. There are six possible messages:
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• Message 1: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 1."
• Message 2: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 2."
• Message 3: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 3."
• Message 4: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 4."
• Message 5: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 5."
• Message 6: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 6."
Your message will be shown to the other participant, and then he or she will be asked
to choose a number between 1 and 6.
The choice of the number by the other participant will determine the payments in
the experiment. For example:
• If he or she chooses the actual outcome of the roll of the die, then you will receive
35 points and he or she will receive 25 points.
• If he or she chooses a number different than the actual outcome, you will receive
28 points and he or she will receive 32 points.
Note that the monetary payments will change from round to round.
Again, only you will be informed of the particular monetary value connected to
each number. The other participant will not be informed of these monetary values.
However, he or she will be told that you have been informed of the monetary value
connected to each number.
In addition, you will always see a list of different participants with which you
might be matched. You will know exactly how often these participants will choose
the number that you send with your message. You will have to indicate the message
that you would like to send to each possible counterpart.
For your convenience, these instructions will remain available to you on all subse-
quent screens of this task.
Round [1-10] of 10
Before starting this round, we have rolled a 6-sided die, and obtained the outcome
3. We ask you to send a message to all possible counterparts. This message is the only
information he or she will receive. He or she will not be informed about the monetary
consequences of each option. In this round the monetary consequences are as follows:
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• If he or she chooses the actual outcome of the roll of the die, then you will
receive [Sender Low Payoff] points and he or she will receive [Receiver High
Payoff] points.
• If he or she chooses a number different than the actual outcome of the roll of
the die, you will receive [Sender High Payoff] points and he or she will receive
[Receiver Low Payoff] points.
Below you will find a list of the 21 participants with whom you might be matched. In
addition there is information how each of them will play.
Please indicate for each participant which message you would like to send him or
her. You will find the six possible messages which correspond to the six numbers in
the instructions below. In the end one participant will be randomly selected and you
will be paid according to your decisions.
Participant 1 will choose the number that you send in your message with 0%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 1?
• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
Participant 2 will choose the number that you send in your message with 5%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 2?
• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
Participant 3 will choose the number that you send in your message with 10%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 3?
• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
Participant 4 will choose the number that you send in your message with 15%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 4?
• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
Participant 5 will choose the number that you send in your message with 20%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 5?
• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
Participant 6 will choose the number that you send in your message with 25%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 6?
• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
Participant 7 will choose the number that you send in your message with 30%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 7?
• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
Participant 8 will choose the number that you send in your message with 35%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 8?
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• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
Participant 9 will choose the number that you send in your message with 40%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 9?
• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
Participant 10 will choose the number that you send in your message with 45%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 10?
• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
Participant 11 will choose the number that you send in your message with 50%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 11?
• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
Participant 12 will choose the number that you send in your message with 55%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 12?
• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
Participant 13 will choose the number that you send in your message with 60%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 13?
• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
Participant 14 will choose the number that you send in your message with 65%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 14?
• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
Participant 15 will choose the number that you send in your message with 70%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 15?
• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
Participant 16 will choose the number that you send in your message with 75%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 16?
• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
Participant 17 will choose the number that you send in your message with 80%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 17?
• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
Participant 18 will choose the number that you send in your message with 85%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 18?
• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
Participant 19 will choose the number that you send in your message with 90%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 19?
• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
Participant 20 will choose the number that you send in your message with 95%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 20?
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• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
Participant 21 will choose the number that you send in your message with 100%
probability. Which message would you send Participant 21?
• Message 1 • Message 2 • Message 3 • Message 4 • Message 5 • Message 6
Questionnaire
Question 1: Please indicate your gender:
• Female • Male
Question 2: Please indicate your age:
Question 3: What is the highest degree/level of education you have completed?
• No schooling • Elementary school • Middle school • High school • Undergraduate
school • Graduate school
Question 4: What is your average yearly household income (in USD)?
• < 20‘000 • 20‘001 - 40‘000 • 40‘001 - 60‘000 • 60‘001 - 80‘000 • 80‘001 - 100‘000
• > 100‘000 • I do not want to say
Question 5: To which religion do you belong?
• Christianity • Islam • Hinduism • Buddhism • Judaism • Folk religion • No
religion • Other
Question 6: Suppose the outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 5. To what
extent do you judge the decision to send something other than Message 5: "The
outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 5." as:51
• 1: Very dishonest ... 7: Very honest
• 1: Very manipulative ... 7: Not at all manipulative
• 1: Strongly associated with personal gains ... 7: Not at all associated with
personal gains
• 1: Strongly hurting the other participant ... 7: Not at all hurting the other
participant
51 The measure Prosoc is computed based on subquestions 2 and 4 while 1 and 3 serve as consistency
check.
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Question 7: Consider the choices of the player who sent a message. To what extent
do you judge the decision to send something other than the truthful message as:52
• 1: Very immoral ... 7: Very moral
• 1: Not at all praiseworthy ... 7: Very praiseworthy
• 1: Not at all blameworthy ... 7: Very blameworthy
• 1: Not at all outrageous ... 7: Very outrageous
• 1: Not at all acceptable ... 7: Very acceptable
Question 8: Individuals have an opportunity to choose which information they
provide to their audience, and they can modify information they obtain before pas-
sing this information on to others. Some view such modification as a violation of
truthfulness; others regard it as acceptable protection of personal interests. What do
you think about the value of truthfulness in such a situation? Truthfulness is about
something...
• ... that one should not sacrifice, no matter what the (material or other) benefits.
[1: Strongly Disagree ... 7: Strongly Agree]
• ... for which I think it is right to make a cost-benefit analysis. [1: Strongly
Disagree ... 7: Strongly Agree]
• ... that cannot be measured in monetary terms. [1: Strongly Disagree ... 7:
• ... about which I can be flexible if the situation demands it. [1: Strongly
Disagree ... 7: Strongly Agree]
Thank you!
You have completed the experiment session. Thank you for doing our study!
Very soon you will receive the fixed fee of $0.25. In the next hours we will randomly
match you with a player for Task 1 and another player for Task 3 and also pay the
bonus that you have earned depending on the rounds selected by the lotteries as well
52 In Questions 7 and 8, I restate some variables such that a large number always corresponds to strong
protected values for honesty.
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as the other participants’ choices. In addition you will receive the money you have
earned in Task 2. We usually manage to pay participants within 24 hours.
Do you have any comments or feedback regarding this experiment?
• Yes • No
1.D.2.2 Receiver
Introduction
In this study you will play a decision making experiment that includes three tasks.
Please read the instructions carefully. You may earn a considerable sum of money,
depending on the decisions you make in the experiment.
In this experiment you will earn experimental points which will be converted to real
money at the end. The conversion rate is set such that 100 points in the experiment
correspond to $1.00 (i.e., $0.01 per point in the experiment). The money you earn
in these tasks will be paid to you at the end of the experiment in addition to a fixed
amount of $0.25 for participation.




In this task you will play a short decision making game. Please read the instructi-
ons carefully. You may earn a considerable sum of money, depending on the decisions
you make in the experiment.
You will be randomly matched with another (anonymous) participant in this task.
Neither of you will know the identity of the other.
We have rolled a 6-sided die, and told the outcome of it to the other participant,
but we are not going to tell it to you.
After being informed of the roll of the die, the other participant will send a message
to you. The message corresponds to a number from 1 to 6. There are six possible
messages:
• Message 1: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 1."
• Message 2: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 2."
• Message 3: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 3."
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• Message 4: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 4."
• Message 5: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 5."
• Message 6: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 6."
We will ask you to choose a number between 1 and 6. The message you receive is the
only information you will have regarding the roll of the die. Your choice of a number
will determine the payments according to two different options, known only to the
other participant.
If you will choose the same number as the number that came up in the roll of the
die you will be paid more than if the number is different than the actual number. For
your convenience, these instructions will remain available to you on all subsequent
screens of this task.
Decisions
The other participant will send you a message. For every possible message we ask
you to choose one of the six numbers. Your choice will determine the payments to
both of you.
Decision 1: Suppose the other participant sent you: Message 1: "The outcome
from the roll of the 6-sided die is 1."
Given this message the number I choose is:
• 1 • 2 • 3 • 4 • 5 • 6
Decision 2: Suppose the other participant sent you: Message 2: "The outcome
from the roll of the 6-sided die is 2."
Given this message the number I choose is:
• 1 • 2 • 3 • 4 • 5 • 6
Decision 3: Suppose the other participant sent you: Message 3: "The outcome
from the roll of the 6-sided die is 3."
Given this message the number I choose is:
• 1 • 2 • 3 • 4 • 5 • 6
Decision 4: Suppose the other participant sent you: Message 4: "The outcome
from the roll of the 6-sided die is 4."
Given this message the number I choose is:
• 1 • 2 • 3 • 4 • 5 • 6
Decision 5: Suppose the other participant sent you: Message 5: "The outcome
from the roll of the 6-sided die is 5."
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Given this message the number I choose is:
• 1 • 2 • 3 • 4 • 5 • 6
Decision 6: Suppose the other participant sent you: Message 6: "The outcome
from the roll of the 6-sided die is 6."
Given this message the number I choose is:
• 1 • 2 • 3 • 4 • 5 • 6
Question regarding your decisions
Out of 100 possible counterparts, how many do you think will send you a truthful
message (i.e., send the message with the number of the actual outcome from the roll
of the 6-sided die)?
Task 2
In this task you will have to complete numerical patterns. You will see 10 patterns
and your task will be to determine the number that comes next in each series.
For each correctly solved pattern you will earn 10 points towards your total pay-
ment at the end of the experiment. The conversion rate is set such that 100 points in
the experiment correspond to $1.00 (i.e., $0.01 per point in the experiment).
You have 120 seconds to determine as many missing numbers as possible. Once
time is over you will be automatically redirected to the next page. You may start the
clock by clicking on the button below.
This task is followed by some general questions.
Task 2
Time left to complete this page: [mm:ss]
Pattern 1: Determine which number comes next: 13, 17, 19, 23, 29, ?
Pattern 2: Determine which number comes next: 1, 4, 9, 16, 25, ?
Pattern 3: Determine which number comes next: 3, 18, 9, 54, 27, ?
Pattern 4: Determine which number comes next: 3, 4, 8, 11, 44, ?
Pattern 5: Determine which number comes next: 2, 5, 10, 17, 28, ?
Pattern 6: Determine which number comes next: 1, 1, 2, 6, 24, ?
Pattern 7: Determine which number comes next: 62, 54, 57, 49, 52, ?
Pattern 8: Determine which number comes next: 4, 12, 3, 9, 0, ?
Pattern 9: Determine which number comes next: 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, ?
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Pattern 10: Determine which number comes next: 43, 32, 64, 53, 106, ?
Task 3
Instructions
Please read the instructions carefully. You may earn a considerable sum of money,
depending on the decisions you make in this task.
In this task you will face decision situations with 10 anonymous participants.
Neither of you will know the identity of the other.
We have rolled a 6-sided die, and told the outcome of it to the other participant,
but we are not going to tell it to you.
After being informed of the roll of the die, the other participant will send a message
to you. The message corresponds to a number from 1 to 6. There are six possible
messages:
• Message 1: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 1."
• Message 2: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 2."
• Message 3: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 3."
• Message 4: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 4."
• Message 5: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 5."
• Message 6: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 6."
The message you receive is the only information you will have regarding the roll of
the die. We will ask you to choose a number between 1 and 6. In addition, you are
forced to choose the number that was stated in the message exactly [ ] times in total
(out of 60 decisions).
In the end a lottery will randomly determine with which of the seven participants
you will be matched. Your choice of a number will determine the payments in the
experiment according to two different options, known only to the other participant.
If you will choose the same number as the number that came up in the roll of the die
you will be paid more than if the number is different than the actual number.
For your convenience, these instructions will remain available to you on all subse-
quent screens of this task.
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Decisions for Participant [1-10]
Participant [1-10] will send you a message. For every possible message we ask you
to choose one of the six numbers. Your choice will determine the payments to both of
you.
Keep in mind that you must choose the same number as the one in the message
in exactly [ ] out of the 60 cases in total.
You have already chosen a number equal to the number stated in the message [ ]
times. This means that you must do so in [ ] more cases.
Decision 1: Suppose the other participant sent you: Message 1: "The outcome
from the roll of the 6-sided die is 1."
Given this message the number I choose is:
• 1 • 2 • 3 • 4 • 5 • 6
Decision 2: Suppose the other participant sent you: Message 2: "The outcome
from the roll of the 6-sided die is 2."
Given this message the number I choose is:
• 1 • 2 • 3 • 4 • 5 • 6
Decision 3: Suppose the other participant sent you: Message 3: "The outcome
from the roll of the 6-sided die is 3."
Given this message the number I choose is:
• 1 • 2 • 3 • 4 • 5 • 6
Decision 4: Suppose the other participant sent you: Message 4: "The outcome
from the roll of the 6-sided die is 4."
Given this message the number I choose is:
• 1 • 2 • 3 • 4 • 5 • 6
Decision 5: Suppose the other participant sent you: Message 5: "The outcome
from the roll of the 6-sided die is 5."
Given this message the number I choose is:
• 1 • 2 • 3 • 4 • 5 • 6
Decision 6: Suppose the other participant sent you: Message 6: "The outcome
from the roll of the 6-sided die is 6."
Given this message the number I choose is:
• 1 • 2 • 3 • 4 • 5 • 6
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Questionnaire
Question 1: Please indicate your gender:
• Female • Male
Question 2: Please indicate your age:
Question 3: What is the highest degree/level of education you have completed?
• No schooling • Elementary school • Middle school • High school • Undergraduate
school • Graduate school
Question 4: What is your average yearly household income (in USD)?
• < 20‘000 • 20‘001 - 40‘000 • 40‘001 - 60‘000 • 60‘001 - 80‘000 • 80‘001 - 100‘000
• > 100‘000 • I do not want to say
Question 5: To which religion do you belong?
• Christianity • Islam • Hinduism • Buddhism • Judaism • Folk religion • No
religion • Other
Question 6: Suppose the outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 5. To what
extent do you judge the decision to send something other than Message 5: "The
outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 5." as:
• 1: Very dishonest ... 7: Very honest
• 1: Very manipulative ... 7: Not at all manipulative
• 1: Strongly associated with personal gains ... 7: Not at all associated with
personal gains
• 1: Strongly hurting the other participant ... 7: Not at all hurting the other
participant
Question 7: Consider the choices of the player who sent you a message. To what
extent do you judge the decision to send something other than the truthful message
as:
• 1: Very immoral ... 7: Very moral
• 1: Not at all praiseworthy ... 7: Very praiseworthy
• 1: Not at all blameworthy ... 7: Very blameworthy
• 1: Not at all outrageous ... 7: Very outrageous
• 1: Not at all acceptable ... 7: Very acceptable
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Question 8: Individuals have an opportunity to choose which information they
provide to their audience, and they can modify information they obtain before pas-
sing this information on to others. Some view such modification as a violation of
truthfulness; others regard it as acceptable protection of personal interests. What do
you think about the value of truthfulness in such a situation? Truthfulness is about
something...
• ... that one should not sacrifice, no matter what the (material or other) benefits.
[1: Strongly Disagree ... 7: Strongly Agree]
• ... for which I think it is right to make a cost-benefit analysis. [1: Strongly
Disagree ... 7: Strongly Agree]
• ... that cannot be measured in monetary terms. [1: Strongly Disagree ... 7:
• ... about which I can be flexible if the situation demands it. [1: Strongly
Disagree ... 7: Strongly Agree]
Thank you!
You have completed the experiment. Thank you for doing our study!
Very soon you will receive the fixed fee of $0.25. In the next hours we will randomly
match you with a player for Task 1 and another player for Task 3 and also pay the
bonus that you have earned depending on the rounds selected by the lotteries as well
as the other player’s choice. In addition you will receive the money you have earned
in Task 2. We usually manage to pay participants within 24 hours.
Do you have any comments or feedback regarding this experiment?
• Yes • No

2 Model Selection from Experimental Data:
Evidence from Individual Lying Behavior∗
with Joel Sobel and Alexander F. Wagner
2.1 Introduction
Economic theory designs general models to organize behavioral observations and to make
predictions in novel situations. Experimental economics identifies simple situations in
which standard models fail to organize data and uses the experimental evidence to support
alternative assumptions. In this paper, we show that offering a new model that organizes a
particular data set better than a given candidate model does not provide evidence that the
new model is useful in other situations. While the basic notion of a difference between
in-sample and out-of-sample performance is well-known, its relevance for experimental
research may be underappreciated and undocumented.
This paper collects experimental data on two familiar games of communication that we
adapt from Gneezy (2005) and Erat and Gneezy (2012). After the Sender privately learns
the state, she is allowed to send a message about the state to the Receiver before the latter
takes an action that determines the payoff of both players. We specify monetary payoffs
such that the Sender would always like the Receiver not to match the true state, thus
providing incentives to lie. We say that the Sender lies if her statement does not match
her private information. We run variations of these experiments with a heterogeneous
sample of Amazon Mechanical Turk (mTurk) users in the US, collecting data on 9000
decisions of 400 individuals. Consistent with existing studies, we find that some Senders
tell the truth even though doing so does not maximize their monetary payoff.
We use a subset of the data to classify subjects into five types. We then study how
well this classification organizes the remaining data. The analysis provides insight into the
range of preferences for honesty present in the population. It also delivers more general
∗ We would like to thank Johannes Abeler, Zachary Breig, Helga Fehr-Duda, Michel Maréchal, Bettina
Rockenbach, participants at the Spring School in Behavioral Economics at UCSD, the Morality, In-
centives and Unethical Behavior Conference, the UCSD Economics Department brown bag seminar,
and the UZH PhD Poster Workshop for very helpful comments and suggestions. Part of this paper
was developed while Bögli was a visiting PhD student at UCSD. Financial support from the Swiss
Finance Institute is gratefully acknowledged.
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insights into the problem of model selection and into how model specifications derived
from one data set lead to useful predictions in novel contexts. We hope to stimulate
further work aimed at comparing how to select one model from several available ones.
The specific games we study are of particular interest to behavioral economics. There
are many situations in which people can earn direct rewards from dishonest behavior.
While people take advantage of these opportunities, there is substantial evidence that at
least some people are reluctant to do so. Understanding the extent to which a narrow de-
finition of utility (maximizing monetary behavior) fails to describe behavior is a necessary
first step to understanding how to build and maintain institutions that lead to desirable
outcomes even in the presence of temptations to lie.
A convincing body of evidence indicates that people are willing to lie when lying
brings direct economic benefits, but that some people also do not like to lie. We wish
to organize our findings by trying to set the extent to which subjects’ behavior can be
described by a small set of pre-specified utility functions. Based on Abeler et al.’s (2016)
comprehensive meta-study on lying we consider five broad categories of preferences: (i)
standard economic theory, (ii) inequity aversion, (iii) reference-dependent preferences, (iv)
lying costs, and (v) reputation or social norms.
Subjects in the first category simply maximize their expected monetary payoff. These
subjects lie whenever there are economic benefits to lying. Inequity averse agents dislike
differences in payoffs between themselves and the other player.1 Inequity-averse indivi-
duals prefer to behave honestly when reporting dishonestly generates a large difference in
payoffs compared to the status quo. Reference-dependent preferences posit that utility de-
pends on personal expectations. These individuals derive utility in relation to a reference
point, e.g., the expected payoff.2 Lying costs correspond to the idea that participants
incur a private cost when telling a lie. Moral reasons, self-image concerns or injunctive
social norms may lead to such costs.3 Finally, reputation and descriptive social norms
might be associated with honesty.4 A higher fraction of individuals acting honestly may
increase the utility costs of dishonesty, and participants may dislike to act in the same
way as dishonest people.
1 Examples of models of inequity aversion are Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).
2 Köszegi and Rabin (2006) provide the seminal model featuring expectations as reference points.
3 There are several different lying cost characterizations in the literature. E.g., Kartik (2009), López-
Pérez and Spiegelman (2013), or Gneezy et al. (2016)
4 Examples of studies that consider some form of a reputation for honesty, social identity or social norms
include: Akerlof (1983), Weibull and Villa (2005), Mazar et al. (2008), and Fischbacher and Heusi
(2013) among others. Note that experiments such as Fischbacher and Heusi (2013) are anonymous.
They conclude that reputational concerns towards others are not critical. Ellingsen and Johannesson
(2008), too, conclude that social esteem may, in fact, play a role even in anonymous settings. No-
netheless explicit reputation and repeated interaction could likely induce an additional tendency to
behave more or less honestly.
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Although some evidence exists on the empirics of truthfulness preferences,5 little is
known about the heterogeneity of preferences within the population and the relative
importance of different preferences in explaining lying behavior. Knowing the distribution
of preferences for truthfulness would improve our understanding of human lying behavior
and possibly allow us to anticipate different truth-telling patterns. A similar situation
arises when researchers try to select the best model of behavior in settings involving
potential pro-social choices. Methodologically, our contribution, therefore, is to provide a
framework that can also be employed in other instances where researchers are interested
in assessing plausible preference specifications.
First, we estimate parameters of a simple utility specification conditional on being
a member of either type for each participant. Then, we let the data tell us which of
all available types explains an individual’s behavior best. As we consider all possible
combinations of types, we have to account for 31 possible worlds (5 one-type worlds, 10
two-type worlds, 10 three-type worlds, 5 four-type worlds, and 1 five-type world). Hence
in a given world not every type is available. We assign each participant to the type among
all available types of a given world that explains individual behavior best.6
The second step of our model selection analysis is to analyze how well the 31 worlds
fit the data in-sample and out-of-sample. We split the sample into an estimation part (in-
sample) and a prediction part (out-of-sample). As the in-sample part we define the set of
decisions which is used for the first step of our analysis, i.e., estimation and classification.
The out-of-sample part consists of all remaining decisions. We derive the parameter
estimates and the classification based on the in-sample part and analyze how well these
parameters fit behavior out-of-sample. In addition, we are interested in how the quality
of the in-sample and the out-of-sample fit depend on the number of decisions used to
estimate and classify participants into types.
We compute a quality measure in order to assess the performance of the fits. We
compute the utilities of lying and not lying based on the estimated parameters for every
participant and take the message that yields a higher utility. We then compare predicted
decisions to real decisions and compute the number of correctly fitted decisions in relation
to the total number of decisions, this is our accuracy measure.
5 Abeler et al. (2014) find lying costs to be large and widespread among the German population. Gibson
et al. (2013) provide evidence for heterogeneity of these costs across and within individuals. Gneezy
et al. (2013) classify people into broad types, including those who never lie, those who always lie, and
those who react to economic incentives.
6 A central feature of our analysis is that we only use behavior to classify individuals. The alternative
is to run regressions of individual behavior on certain measurable characteristics of individuals and
then to use the estimated regression parameters to make predictions for the future behavior of those
individuals, conditional on their characteristics. We show that these characteristics (except some that
are in general hard to measure, such as intrinsic values) explain little of variation in behavior.
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Because the number of conceivable worlds is large, we restrict our attention to unique
and well performing worlds. Specifically, we eliminate worlds equivalent to a world that
allows for fewer types and dominated worlds. Two worlds with different numbers of types
are considered equivalent if they assign participants to the same types. This implies that
at least one type is redundant and contains no members. As a result, the world in which
a given type is redundant can be eliminated in favor of a smaller world that considers the
same types except the redundant. Dominated worlds are those whose in- or out-of-sample
fit is strictly worse than another world’s, regardless of the number of observations used
to estimate parameters and to classify participants to types.
Our results are similar in the two slightly different environments: First, the quality
of the in-sample fit exhibits a (broadly) decreasing convex and the out-of-sample fit an
increasing concave shape with respect to the number of decisions used for the estimation.
That is, adding data points allows us to fit in-sample worse at a decreasing rate and
out-of-sample better at a decreasing rate. Second, worlds that fit the data well in-sample
do not necessarily perform well out-of-sample and vice versa. The quality of an in-sample
fit conveys no information about the quality of an out-of-sample fit for a fixed number of
observations in each of the two samples. Third, the size of the in-sample part is important
for determining the best possible world in-sample and out-of-sample. Finally, we provide
indicative evidence that the share of each type within the whole population is quite stable
across the two situations we study.
When only a small number of decisions is used to estimate and classify, lying costs
explain behavior best in-sample. However, they do poorly in-sample once more data are
collected. More importantly, they do poorly relative to other models in predicting lying
behavior out-of-sample. A world consisting of three types – reference-dependent prefe-
rences, lying costs, and a concern for reputation and descriptive social norms – organizes
lying behavior best when combining in-sample and out-of-sample performance. In this
three-type world (and in the benchmark five-type world) lying costs and reputation/social
norm concerns make up the largest shares in the population. The natural caveat here is
that in a richer setting – for example, one that involves repeated interactions – other
preference models would perhaps be available.
We reach a simple but instructive conclusion. The quality of the in-sample fit of a
model does not say anything about how well that model will be able to explain future
behavior. Similarly, worlds that perform comparably poorly in-sample might do a decent
job in organizing future data sets. As a consequence, it is crucial that researchers are very
cautious when deciding about a preferred model based on an in-sample methodology only.
The most important safeguard against this error is to collect data on a large number of
decisions.
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Our study makes methodological and substantive contributions. Methodologically,
this paper contributes to a small recent literature on model selection in experiments (e.g.,
Ericson et al. (2015), Peysakhovich and Naecker (2017), and Breig (2017)). These papers
study model selection in the domains of preferences over time, risk, and/or ambiguity.
The latter two studies provide evidence that it depends on the context whether a better
in-sample fit also implies a more accurate out-of-sample prediction. All of these studies
focus on one-type worlds.7 We instead also consider worlds consisting of several types to
which participants are assigned according to their behavior. This allows us to study how
the distribution of types depends on the number of observations, and to document that
having more types available does not necessarily improve the predictions.
Thematically, our study links to the broad experimental literature on strategic infor-
mation transmission games (e.g., Dickhaut et al. (1995), Blume et al. (1998), Cai and
Wang (2006), Wang et al. (2010) among others) and deception in general (Bucciol et al.
(2013), Fischbacher and Heusi (2013)). However, our focus lies, on the one hand, on
model selection in strategic information transmission environments per se and, on the ot-
her hand, on the heterogeneity of preferences that lead to untruthful reporting of agents.
Our paper is most closely related to the meta-study of Abeler et al. (2016) as we rely
on five types which correspond to different broad categories of explanations according to
their structural characterization. In addition, both Abeler et al. (2016) and we aim at
investigating what kind of preferences for honesty can best explain lying. While they
apply a meta-study of existing data, excluding models one-by-one that cannot organize
these in-samples, we collect new data, which allows us to run an extensive statistical ana-
lysis. Most importantly, we are able to compare how well different models fit lying data
in-sample and out-of-sample.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 explains the experi-
mental design. In Section 2.3, we introduce the estimation as well as the classification
and highlight the statistical methodology. Section 2.4 describes the sample as well as
its descriptive statistics. Section 2.5 conducts the model selection and provides results.
Section 2.6 is a conclusion.
7 Only Breig (2017) in one analysis investigates the performance of a world that allows for two different
risk preferences.
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2.2 Experimental Methodology
2.2.1 Games
We slightly adapt two well-established sender-receiver games from the literature. Alt-
hough both share the conceptual roots in the cheap-talk literature, their structures differ
somewhat.
Game A follows Gneezy (2005) where the Sender is informed about two payoff options
(named Option X and Y) conditional on the Receiver’s action. Knowing the payoff matrix,
she must provide a message concerning the payoffs to the Receiver. The message space
consists of two messages:
1. “Option X will earn you more money than Option Y .”
2. “Option Y will earn you more money than Option X.”
The Receiver does not (and will never) know the payoffs. His choice (either Option X
or Y ) determines the payment to both players. Finally, the players are paid according to
the Receiver’s action.
In Game B we adapt the game of Erat and Gneezy (2012). Nature rolls a 6-sided die
in the beginning. The Sender privately observes the outcome from the roll of the 6-sided
die. In addition, the Sender is informed about the two payoff options: Option X if the
Receiver chooses the actual number from the roll of the die, and Option Y if the Receiver
chooses any number different from the actual outcome of the roll of the 6-sided die. The
Sender must send a message about the actual outcome to the Receiver. The message
space consists of six messages. For i = {1, 2, . . . 6}, message i is:
The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is i.
The Receiver does not (and will never) know the payoffs. He chooses one number upon
receiving the Sender’s message. The payments to both players depend on whether the
Receiver picked the actual outcome of the roll of the die.
2.2.2 Payoffs
We use the same set of payoff matrices for both games. We specify the payoffs in order
to provide economic incentives to lie (ΠS (a, θ) > ΠS (θ, θ) when a 6= θ), i.e., the Sender’s
payoff ΠS if the Receiver chooses any action a that is different from the state θ is larger
than the Sender’s payoff if the Receiver’s action matches the state. We further assume that
monetary payoffs depend only on whether a = θ so that the quantity ΠS (a, θ) − ΠS (θ, θ)
is constant when a 6= θ. When a 6= θ, this quantity is the monetary cost of stating the
Chapter 2 113
truth, which we denote by Ξ > 0 and call ECOST. In both games, the Sender’s payoff
is maximized when the Receiver chooses the option that does not lead to the Receiver’s
higher payoff. Assuming that the Receiver chooses the outcome that maximizes his payoffs
under the assumption that the Sender’s message is accurate,8 the Sender has monetary
incentives to lie. We vary Ξ to investigate the consequences of changing ECOST on
truth-telling behavior. Overall, we use 15 differing values of ECOST ranging from $0.05
to $0.75.9
Table 2.A.1 in Appendix 2.A displays all payoff matrices. As an illustration, one
specific payoff matrix is displayed in Figure 2.1. This particular payoff matrix corresponds
to the matrix depicted in the first row of the Ξ = $0.25 box in the first column of
Table 2.A.1. While participants see the payoffs in experimental currency units that are
exchanged at a rate of $0.05 per unit, we directly state payoffs in terms of $ values here.
Receiver




Figure 2.1: Payoff matrix example
Given this, the payoffs are ($1.10, $1.15) if a = θ, i.e., $1.10 for the Sender and
$1.15 for the Receiver, and ($1.35, $0.60) if a 6= θ, i.e., $1.35 for the Sender and $0.60
for the Receiver. Consequently, the monetary incentives of lying amount to $0.25 (=
$1.35 − $1.10).
Each participant plays one game either in the role of a Sender or a Receiver. We
collect comprehensive data for Senders. Specifically, we put the Sender in K = 45 differing
and randomly ordered decision situations. We apply a direct elicitation method for the
Sender’s strategies. Each of the 15 ECOST levels is played three times. While the Sender
plays 45 independent rounds with varying payoff matrices, we use the strategy-method to
elicit the Receiver’s behavior as he has no knowledge about the payoff options and hence
his strategic decision situation does not vary across rounds.
In addition, we elicit the player’s first-order beliefs about the other player’s action.
Finally, a questionnaire eliciting demographic characteristics and protected values (as
in Tanner et al. (2009) and Gibson et al. (2013)) and prosocial concerns completes our
8 This assumption is consistent with the data.
9 The implied effect on the Sender’s average compensation is between 3.1% (= 0.05/1.60) and 46.9%
(= 0.75/1.60).
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experiment.10 In order to determine the payments to both players, one of the Sender’s 45
rounds is randomly selected and matched with the Receiver’s corresponding action. The
anonymously matched participants are paid according to the outcome induced by their
behavior. All participants were paid within 24 hours after completion of the experiment.
We ran two sessions of the experiment in March and August 2015. The experiment is
programmed and conducted with the experimental software oTree (Chen et al. (2015)).
Appendix 2.B contains the complete set of experimental instructions.
2.3 Estimation, Classification and Model Selection
2.3.1 Types
Let the Sender’s utility in a given state conditional on belonging to type t be
U ti (a, θ,mi) = Π
S(a, θ) − Ψti(a, θ,mi),
where ΠS(·) denotes the Sender’s payoff if nature draws θ, the Sender’s message is mi, and
the Receiver chooses a. Varying the functional form of Ψti(·) determines the type of model
that describes the Sender’s preferences.11 The literature of deception and lying suggests
several models to describe lying behavior. Abeler et al. (2016) provide a comprehensive
meta-study. We follow their general set up and restrict attention to five broad categories
of lying costs: (i) standard economic theory (EC ), (ii) social preferences in the form of
inequity aversion (IA), (iii) reference-dependent preferences (RD), (iv) lying costs (LC ),
and (v) reputation or social norms (SN ).12
(i) The first type of agent maximizes her own monetary payoff according to the standard
economic model (EC). Consequently, EC participants are willing to lie whenever
there are economic benefits to lying as ΨECi (·) ≡ 0. Since our payoff matrices always
feature such incentives to tell a lie, participants are expected to report dishonestly if
they believe the Receiver to follow their message in more than one half of all cases in
10 As prosociality is not our main focus, we use a simple prosocial concerns measure that is based on
two survey questions. There are more sophisticated prosocial concerns measures (see, e.g., Van Lange
et al. (1997)).
11 Note that Ψti may sometimes depend on other parameters.
12 Of course these five types do not form a complete taxonomy. While we stick to models suggested
by Abeler et al. (2016), there might be other models that could do a much better job in organizing
data. In addition, even for the broad types that we consider, there are other specifications how such
preferences could be characterized. Our approach therefore serves as a proof of concept for a popular
selection of models rather than a conclusive analysis on the whole universe of possible lying models.
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Game A and more than one sixth of all cases in Game B.13 EC Participants derive
utility UECi (a, θ,mi) = Π
S(a, θ).
(ii) Interdependent preferences imply that utility depends on other participants’ payoffs.
Specifically, we consider inequity aversion where participants might have a distaste
for a big difference in the payoffs between Sender and Receiver. Bolton and Ocken-
fels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) introduce models of inequity aversion (IA).
Individuals motivated by IA would hence prefer to behave honestly if reporting un-
truthfully implied a substantial difference in payoffs compared to the status quo. We
consequently define ΨIAi (·) ≡ max
(
ΠR(a, θ) − ΠS(a, θ), 0
)
and consider the utility
specification
U IAi (a, θ,mi) = Π
S(a, θ) − γIA max
(
ΠR(a, θ) − ΠS(a, θ), 0
)
,
where γIA denotes the coefficient that loads on to the difference between the Re-
ceiver’s and the Sender’s payoff. From a Sender’s perspective this difference corre-
sponds to the negative inequity in a given state. Due to the design of our payoff
matrices negative and positive inequity are perfectly (negatively) correlated. As a
consequence, we cannot differentiate between an increase in negative inequity and a
decrease in positive inequity or vice versa. Hence we only consider negative inequity.
(iii) Reference-dependent (RD) preferences suggest that utility depends on personal ex-
pectations. RD individuals derive utility in relation to a reference point, e.g., the
expected payoff. Köszegi and Rabin (2006) provide the seminal model featuring
expectations-dependent reference points. We assume ΨRDi (·) ≡
(




and compute the utility specification as
URDi (a, θ,mi) = Π
S(a, θ) + γRD
(





where γRD reflects a coefficient that measures the importance of the reference point.
The expectation of the payoff depends on the Sender’s first-order belief, i.e., the sub-
jective likelihood that the Receiver’s action will match the message. If the possible
gain of lying is high compared to the expected payoff in the status quo, participants
will tend to lie more (Garbarino et al. (2017)).
13 In Game A, if the Receiver follows the Sender’s message with probability p, the gain from lying is
(2p− 1)Ξ. In Game B, if the Receiver follows the Sender’s message with probability p and otherwise
selects randomly, the Sender obtains her preferred action with probability p+ .8(1 − p) if she lies and
with probability (1 − p) if she tells the truth. Hence her monetary payoff is maximized by lying if
p > 1/6. In Appendix 2.C, we illustrate the expected utility computation for all types.
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(iv) Lying costs (LC) refer to the idea that participants incur a private cost when telling
a lie. Moral reasons, self-image concerns or injunctive social norms may lead to such
costs. There are several different lying cost characterizations in the literature: Pure
lying aversion postulates that lies are costly since uttering a lie per se triggers bad
feelings implying losses in utility (e.g., Kartik (2009), López-Pérez and Spiegelman
(2013)). Others, e.g., Gibson et al. (2013), suggest that lying costs are increasing in
the incentives provided to lying, or, e.g., Gneezy et al. (2016) argue that they depend
on the three dimensions: payoff of the player, outcome of the private information,
and likelihood of the lie.
For convenience we posit lying costs to be convex and increasing in the monetary
incentives of lying and define ΨLCi (·) ≡ (α+ βΞ + ρΞ2)✶mi 6=θ. Whenever these lying
costs are smaller than the possible gain of deviating from the truth, LC individuals
will report untruthfully. The utility representation reads
ULCi (a, θ,mi) = Π
S(a, θ) −
(
α+ βΞ + ρΞ2
)
✶mi 6=θ,
where α, β, and ρ are the coefficients for the constant, the linear and the convex
term of ECOST, respectively. Lying costs occur if the Sender lies, i.e., if the message
deviates from the state.
(v) Social norms (SN) accounts for the effects of reputation and descriptive social norms
that might be associated with honesty. The idea of reputation for honesty is that
participants dislike to act in the same way as dishonest people. Since only the
experimenter observes whether a participant reports honestly, reputation for honesty
in our setting does not consider how participants are perceived by others. Similarly,
descriptive social norms for honesty increase the utility costs of dishonesty. We





✶mi 6=θ and use the utility characterization
USNi (a, θ,m) = Π






where γSN is the individual coefficient that loads on the average proportion of trut-
hful reports in a given situation. The higher the proportion of truthful reports in
a given game the lower are the incentives to lie due to concerns for reputation and
social norms. Consequently, SN participants are expected to report deceitfully more
often if other people do so frequently too. Unlike the other specification, in this
specification m represents the entire set of messages sent by the population, with
mj the message of Sender j. As only the experimenter observes whether a partici-
pant reports honestly, reputation for honesty in our setting does not consider how
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participants are perceived by others. As we analyze several types in one single data
set our simplistic form of SN should be sufficient. However, there are also other
characterizations of reputation and social norms. Studies that consider some form
of a reputation for honesty or social norms include, among others, Akerlof (1983),
Weibull and Villa (2005), Mazar et al. (2008), Fischbacher and Heusi (2013), López-
Pérez and Spiegelman (2013), Dufwenberg and Dufwenberg (2016), Khalmetski and
Sliwka (2017). Mazar et al. (2008) and Fischbacher and Heusi (2013) argue that
even in anonymous settings such motivations can be at play.
2.3.2 Estimation













where η(i, k | t) = E[U ti (ak, θk, θ′k) − U ti (ak, θk, θk)]/λi, θ′k 6= θk is the gain in expected
utility associated with lying if Sender i has type t ∈ {EC, IA, RD, LC, SN} preferences.
In Appendix 2.C, we provide the respective expected utility computations conditional
on belonging to either of the five types. The parameter λi reflects a scale parameter
measuring the degree of erroneous play. We allow for players making suboptimal decisions
and maximizing U ti (·)+λiǫ instead, where ǫ denotes logistic errors. Tik is a binary variable
taking the value one if the Sender i states the truth in decision k, and zero else.
Because we are only interested in Sender behavior and how incentives rather than
first-order beliefs influence behavior, we neglect Receiver behavior and assume Senders’
first-order beliefs to equal one, i.e, Receivers to be credulous. As a consequence, our
analysis is not subject to possible belief misstatements by participants who want to look
more ethical and thus adjust their self-reported beliefs as shown by, e.g., Andreoni and
Sanchez (2014). However, we also conduct the full analysis using self-reported first-order
beliefs to derive expected utilities. We find qualitatively similar results, which are available
on request.
We apply a maximum likelihood procedure to estimate this random effects logit mo-
del.14 We estimate the parameters in Ψ(·) and the degree of erroneous play at the in-
14 For computational simplicity we set lower and upper bounds for the parameter estimates. Neither a
change in the bounds nor the initial values of the parameters has a substantial effect on this paper’s
findings.
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dividual level conditional on the five different types. Having computed the individual
likelihood for each type, we proceed with the classification of all participants.
2.3.3 Classification
Because it is our goal to compare and analyze worlds with several types, we have to first
sketch out the whole space of possible type combinations. All possible type combinations
yield 31 different worlds: 5 worlds with only one type, 10 worlds with two types, 10 worlds
with three types, 5 worlds with four types, and one world with all five types. The list of
the 31 models is displayed in Table 2.D.1 in Appendix 2.D. Having a broad variety of
different worlds, we can analyze what combination of types explains the data best.
After having computed the log-likelihood conditional on belonging to each single
type in a given world, we assign every participant to the type which yields the hig-
hest log-likelihood in-sample. Based on the resulting assignment we sum the respective
log-likelihoods Lti of all participants in order to derive the total log-likelihood of a given
world. Note that for this procedure we only use behavioral information. This approach
deliberately leaves aside potentially relevant information that could be gleaned from other
personal characteristics.
2.3.4 Model Selection
Having completed the classification, our goal is to analyze how well the 31 worlds fit the
data in-sample as well as out-of-sample. First, we split the sample into an estimation
part (in-sample) and a prediction part (out-of-sample). We use the in-sample decisions
to estimate individual parameters of the different types and to classify people into types.
The out-of-sample decisions are those not used for estimation and classification. We use
the classification based on in-sample decisions to compute the quality of the out-of-sample
estimates. We are interested in how the quality of the in-sample and the out-of-sample
fits depend on the number of decisions used to estimate and classify participants into
types.
We compare the different worlds as follows: Step 1, we split the sample into two parts
according to the number of decisions k. Thus, we take k ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , 44} decisions in the
in-sample part and 45 − k decisions in the out-of-sample part. We start by setting k = 1.
Step 2, we randomly select k decisions from the set of all decisions. This random selection
determines which specific decisions we consider for the in-sample. Step 3, we estimate
individual parameters conditional on being a member of a given type and run the classifi-
cation by assigning subjects to types based on the individual conditional log-likelihoods.
Step 4, we derive the in-sample fit, i.e., we aggregate individual log-likelihoods, conditio-
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nal on k and the specific random draw and compute the implied out-of-sample fit based
on the estimated parameters. Step 5, we repeat the steps 2 to 4 for M different random
selections of the k decisions and then derive average in-sample and out-of-sample perfor-
mances for all worlds across the M draws. Finally, we set knew = k+ 1 and repeat all the
previous steps.15
The quality measure we use to assess in-sample and out-of-sample fits is the accuracy
with respect to the share of correctly fitted decisions. We compute the expected utilities
of lying and not lying based on the estimated parameters for every participant and predict
that the participant will choose the message that yields a higher utility. We then com-
pare the predicted decisions to real decisions and compute the number of correctly fitted
decisions in relation to the total number of decisions; this is our overall accuracy measure.
An alternative quality measure is the normalized log-likelihood, which can be computed
directly from individual log-likelihood values normalized by the number of decisions con-
sidered in the sample. However, the normalized log-likelihood only behaves sensibly as
a way to compare in-sample performance. The measure explodes when assessing out-of-
sample performance as its value changes dramatically if there is a single observation for
one individual that is unlikely to be derived from the model under consideration. Because
the out-of-sample fit is not the result of an optimization, this happens frequently.
2.4 Data and Descriptive Evidence
2.4.1 Data Collection and Sample Characteristics
We recruited 400 US participants (100 Senders and 100 Receivers per game) on mTurk.
We required subjects to have successfully completed at least 1000 HITs (human intelligence
tasks on mTurk) with an overall approval rate of more than 95%.16 For each participant,
we included two understanding questions in the experiment. The first understanding
was adequately solved by 77% of all participants. 94% were able to answer the second
question correctly. This suggests that participants learned through the feedback to the
first question and that they achieved an overall satisfactory level of understanding.
Our sample consists of 53% males and 47% females. Compared to laboratory studies
our sample is very heterogeneous featuring an age range from 16 to 76 years and a va-
15 Our approach is consistent with the idea of cross-validation, an unbiased method to evaluate models
with different numbers of parameters (e.g., Kohavi (1995), Arlot and Celisse (2010)).
16 There are several studies showing that experiments executed on mTurk yield results consistent with
these obtained in common laboratory settings even though the stakes are usually smaller (e.g., Horton
et al. (2011), Paolacci et al. (2010), Amir et al. (2012)). Bohannon (2016) claims that most of the
participants on mTurk are professional experiment takers just as in many lab settings.
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riety in highest completed education from high school to graduate school. The median
participant is 33 years old and holds an undergraduate degree.
Participants’ earnings were a $0.50 show-up fee plus an average outcome-implied bonus
of about $1.06 for this 10−15 minutes task. Thus, they earned between $6.22 (= 1.56/10×
60) and $9.33 (= 1.56/15 × 60) per hour on average.
Table 2.1 provides an overview of the Senders’ descriptive statistics in both games.17
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics
Mean St. dev. Min Med Max Observations
Gender 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 199
Age 34.56 11.23 18.00 32.00 76.00 199
Education 2.77 0.67 2.00 3.00 4.00 199
Proportion of lies 0.58 0.34 0.00 0.67 1.00 200
1st-order belief 0.51 0.25 0.00 0.50 1.00 200
Earnings (USD) 1.60 0.25 1.00 1.60 2.10 200
PV 4.04 0.97 1.78 3.89 7.00 199
Prosoc 3.62 1.56 1.00 3.50 7.00 199
This table shows descriptive statistics for Senders in the two games. Gender takes the value one for men
and zero for women. Education denotes the highest completed education stage: 1: Elementary School,
2: High School, 3: Undergraduate School, 4: Graduate School. Proportion of lies refers to the ratio of
incorrect to total messages transmitted by the Sender. The 1st-order belief corresponds to the Sender’s
assessment of the likelihood that the Receiver’s action will match the message. Earnings include a fixed
payment of $0.50 and a variable compensation component. PV reflects an index of protected values
for honesty. Prosoc is a variable capturing prosocial concerns. The full questionnaires underlying these
variables are available in Appendix 2.B. One participant disconnected early resulting in demographic
data for 199 individual Senders.
2.4.2 Overall Behavior
Overall, 58% of the 9000 messages sent are lies, meaning that the content of the message
is contradictory to the true state of the world.18 Senders in Game A tend to lie less
than Senders in Game B, consistent with the original studies of Gneezy (2005) and Erat
and Gneezy (2012), respectively. The mean percentage of lying decisions for a given
Sender equals 53% in Game A and 64% in Game B, respectively. This extent of lying is
generally above the fraction of lies in Gneezy (2005) who finds lying rates of 17% to 52%
depending on the treatment, and Erat and Gneezy (2012) with a range from 43% to 76%,
respectively. Both these studies use student participants and experiments that physically
17 In this paper, we concentrate on Senders only and thus neglect Receiver behavior completely.
18 We consider messages that contradict the true state of the world as lies regardless of the Sender’s
intention. As shown by Sutter (2009) a truthful message might also be used to deceive the other
player if the transmitting player believes the Receiver not to follow her message.
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take place in a laboratory. The share of following decisions per Receiver slightly varies
across games and amounts to 90% in Game A and 85% in Game B on average. Figure 2.2
displays the distribution of Senders with respect to the proportion of lying decisions as
well as the relationship between ECOST and the proportion of lies.
























Figure 2.2: Descriptive lying behavior. The top two plots feature histograms of the
proportion of lies. The bottom two plots illustrate the relationship of the proportion of lies with
respect to ECOST. Each circle corresponds to one of the 45 different decision situations. The
left plots correspond to Game A and the right plots to Game B, respectively.
Across games the histograms look slightly different. While the distribution in Game
A is almost symmetric with peaks for very honest and dishonest behavior,19 Game B
exhibits right-skewness with a remarkable number of Senders frequently transmitting
incorrect messages. Game B’s histogram shows a clear step-wise ascent towards the
highest frequency of telling lies. In contrast to Game A, a substantial number of Senders
is lying in about 60% to 90% of all situations.
Each circle in the scatterplots in Figure 2.2 corresponds to an experimental round and
reflects the ratio of lying Senders for a given decision situation. We note an increasing
pattern with respect to ECOST. The higher the potential cost of transmitting a truthful
19 The higher number of honest Senders in Game A compared to Game B could also indicate that some
participants’ preferences depend on the labels of the messages (in the spirit of Gneezy et al. (2016)).
Identifying such types would require variation in framing within participants.
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message the larger is the proportion of lying Senders (consistent with Gneezy (2005)).
However, for higher ECOST the relationship flattens (consistent with findings in a non-
strategic setting in Gibson et al. (2013)). Table 2.2 displays the relationship of lying and
the decision environment as well as demographic variables.
Table 2.2: Determinants of the decision to lie
Dependent variable: Game A Game B Combined
Lie (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ECOST 0.097*** 0.246*** 0.106*** 0.133* 0.100*** 0.186***
(0.015) (0.075) (0.017) (0.069) (0.011) (0.050)
Neg. Inequity 0.044*** 0.018 0.041*** 0.051** 0.042*** 0.032**
(0.008) (0.019) (0.009) (0.021) (0.006) (0.014)
Belief R follows 0.401 0.398 -0.753 -0.752 -0.225 -0.223
(0.785) (0.788) (0.575) (0.576) (0.493) (0.493)
Gender -0.099 -0.101 0.466* 0.466* 0.201 0.201
(0.341) (0.341) (0.268) (0.268) (0.213) (0.213)
Age -0.014 -0.014 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009
(0.016) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009)
Education 0.136 0.136 0.267 0.267 0.157 0.157
(0.218) (0.218) (0.222) (0.222) (0.149) (0.149)
PV -0.959*** -0.670*** -0.528*** -0.475** -0.690*** -0.524***
(0.226) (0.245) (0.182) (0.189) (0.136) (0.141)
ECOST × PV -0.036** -0.007 -0.021*
(0.016) (0.016) (0.011)
Prosoc -0.064 -0.122 -0.183* -0.165 -0.121 -0.142*
(0.119) (0.110) (0.108) (0.105) (0.079) (0.075)




Constant 3.113** 2.132 1.855 1.575 2.150** 1.544*
(1.324) (1.417) (1.273) (1.253) (0.911) (0.921)
Observations 4,455 4,455 4,500 4,500 8,955 8,955
Number of participants 99 99 100 100 199 199
Pseudo R2 0.123 0.126 0.097 0.098 0.106 0.107
This table presents coefficients of logit regressions. The dependent variable is the binary variable Lie
which takes the value one if the Sender tells a lie, and zero else. ECOST is the economic cost of stating
the truth. Negative inequity refers to the difference ΠR(θ, θ) − ΠS(θ, θ). Belief R follows denotes the
Sender’s first-order belief. Gender takes the value one for men and zero for women. Education takes
the following values: 0: No schooling, 1: Elementary school, 2: High school, 3: Undergraduate degree,
4: Graduate school. PV reflects an index of protected values for honesty. Prosoc is a variable capturing
prosocial concerns. The full questionnaires underlying these variables are available in Appendix 2.B.
Game takes the value 0 for Game A and 1 for Game B, respectively. Columns (1) and (2) use data from
Game A, columns (3) and (4) from Game B, and columns (5) and (6) from both games. Robust standard
errors are obtained by clustering at the individual level and appear in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Table 2.2 affirms the indicative evidence of Figure 2.2 and shows the proportion of lies
to be increasing in ECOST. The increase in ECOST is diminishing for higher incentives.
In addition, the difference in payoffs between Sender and Receiver influences lying. The
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less favorable the difference in payoffs for the Sender if reporting truthfully, i.e., the greater
the negative inequity, the more likely she will lie. We would expect the coefficient on the
Sender’s first-order belief, i.e., the likelihood she assigns to the Receiver to match her
message, to be significantly positive if it only entered the Sender’s expected monetary
payoff computation. The resulting coefficient indicates that the first-order belief does not
only enter her expected monetary payoff calculation but also - at least for some - the
moral costs of telling a lie. In addition, stronger protected values as well as prosocial
concerns lead to more honesty. Finally, lying in Game B is significantly more pronounced
than in Game A.
Our data confirm that the mTurk implementation of the Gneezy (2005) and Erat and
Gneezy (2012) games with general population participants yields similar overall results
as the laboratory setting with student participants. However, they also confirm that the
two considered sender-receiver games, while similar in their fundamental structure lead
to quite different overall behavior patterns across games.
2.5 Results
Based on the methodology explained in Section 2.3, we conduct the estimation, assign
participants to types, and compute the in- and out-of-sample fits for all worlds under
consideration. Appendix Table 2.D.2 and Table 2.D.4 provide a complete overview of
all worlds and how well they fit the data in- as well as out-of-sample in Game A and
B, respectively.20 For our analysis we focus on the share of correctly fitted decisions.
Section 2.5.1 considers model selection when choosing one of the five available types.
Section 2.5.2 allows for multiple types. Section 2.5.3 studies the shares of types in the
population and the demographic and other correlates of the probability with which a
participant is assigned to being a particular type.
2.5.1 Selecting One Preference Type
We begin with model selection that involves selecting the best among the five available
types. Thus, this special case only considers the five one-type worlds. Figure 2.3 shows the
in- and out-of-sample fit for all these one-type worlds. Similarly, Table 2.3 and Table 2.4
display the computed in- and out-of-sample performances in Game A and B, respectively.
In addition, the accuracies are tested for statistical significance.
Figure 2.3 highlights that among all five one-type worlds, one world features substan-
tially worse in-sample and out-of-sample accuracy, namely the EC world. The standard
20 The standard errors of the fits for all worlds are displayed in Appendix Table 2.D.3 and Table 2.D.5
for Games A and B, respectively.
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economic model does really poorly at organizing data as participants seem not to follow
the strategy to always lie.21 The bad in- and out-of-sample fit of EC is unsurprising given
that we only estimate the parameter of erroneous play λi and that EC is nested in all
other types.
Our main interest is in comparing the four worlds that have at least one additional
parameter. These worlds explain behavior better. Moreover, in-sample fits are always
better than the respective out-of-sample fits. However, lying costs (LC) and social norms
(SN) perform better than both inequity aversion (IA) and reference-dependent preferences
(RD). LC explains behavior significantly best in-sample when approximately less than
half of the full sample is used to estimate and classify participants, and SN performs best
in-sample when more than half of the sample is used. However, an approach based on
reputation and social norms (SN) does fit the data best out-of-sample, regardless of the
number of decisions in the in-sample part. There are no substantial differences between
Game A and B.
This first analysis highlights why many papers that analyze lying in the context of
strategic information transmission suggest lying cost, reputation, or norm-based explana-
tions to explain their findings as these are the types that do really well in-sample. Based
on this baseline analysis with five one-type worlds we are already able to observe some
of our key insights: First, the quality of the in-sample fit is decreasing in the number
of decisions used to estimate parameters and to assign participants to types. The more
decisions, the tougher it is to explain each and every choice. Second, the quality of the
out-of-sample fit is usually increasing in the number of decisions used to estimate para-
meters and to assign participants to types. More decisions make it easier to estimate
and classify participants into types implying a better classification and hence better out-
of-sample predictions. Third, worlds that fit the data well in-sample do not necessarily
perform well out-of-sample and vice versa. Finally, the size of the in-sample part of the
data is important for determining the best possible worlds.
21 If one allowed for all possible first-order beliefs instead, the Sender’s strategy under EC would be to
lie whenever the expected monetary payoff of lying is greater than of telling the truth, i.e., whenever
the participant’s first-order belief is greater than one half in Game A or greater than one sixth in








Figure 2.3: In- and out-of-sample performance of one-type worlds. Solid lines reflect in-sample accuracy, dashed lines out-of-sample
accuracy. EC denotes the standard economic model, IA inequity aversion, RD reference-dependent preferences, LC lying costs, and SN
reputation or social norms. The left plot correspond to Game A, and the right plot to Game B, respectively. The accuracies are derived based
on M = 1000 random draws.
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Table 2.3: Performance of one-type worlds in Game A
In-sample accuracy
Decisions in-sample
1 11 22 33 44
EC 0.5214 0.5249 0.5253 0.5256 0.5257
IA 0.9377*** 0.8531*** 0.8413*** 0.8368*** 0.8344***
RD 0.8966*** 0.8330*** 0.8265*** 0.8246*** 0.8242***
LC 1.0000*** 0.9134*** 0.8921*** 0.8864*** 0.8838***
SN 1.0000*** 0.9035*** 0.8923 0.8885*** 0.8859***
Out-of-sample accuracy
Decisions in-sample
1 11 22 33 44
EC 0.5257 0.5258 0.5258 0.5256 0.5208
IA 0.7216*** 0.8133*** 0.8186*** 0.8209*** 0.8240***
RD 0.6989*** 0.8114*** 0.8150*** 0.8158*** 0.8123***
LC 0.7717 0.8360*** 0.8555*** 0.8634*** 0.8690***
SN 0.7711*** 0.8630*** 0.8719*** 0.8748*** 0.8774***
This table presents the computed in-sample and out-of-sample accuracies in Game A. Decisions in-sample
corresponds to the number of decisions used to estimate the one-type worlds. For each accuracy we run
a two-tailed t-test against the next lower accuracy for a given number of decisions in-sample. We test
the out-of-sample accuracies similarly. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively. Accuracies are depicted in Table 2.D.2 and the corresponding standard errors in Table 2.D.3.
Table 2.4: Performance of one-type worlds in Game B
In-sample accuracy
Decisions in-sample
1 11 22 33 44
EC 0.6342 0.6368 0.6372 0.6374 0.6374***
IA 0.9553*** 0.8193*** 0.8068*** 0.8021*** 0.7984***
RD 0.9242*** 0.7923*** 0.7874*** 0.7862*** 0.7856***
LC 1.0000*** 0.8833*** 0.8540 0.8460*** 0.8429***
SN 1.0000*** 0.8677*** 0.8536*** 0.8493*** 0.8479***
Out-of-sample accuracy
Decisions in-sample
1 11 22 33 44
EC 0.6374 0.6375 0.6375 0.6371 0.6323
IA 0.6863*** 0.7715 0.7814*** 0.7840 0.7819
RD 0.6781*** 0.7709*** 0.7794*** 0.7824*** 0.7811***
LC 0.7035*** 0.7767*** 0.8043*** 0.8156*** 0.8234***
SN 0.7147*** 0.8144*** 0.8276*** 0.8328*** 0.8342***
This table presents the computed in-sample and out-of-sample accuracies in Game B. Decisions in-sample
corresponds to the number of decisions used to estimate the one-type worlds. For each accuracy we run
a two-tailed t-test against the next lower accuracy for a given number of decisions in-sample. We test
the out-of-sample accuracies similarly. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively. Accuracies are depicted in Table 2.D.4 and the corresponding standard errors in Table 2.D.5.
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2.5.2 Considering Type Combinations
We now allow for richer worlds, not forcing everybody to be of the same type. Because the
number of different worlds is large we restrict our attention to unique and well performing
worlds. We proceed as follows: First, we eliminate all worlds that are equivalent to a
world which allows for fewer types. Then, we compare the remaining worlds and begin to
eliminate dominated worlds.
Worlds are considered equivalent if all participants in two worlds (with a different
number of available types) are assigned to the same types. This implies that at least one
type is redundant and contains no members. As a result the world in which a given type
is redundant can be eliminated in favor of a smaller world that considers the same types
except the redundant.
A world is considered dominated if its accuracy is strictly smaller than another world’s
for all number of decisions used to estimate and classify participants greater than 3. We
separately analyze dominance in the in-sample and the out-of-sample dimension.22 Worlds
that are dominated, in-sample or out-of-sample, are eliminated. As we refine separately
for in-sample and out-of-sample fits, it is very likely that some worlds will be dominated
in one of the two dimensions only.
After this procedure, we are left with 4 in-sample and 2 out-of-sample worlds in Game
A (using M = 1000 different random selections for the specific decisions used to estimate
parameters and assign participants to types), and 3 in-sample and 3 out-of-sample worlds
in Game B (M = 1000), respectively. Figure 2.4 provides the in- and out-of-sample
performance of all worlds that are not dominated in at least one dimension for both
games. In addition, the fit of the world that leads to the highest combined accuracy, i.e.,
in-sample plus out-of-sample, is drawn.
Overall, the figures for the two experiments are quite similar. If the number of decisions
used to estimate and classify people into types is comparably small (Game A: < 11, Game
B: < 14) a simple one-type world featuring only participants with constant, linear or
convex lying costs explains behavior significantly best in-sample. Once the size of the
in-sample part of the data increases a two-type world with lying costs and reputation (or
a three-type world that also includes the reference-dependent type) outperforms. More
elaborated worlds with four- or five types are not able to further improve the in-sample
accuracy.
22 The in-sample fit of most models, if only few decision are used to estimate the parameters, is very
similar and only differs due to numerical reasons. In order to control for these numerical differences,
we neglect the fits derived from only 1, 2, or 3 decisions for our elimination, i.e., we only eliminate
worlds that are dominated if 4 to 44 decisions were used to estimate and classify participants into
types.
Figure 2.4: In- and out-of-sample performance of non-dominated worlds. In Game A (left-hand side) the following worlds are not
dominated in-sample: LC; RD & LC; LC & SN; IA, LC & SN; and out-of-sample: RD & SN; IA, RD & SN. In Game B (right-hand side)
the following worlds are not dominated in-sample: LC; LC & SN; EC, RD & LC; and out-of-sample: IA, RD & SN; RD, LC & SN; IA, RD,
LC & SN. World RD, LC & SN explains behavior best when summing in- and out-of-sample performance. EC reflects the standard economic
model, IA inequity aversion, RD reference-dependent preferences, LC lying costs, and SN reputation or social norms. Worlds which are not
dominated in-sample feature solid lines and the corresponding out-of-sample fits dotted lines. Worlds which are not dominated out-of-sample
feature dashed lines and the corresponding in-sample fits dotted lines. The accuracies are derived based on M = 1000 random selections.
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Out-of-sample the story is different. The simple LC only world does really poorly in
fitting the behavioral data out-of-sample compared to the other worlds regardless of the
sample size used for the estimation. This finding raises a caveat for behavioral research
and specifically the experimental literature on lying. As experimental studies in the
corresponding literature mostly base their results on only few decisions per participant,
it is very likely that they find a lying costs model to organize the data well. However,
as shown in Figure 2.4, not only will a model considering lying costs no longer do well
in-sample once more data is collected, but also - and much more importantly - it will do
a terrible job compared to other models in predicting future lying behavior.
We find a world with types IA, RD, and SN to explain behavior best out-of-sample
most of the time. It reaches an out-of-sample accuracy of 0.85 in Game A and 0.80 in
Game B already after 6 decisions in the estimation part of the data. While this world does
significantly outperform the best-performing in-sample worlds, it would never be chosen
if a study only accounted for the accuracy of the in-sample fit. Adding in-sample and
out-of-sample performance, we find a world with RD, LC, and SN to explain behavior
best in both games.
Figure 2.4 reveals a dilemma of model selection. The quality of the in-sample fit does
not say anything about how well the same model will be able to explain future behavior.
Similarly, worlds that perform comparably poorly in-sample might very well do a pretty
good job in organizing future data sets. As a consequence, it is crucial that researchers are
very cautious when deciding about a preferred model based on an in-sample methodology
only as it might provoke misleading modeling choices.
2.5.3 World Characteristics
This subsection analyzes the shares of the population assigned to each type and the
characteristics that explain the probability of a participant being assigned to a given
type. For this analysis, we use the five-type model as a benchmark in order to have one
that can be analyzed with respect to all types and in both games even though some worlds
that feature less types can explain behavior slightly better. In Figure 2.5, we investigate
the classification of participants. We plot the distribution of types, i.e., the share of each
type within the population in both games.
A desirable property of model selection is for the distribution of types in the population
to be similar no matter what the exact decision environment is. Finding stable shares in
different experimental data sets with different participants and somewhat different games
suggests that the proposed world does a reasonable job in explaining how people in the
population behave. Figure 2.5 provides indicative evidence that the share of each type
within the whole population is quite stable across different games.
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Figure 2.5: Distribution of types within the population with respect to the number
of decisions used to estimate and classify participants into types in the five-type
world. EC reflects the standard economic model, IA inequity aversion, RD reference-dependent
preferences, LC lying costs, and SN reputation or social norms. The left plot correspond to Game
A, and the right plot to Game B, respectively. The distributions are derived based on M = 1000
random draws.
We find LC and SN to make up the largest shares in the population. This is in line
with Figure 2.3 which showed that these two types are also the ones that can organize data
quite well in a one-type world. Moreover, Figure 2.5 highlights that the distribution of
types also depends on the size of the sample data used to estimate and classify participants
into types.23 Again, using only a small number of decisions might imply very misleading
conclusions.24
Next, we relate the probability of belonging to a specific type to demographic charac-
teristics such as gender, age, and education, and protected values and prosocial concerns.
The probability of belonging to a given type is computed as the average of a binary
assignment variable which takes the value one if a participant is assigned to the given
type in a specific draw and for a given number of decisions, and zero else. We derive the
averages of these binary assignment variables over all 44 possible number of decisions and
the M = 1000 selections.
Table 2.5 displays the results of the corresponding regressions for the five-type world.25
23 The one exception is type EC, to which no participant is assigned.
24 Keep in mind that we consider binary choices only. If one considered settings with a richer message
space instead, collecting information about fewer decisions might be sufficient.
25 Comparing the results for the benchmark world with the best in-sample, out-of-sample, or combined
world, i.e., a world consisting of types LC and SN in-sample, a world with types IA, RD, and SN
out-of-sample, or RD, LC & SN which features the best combined accuracy, yields similar results
indicating that people are broadly assigned to similar categories.
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Table 2.5: Type classification and personal characteristics
Dependent variable: Type EC Type IA Type RD Type LC Type SN
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Belief R follows -0.145 0.122* 0.070 -0.046
(0.090) (0.066) (0.113) (0.102)
Gender 0.024 -0.025 -0.016 0.016
(0.040) (0.028) (0.055) (0.054)
Age -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Education 0.051* -0.008 -0.027 -0.016
(0.029) (0.020) (0.041) (0.037)
PV -0.035 -0.037** 0.066** 0.005
(0.023) (0.016) (0.031) (0.029)
Prosoc -0.006 -0.022*** 0.013 0.016
(0.016) (0.008) (0.019) (0.018)
Game -0.009 -0.020 0.034 -0.006
(0.041) (0.032) (0.059) (0.056)
Constant 0.269 0.319*** 0.080 0.331
(0.175) (0.118) (0.231) (0.232)
Observations 199 199 199 199 199
R-squared 0.048 0.070 0.034 0.007
This table presents coefficients of OLS regressions. The dependent variables are frequencies a given
participant is assigned to the respective type. The frequency a participant is assigned to a given type
corresponds to the average over all number of decisions and random selections. Column (1) refers to the
standard economic model (however, no participant is assigned to EC), column (2) to social preferences,
column (3) to reference-dependent preferences, column (4) to lying costs, and column (5) to reputation
and social norms. Belief R follows indicates the Sender’s first-order belief with respect to the likelihood
that the Receiver chooses what the Sender has sent in her message. Gender takes the value one for men
and zero for women. Education takes the following values: 0: No schooling, 1: Elementary school, 2:
High school, 3: Undergraduate degree, 4: Graduate school. The measurement of PV as well as Prosoc is
described in Appendix 2.B. Game takes the value one in Game B, and zero else. Robust standard errors
appear in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
The empty first column in the table indicates that no participants are assigned to EC re-
gardless of the number of decisions used to estimate and classify participants into types.
Columns (2) to (5) show that demographic characteristics hardly have any influence on
the type to which a participant is assigned. One exception is that well-educated par-
ticipants are more likely assigned to IA. Participants with strong protected values and
prosocial concerns are significantly less often classified as RD, and high-PV individuals
are more often classified as LC. Finally, we find no impact of the specific game on the clas-
sification, highlighting that our classification is robust to changes in the strategic decision
environment.
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2.6 Conclusion
We collect and make available a comprehensive data set of lying decisions in strategic
information transmission settings. Using these data, we deliver two substantive results
and one methodological accomplishment: First, we classify people into five different types
according to their behavior. We analyze how models that allow for different types fit ex-
perimental data in-sample as well as out-of-sample. Second, our paper reveals the quality
of the in-sample fit does not say anything about how well the same model will be able to
explain behavioral data out-of-sample. Similarly, worlds that perform poorly in-sample
might very well do a pretty good job in organizing future data sets. As a consequence,
it is crucial that researchers are very cautious when deciding about a preferred model
based on an in-sample methodology only as it might provoke misleading modeling choices
especially when using a small number of decisions. Third, in terms of methods, the pa-
per provides a framework that can be employed in other instances where researchers are
interested in assessing plausible preference specifications.
Since we run our analysis in two different strategic information transmission environ-
ments we are confident that our key findings are robust to other applications of similar
settings. Further research could analyze parameter stability and how the number of rounds
used for the estimation influences the persistence of the parameter estimates within types.
We find indicative evidence that the distribution of the individual parameter estimates
within types and the share of each type within the population are quite stable across
different strategic decision situations.
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(20, 28) (22, 14) (18, 26) (25, 17) (15, 23) (27, 19)
(16, 31) (18, 17) (14, 29) (21, 20) (12, 27) (24, 23)
$0.15
(23, 24) (26, 11)
$0.40
(21, 22) (29, 14)
$0.65
(18, 19) (31, 16)
(20, 28) (23, 15) (17, 25) (25, 17) (14, 22) (27, 19)
(16, 31) (19, 18) (14, 29) (22, 21) (11, 26) (24, 23)
$0.20
(23, 24) (27, 12)
$0.45
(20, 21) (29, 14)
$0.70
(17, 18) (31, 16)
(19, 27) (23, 15) (16, 24) (25, 17) (14, 22) (28, 20)
(16, 31) (20, 19) (13, 28) (22, 21) (10, 25) (24, 23)
$0.25
(22, 23) (27, 12)
$0.50
(19, 20) (29, 14)
$0.75
(17, 18) (32, 17)
(18, 26) (23, 15) (16, 24) (26, 18) (13, 21) (28, 20)
(15, 30) (20, 19) (12, 27) (22, 21) (10, 25) (25, 24)
This table summarizes all 45 payoff matrices in experimental units. One point in the experiment corre-





denotes the Sender’s and the Receiver’s payoff, respectively. The two possible outcomes
are a = θ (i.e., action and state coincide) and a 6= θ (i.e., action and state differ) and depend on the
Receiver’s choice a only.
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2.B Appendix B: Experimental Instructions
In general, the wording is kept very similar to the underlying studies of Gneezy (2005)
and Erat and Gneezy (2012).
2.B.1 Game A
2.B.1.1 Sender
After a participant has accepted the HIT on mTurk and is assigned to be a Sender, we
provide detailed instructions about Game A:
Instructions
In this study you will play 45 rounds of a decision making experiment. Please read
the instructions carefully. You may earn a considerable sum of money, depending on the
decisions you make in the experiment.
In the end, one of the 45 rounds will be randomly selected and you will be randomly
matched with another (anonymous) participant. Neither of you will ever know the identity
of the other. The money you earn in this particular round will be paid to you at the end
of the experiment in addition to a fixed amount of $0.50 for participation. The conversion
rate is set such that 20 points in the experiment correspond to $1.00 (i.e., $0.05 per point
in the experiment).
In every round, two possible monetary payments are available to you and your coun-
terpart in the experiment. For example, the two payment options might be:
• Option X: 35 points to you and 25 points to the other player
• Option Y: 28 points to you and 32 points to the other player
Note that the monetary payments of the two options will change from round to round.
The choice rests with the other player who will have to choose either Option X or
Option Y. The only information your counterpart will have is information sent by you in
a message. That is, he or she will not know the monetary payments associated with each
option.
We will ask you to choose one of the following two possible messages, which you will
send to your counterpart:
• Message 1: "Option X will earn you more money than Option Y."
• Message 2: "Option Y will earn you more money than Option X."
We will show the other participant your message, and ask him or her to choose either X
or Y. To repeat, your counterpart’s choice will determine the payments in the experiment.
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However, your counterpart will never know what sums were actually offered in the option
not chosen (that is, he or she will not be able to infer whether your message was true or
not). Moreover, he or she will never know the sums to be paid to you according to the
different options.
We will pay the two of you according to the choice made by your counterpart.
For your convenience, these instructions will remain available to you on all subsequent
screens of this study.
The instructions are followed by two understanding questions which check the Sender’s
knowledge of the game structure and the payoff derivation. The Sender is informed about
the correctness of her answers and, if the answer is incorrect, shown the correct solution
with an explanation.
Then, the first round starts:
Round 1 of 45
We ask you to send a message to the other player. This message is the only infor-
mation your counterpart will receive. He or she will not be informed about the monetary
consequences of each option. In this round the monetary consequences are as follows:
• If your counterpart chooses Option X, you will earn 19 points and your counterpart
will earn 20 points.
• If your counterpart chooses Option Y, you will earn 29 points and your counterpart
will earn 14 points.
I choose to send:
• Message 1: "Option X will earn you more money than Option Y."
• Message 2: "Option Y will earn you more money than Option X."
The exact screen the Sender faces is depicted in Figure 2.B.1.
The subsequent rounds are formatted similarly but feature different payoff matrices.
In a next step, we elicit the Sender’s first-order belief by asking: Out of 100 possible
counterparts, how many do you think will follow your messages (i.e., choose the option
you have recommended)?
In the questionnaire we ask demographics (i.e., gender, age, education) and use Tanner
et al. (2009)’s protected values survey. We adjusted the questions to our context:
1. Consider the choices of the player who sent a message. To what extent do you judge
the decision to send something other than the truthful message as
• 1: Very immoral ... 7: Very moral
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Figure 2.B.1: Decision situation for a Sender in Game A
• 1: Not at all praiseworthy ... 7: Very praiseworthy
• 1: Not at all blameworthy ... 7: Very blameworthy
• 1: Not at all outrageous ... 7: Very outrageous
• 1: Not at all acceptable ... 7: Very acceptable
2. Individuals have an opportunity to choose which information they provide to their
audience, and they can modify information they obtain before passing this informa-
tion on to others. Some view such modification as a violation of truthfulness; others
regard it as acceptable protection of personal interests. What do you think about the
value of truthfulness in such a situation? Truthfulness is about something...
• ... that one should not sacrifice, no matter what the (material or other) benefits.
[1: Strongly Disagree ... 7: Strongly Agree]
• ... for which I think it is right to make a cost-benefit analysis. [1: Strongly
Disagree ... 7: Strongly Agree]
• ... that cannot be measured in monetary terms. [1: Strongly Disagree ... 7:
• ... about which I can be flexible if the situation demands it. [1: Strongly
Disagree ... 7: Strongly Agree]
In addition, we elicit players’ prosocial concerns on a 7-point Likert scale. While the
second (Manipulative) and the fourth (Hurting) question make up the prosocial concerns
measure, questions one and three serve as control questions.
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Suppose that the player who must choose either Option X or B earns more from choo-
sing Option Y. To what extent do you judge the decision to send Message 1: "Option X
will earn you more money than Option Y." as:
• 1: Very dishonest ... 7: Very honest
• 1: Very manipulative ... 7: Not at all manipulative
• 1: Strongly associated with personal gains ... 7: Not at all associated with personal
gains
• 1: Strongly hurting the other participant ... 7: Not at all hurting the other partici-
pant
Finally, Figure 2.B.2 shows the final screen of the experiment before being returned
to mTurk.26
Figure 2.B.2: End of the experiment
2.B.1.2 Receiver
A participant who is assigned to be a Receiver in Game A is provided with the following
instructions:
26 In fact, for a first pilot experiment, we have directly matched participants and shown them the variable
payoffs they achieved. However, this caused, on the one hand, unsatisfactory waiting periods for some
participants due to a delayed start of others, and, on the other hand, administrative effort for the
experimenter due to players disconnecting in between.
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Instructions
This is a short experiment in decision making. Please read the instructions carefully.
You may earn a considerable sum of money, depending on the decisions you make in the
experiment.
In this experiment you will be randomly matched with another (anonymous) partici-
pant. Neither of you will ever know the identity of the other. The money you earn in this
game will be paid to you in addition to a fixed amount of $0.50 for participation.
Two possible monetary payments are available to you and your counterpart in the
experiment. The payments depend upon the option chosen by you. We showed the two
payment options to your counterpart. The only information you will have is the message
your counterpart sends to you.
Two possible messages could be sent:
• Message 1: "Option X will earn you more money than Option Y."
• Message 2: "Option Y will earn you more money than Option X."
Upon observing what message your counterpart sent, you may choose either Option X
or Option Y. Your choice will determine the payments in the experiment. You will never
know what sums were actually offered in the option not chosen (that is, if the message
sent by your counterpart was true or not). Moreover, you will never know the sums your
counterpart could be paid with the other option.
We will pay the two of you according to the choice you make.
For your convenience, these instructions will remain available to you on all subsequent
screens of this study.
Right after the instructions, the Receiver’s decision screen is shown asking for the
Receiver’s strategies conditional on all possible messages (see Figure 2.B.3):
Decisions
Your counterpart will send you a message. For every possible message we ask you to
choose one of the two options. Your choice will determine the payments to you and your
counterpart.
Decision 1: Suppose your counterpart sent you: Message 1: "Option X earns you more
money than Option Y."
Given this message I would choose:
• Option X
• Option Y
Decision 2: Suppose your counterpart sent you: Message 2: "Option Y earns you more
money than Option X."
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Given this message I would choose:
• Option X
• Option Y
Figure 2.B.3: Decision situation for a Receiver in Game A
In a next step, we elicit the Receiver’s first-order belief by asking: Out of 100 possible
counterparts, how many do you think will send you a truthful message (i.e., report the
option which will earn you more)?
Finally, a questionnaire and a final screen similar to the Sender’s close the experiment.
2.B.2 Game B
2.B.2.1 Sender
A participant who is assigned to be a Sender is provided with detailed instructions about
Game B:
Instructions
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In this study you will play 45 rounds of a short decision making experiment. Please
read the instructions carefully. You may earn a considerable sum of money, depending on
the decisions you make in the experiment.
In the end, one of the 45 rounds will be randomly selected and you will be randomly
matched with another (anonymous) participant. Neither of you will know the identity of
the other. The money you earn in this particular round will be paid to you at the end of
the experiment in addition to a fixed amount of $0.50 for participation. The conversion
rate is set such that 20 points in the experiment correspond to $1.00 (i.e., $0.05 per point
in the experiment).
Before every round, we will roll a 6-sided die. The other participant will not be infor-
med about the outcome of the die roll. However, he or she will be told that you have been
informed about the outcome of the die roll. In every round, you will be asked to send a
message to the other participant. The message will correspond to a number from 1 to 6.
There are six possible messages:
• Message 1: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 1."
• Message 2: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 2."
• Message 3: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 3."
• Message 4: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 4."
• Message 5: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 5."
• Message 6: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 6."
Your message will be shown to the other participant, and then he or she will be asked to
choose a number between 1 and 6.
The choice of the number by the other participant will determine the payments in the
experiment. For example:
• If he or she chooses the actual outcome of the roll of the dice, then you will receive
35 points and he or she will receive 25 points.
• If he or she chooses a number different than the actual outcome, you will receive 28
points and he or she will receive 32 points.
Note that the monetary payments will change from round to round.
Finally, only you will be informed of the particular monetary value connected to each
message. The other participant will not be informed of these monetary values. However,
he or she will be told that you have been informed of the monetary value connected to each
message.
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For your convenience, these instructions will remain available to you on all subsequent
screens of this study.
The instructions are followed by two understanding questions which check the Sender’s
knowledge of the game structure. The Sender is informed about the correctness of her
answers and, if the answer is incorrect, shown the correct solution with an explanation.
Then, the first round starts:
Round 1 of 45
Before starting this round, we have rolled a 6-sided die, and obtained the outcome
2. We ask you to send a message to the other participant. This message is the only
information he or she will receive. He or she will not be informed about the monetary
consequences of each option. In this round the monetary consequences are as follows:
• If he or she chooses the actual outcome of the roll of the dice, then you will receive
19 points and he or she will receive 20 points.
• If he or she chooses a number different than the actual outcome of the roll of the
dice, you will receive 29 points and he or she will receive 14 points.
The message I will send is:
• Message 1: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 1."
• Message 2: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 2."
• Message 3: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 3."
• Message 4: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 4."
• Message 5: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 5."
• Message 6: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 6."
The exact screen the Sender faces is depicted in Figure 2.B.4.
The subsequent rounds are formatted similarly but feature different payoff matrices.
In a next step, we elicit the Sender’s first-order belief by asking: Out of 100 possible
counterparts, how many do you think will follow your messages (i.e., choose the number
you mention in your message)?
In the questionnaire we ask demographics (i.e., gender, age, education) and use Tanner
et al. (2009)’s protected values survey similar as in Game A.
We have slightly adjusted the question supposed to elicit players’ prosocial concerns:
Suppose the outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 5. To what extent do you judge
the decision to send something other than Message 5: "The outcome from the roll of the
6-sided die is 5." as:
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Figure 2.B.4: Decision situation for a Sender in Game B
• 1: Very dishonest ... 7: Very honest
• 1: Very manipulative ... 7: Not at all manipulative
• 1: Strongly associated with personal gains ... 7: Not at all associated with personal
gains
• 1: Strongly hurting the other participant ... 7: Not at all hurting the other partici-
pant
Finally, the final screen (similar to Figure 2.B.2) of the experiment is shown before
being returned to mTurk.27
27 In fact, for a first pilot experiment, we have directly matched participants and shown them the variable
payoffs they achieved. However, this caused, on the one hand, unsatisfactory waiting periods for some
participants due to a delayed start of others, and, on the other hand, administrative effort for the
experimenter due to players disconnecting in between.
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2.B.2.2 Receiver
A participant who is assigned to be a Receiver in Game B is provided with the following
instructions:
Instructions
This is a short experiment in decision making. Please read the instructions carefully.
You may earn a considerable sum of money, depending on the decisions you make in the
experiment.
You will be randomly matched with another (anonymous) participant in this experi-
ment. Neither of you will know the identity of the other. The money you earn in this
game will be paid to you in addition to a fixed amount of $0.50 for participation.
We have rolled a 6-sided die, and told the outcome of it to the other participant, but
we are not going to tell it to you.
After being informed of the roll of the die, the other participants sent a message to
you. The message corresponds to a number from 1 to 6. There are six possible messages:
• Message 1: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 1."
• Message 2: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 2."
• Message 3: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 3."
• Message 4: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 4."
• Message 5: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 5."
• Message 6: "The outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die is 6."
We will ask you to choose a number between 1 and 6. The message you received is the
only information you will have regarding the roll of the die. Your choice of a number will
determine the payments in the experiment according to two different options (Option X
and Option Y), known only to the other participant.
If you will choose the same number as the number that came up in the roll of the die,
both of you will be paid according to option A. If you will choose a number different than
the actual number, you will both be paid according to option B.
For your convenience, these instructions will remain available to you on all subsequent
screens of this study.
Right after the instructions, the Receiver’s decision screen is shown asking for the
Receiver’s strategies conditional on all possible messages (see Figure 2.B.5):
Decisions
The other participant will send you a message. For every possible message we ask you
to choose one of the six numbers. Your choice will determine the payments to both of you.
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Decision 1: Suppose the other participant sent you: Message 1: "The outcome from
the roll of the 6-sided die is 1." Given this message the number I choose is:
•1 • 2 • 3 • 4 • 5 • 6
Decision 2: Suppose the other participant sent you: Message 2: "The outcome from
the roll of the 6-sided die is 2." Given this message the number I choose is:
•1 • 2 • 3 • 4 • 5 • 6
Decision 3: Suppose the other participant sent you: Message 3: "The outcome from
the roll of the 6-sided die is 3." Given this message the number I choose is:
•1 • 2 • 3 • 4 • 5 • 6
Decision 4: Suppose the other participant sent you: Message 4: "The outcome from
the roll of the 6-sided die is 4." Given this message the number I choose is:
•1 • 2 • 3 • 4 • 5 • 6
Decision 5: Suppose the other participant sent you: Message 5: "The outcome from
the roll of the 6-sided die is 5." Given this message the number I choose is:
•1 • 2 • 3 • 4 • 5 • 6
Decision 6: Suppose the other participant sent you: Message 6: "The outcome from
the roll of the 6-sided die is 6." Given this message the number I choose is:
•1 • 2 • 3 • 4 • 5 • 6
In a next step, we elicit the Receiver’s first-order belief by asking: Out of 100 possible
counterparts, how many do you think will send you a truthful message (i.e., send the
message with the number of the actual outcome from the roll of the 6-sided die)?
Finally, a questionnaire and a final screen similar to the Sender’s close the experiment.
Chapter 2 145
Figure 2.B.5: Decision situation for a Receiver in Game B
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2.C Appendix C: Expected Utilities
In this section, we illustrate Senders’ expected utility computation conditional on belon-
ging to each of the five types.
2.C.1 Type EC
We know that EC Participants derive utility
UECi (a, θ,mi) = Π
S(θ, a),
where ΠS(θ, a) indicates the Sender’s monetary payoff in state θ when the Receiver plays
action a.
As a consequence, the expected utility of lying equals
E
[
UECi (a, θ, θ
′)
]
= β(Π + Ξ) + (1 − β)(qΠ + (1 − q)(Π + Ξ)),
where Π := ΠS(θ, θ) denotes the Sender’s payoff if the Receiver matches the state (a =
θ).28 Ξ indicates ECOST, β the Sender’s first-order belief, and q the game-specific pro-
bability to achieve the low payoff if the Sender lies and the Receiver does not follow. In
Game A, this probability equals q = 1, and in Game B q = 1/5. The expected utility of
telling the truth is given by
E
[
UECi (a, θ, θ)
]
= βΠ + (1 − β)(Π + Ξ).
In order to decide about lying or telling the truth, the Sender considers the difference
E
[
UECi (a, θ, θ
′) − UECi (a, θ, θ)
]
= (β + βq − q) Ξ. (2.C.1)
The greater Eq. (2.C.1), the higher is the likelihood that the Sender tells a lie conditional
on being EC.
2.C.2 Type IA
We consider the following utility specification for inequity aversion
U IAi (a, θ,mi) = Π
S(θ, a) − γIA max
(
ΠR(θ, a) − ΠS(θ, a), 0
)
,
28 Since incentives are misaligned, the Sender’s payoff if a = θ always equals the lower of the two possible
Sender payoffs.
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where γIA denotes the Sender’s distaste for negative inequity.
Therefore, we derive the Sender’s expected utility of lying as
E
[
U IAi (a, θ, θ
′)
]
= β (Π + Ξ) + (1 − β) (q(Π − γIAδ) + (1 − q)(Π + Ξ)) ,
where δ := ΠR(θ, θ) − ΠS(θ, θ) denotes negative inequity in case the Receiver matches the
state. The expected utility of telling the truth equals
E
[
U IAi (a, θ, θ)
]
= β (Π − γIAδ) + (1 − β) (Π + Ξ) ,
implying a difference between lying and telling the truth of
E
[
U IAi (a, θ, θ
′) − U IAi (a, θ, θ)
]
= (β + βq − q) (Ξ + γIAδ) .
2.C.3 Type RD
Reference-dependent preferences suggest that utility depends on personal expectations.
We compute the utility specification as
URDi (a, θ,mi) = Π
S(θ, a) + γRD
(





where γRD reflects a coefficient which measures the importance of the reference point.
We derive an expected utility of lying
E
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and an expected utility of telling the truth
E
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+ (1 − β)
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The resulting difference equals
E
[
URDi (a, θ, θ
′) − URDi (a, θ, θ)
]
= (β + βq − q) (1 + γRD) Ξ.
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2.C.4 Type LC
Lying costs refer to the idea that participants incur a private cost when telling a lie. We
assume a utility representation
ULCi (a, θ,mi) = Π
S(θ, a) −
(
α+ βΞ + ρΞ2
)
✶mi 6=θ,
where α, β, and ρ are the coefficients for the constant, the linear and the convex term
of ECOST, respectively. Lying costs occur if the Sender lies, i.e., if the message deviates
from the state.
We derive the expected utility of lying to be given by
E
[
ULCi (a, θ, θ
′)
]
= β (Π + Ξ − Ψ) + (1 − β) (q(Π − Ψ) + (1 − q) (Π + Ξ − Ψ)) ,
where Ψ := (a+ bΞ + cΞ2) denotes the Sender’s cost of lying. The expected utility of
telling the truth equals
E
[
ULCi (a, θ, θ)
]
= β (Π + Ξ) + (1 − β) (Π + Ξ) ,
respectively, implying the marginal utility increase of lying to be
E
[
ULCi (a, θ, θ
′) − ULCi (a, θ, θ)
]
= (β + βq − q) Ξ − Ψ.
2.C.5 Type SN
The idea of reputation for honesty is that participants dislike to act in the same way as
dishonest people. We apply the utility characterization
USNi (a, θ,m) = Π





✶mi 6=θ, j ∈ {1, . . . , N},
where γSN is the individual coefficient that loads on the average proportion of truthful
reports in a given game. m denotes the entire set of messages.











denotes the average number of honest messages. The correspon-





= βΠ + (1 − β) (Π + Ξ) ,
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and the resulting difference between lying and telling the truth is computed as
E
[
USNi (a, θ,m) − USNi (a, θ,m)
]
= (β + βq − q) Ξ − γSNm.
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2.D Appendix D: Additional Tables
Table 2.D.1: List of all worlds











7 EC & RD
8 EC & LC
9 EC & SN
10 IA & RD
11 IA & LC
12 IA & SN
13 RD & LC
14 RD & SN
15 LC & SN
16
three types
EC, IA & RD
17 EC, IA & LC
18 EC, IA & SN
19 EC, RD & LC
20 EC, RD & SN
21 EC, LC & SN
22 IA, RD & LC
23 IA, RD & SN
24 IA, LC & SN
25 RD, LC & SN
26
four types
EC, IA, RD & LC
27 EC, IA, RD & SN
28 IA, RD, LC & SN
29 EC, RD, LC & SN
30 EC, IA, LC & SN
31 five types EC, IA, RD, LC & SN
This table presents a list of all 31 worlds. EC reflects the standard economic model, IA inequity aversion,
RD reference-dependent preferences, LC lying costs, and SN reputation or social norms.
Table 2.D.2: In- and out-of-sample accuracy - Game A
Decisions used to estimate and classify
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22)
1-type
EC
in 0.521 0.522 0.525 0.524 0.524 0.525 0.524 0.524 0.524 0.525 0.525 0.525 0.525 0.525 0.525 0.525 0.525 0.525 0.525 0.526 0.526 0.525
out 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.526
IA
in 0.938 0.929 0.910 0.892 0.882 0.873 0.866 0.861 0.858 0.855 0.853 0.851 0.849 0.848 0.847 0.846 0.845 0.844 0.843 0.843 0.842 0.841
out 0.722 0.774 0.790 0.797 0.802 0.805 0.807 0.809 0.811 0.812 0.813 0.814 0.815 0.816 0.816 0.816 0.817 0.817 0.818 0.818 0.818 0.819
RD
in 0.897 0.866 0.858 0.854 0.849 0.844 0.840 0.837 0.836 0.834 0.833 0.832 0.831 0.830 0.830 0.829 0.828 0.828 0.828 0.827 0.827 0.826
out 0.699 0.768 0.791 0.799 0.803 0.806 0.808 0.809 0.810 0.811 0.811 0.812 0.813 0.813 0.813 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.815 0.815
LC
in 1.000 0.997 0.991 0.976 0.961 0.949 0.939 0.930 0.923 0.918 0.913 0.910 0.906 0.904 0.902 0.899 0.898 0.896 0.895 0.894 0.893 0.892
out 0.772 0.794 0.805 0.812 0.817 0.821 0.824 0.828 0.831 0.834 0.836 0.839 0.841 0.843 0.845 0.847 0.848 0.850 0.852 0.853 0.854 0.855
SN
in 1.000 0.971 0.957 0.939 0.930 0.922 0.917 0.912 0.909 0.906 0.904 0.902 0.900 0.899 0.898 0.896 0.896 0.895 0.894 0.893 0.893 0.892
out 0.771 0.804 0.827 0.837 0.844 0.849 0.854 0.857 0.859 0.861 0.863 0.864 0.866 0.867 0.867 0.868 0.869 0.870 0.871 0.871 0.872 0.872
2-types
EC, IA
in 0.614 0.633 0.895 0.883 0.877 0.869 0.865 0.860 0.857 0.855 0.853 0.851 0.849 0.848 0.847 0.846 0.845 0.844 0.843 0.843 0.842 0.841
out 0.496 0.525 0.793 0.800 0.805 0.807 0.810 0.812 0.813 0.814 0.815 0.815 0.816 0.817 0.817 0.817 0.817 0.818 0.818 0.819 0.819 0.819
EC, RD
in 0.576 0.547 0.791 0.820 0.825 0.832 0.830 0.831 0.831 0.833 0.833 0.832 0.831 0.830 0.830 0.829 0.829 0.828 0.828 0.828 0.827 0.827
out 0.507 0.519 0.772 0.801 0.805 0.812 0.813 0.814 0.814 0.816 0.816 0.816 0.816 0.816 0.816 0.816 0.817 0.817 0.817 0.817 0.815 0.815
EC, LC
in 1.000 0.997 0.989 0.962 0.935 0.925 0.919 0.914 0.909 0.905 0.902 0.902 0.895 0.893 0.891 0.886 0.887 0.883 0.883 0.881 0.884 0.886
out 0.772 0.794 0.807 0.824 0.833 0.837 0.839 0.840 0.843 0.845 0.846 0.847 0.848 0.850 0.851 0.850 0.853 0.851 0.853 0.852 0.855 0.858
EC, SN
in 1.000 0.971 0.957 0.939 0.930 0.922 0.917 0.912 0.909 0.906 0.904 0.902 0.900 0.899 0.898 0.896 0.896 0.895 0.894 0.893 0.893 0.892
out 0.771 0.804 0.827 0.837 0.844 0.849 0.854 0.857 0.859 0.861 0.863 0.864 0.866 0.867 0.867 0.868 0.869 0.870 0.871 0.871 0.872 0.872
IA, RD
in 0.939 0.924 0.910 0.891 0.881 0.872 0.866 0.861 0.858 0.856 0.854 0.852 0.850 0.848 0.847 0.846 0.845 0.845 0.844 0.843 0.843 0.842
out 0.720 0.772 0.790 0.797 0.803 0.805 0.809 0.811 0.812 0.814 0.815 0.816 0.817 0.818 0.818 0.819 0.820 0.820 0.820 0.821 0.821 0.821
IA, LC
in 1.000 0.997 0.982 0.952 0.935 0.931 0.922 0.915 0.911 0.908 0.902 0.899 0.896 0.894 0.892 0.888 0.887 0.884 0.883 0.882 0.882 0.883
out 0.771 0.794 0.802 0.819 0.822 0.829 0.834 0.837 0.840 0.842 0.843 0.845 0.847 0.849 0.850 0.849 0.850 0.849 0.850 0.851 0.852 0.855
IA, SN
in 1.000 0.971 0.957 0.940 0.929 0.920 0.914 0.910 0.905 0.903 0.901 0.898 0.896 0.895 0.894 0.893 0.892 0.892 0.891 0.890 0.890 0.890
out 0.771 0.804 0.827 0.837 0.845 0.850 0.855 0.858 0.861 0.863 0.865 0.866 0.867 0.868 0.869 0.870 0.870 0.871 0.872 0.872 0.873 0.873
RD, LC
in 1.000 0.997 0.989 0.971 0.952 0.934 0.925 0.915 0.910 0.906 0.902 0.902 0.895 0.893 0.892 0.886 0.887 0.883 0.883 0.881 0.884 0.886
out 0.772 0.794 0.807 0.817 0.823 0.829 0.834 0.837 0.840 0.842 0.844 0.846 0.847 0.849 0.850 0.849 0.852 0.850 0.852 0.852 0.855 0.857
RD, SN
in 1.000 0.971 0.957 0.939 0.930 0.922 0.917 0.912 0.909 0.906 0.904 0.902 0.900 0.899 0.898 0.896 0.896 0.895 0.894 0.893 0.893 0.892
out 0.771 0.804 0.827 0.837 0.844 0.849 0.854 0.857 0.860 0.861 0.863 0.865 0.866 0.867 0.868 0.869 0.869 0.870 0.871 0.872 0.872 0.872
LC, SN
in 1.000 0.997 0.980 0.962 0.946 0.938 0.930 0.925 0.920 0.917 0.913 0.911 0.907 0.906 0.904 0.902 0.901 0.900 0.899 0.899 0.899 0.898
out 0.766 0.793 0.818 0.832 0.839 0.841 0.847 0.850 0.852 0.853 0.855 0.857 0.860 0.860 0.863 0.864 0.865 0.866 0.867 0.867 0.868 0.869
3-types
EC, IA, RD
in 0.625 0.629 0.895 0.883 0.878 0.869 0.865 0.861 0.858 0.855 0.853 0.852 0.850 0.848 0.848 0.846 0.845 0.845 0.844 0.843 0.843 0.842
out 0.496 0.523 0.793 0.800 0.805 0.808 0.811 0.813 0.814 0.816 0.816 0.817 0.818 0.819 0.819 0.819 0.820 0.820 0.820 0.821 0.821 0.821
EC, IA, LC
in 1.000 0.997 0.981 0.950 0.931 0.928 0.921 0.914 0.910 0.907 0.902 0.899 0.896 0.894 0.892 0.888 0.887 0.884 0.883 0.882 0.882 0.883
out 0.771 0.794 0.802 0.821 0.824 0.832 0.835 0.838 0.841 0.843 0.844 0.846 0.848 0.849 0.850 0.849 0.851 0.850 0.851 0.852 0.852 0.855
EC, IA, SN
in 1.000 0.971 0.957 0.940 0.929 0.920 0.914 0.910 0.905 0.903 0.901 0.898 0.896 0.895 0.894 0.893 0.892 0.892 0.891 0.890 0.890 0.890
out 0.771 0.804 0.827 0.837 0.845 0.850 0.855 0.858 0.861 0.863 0.865 0.866 0.867 0.868 0.869 0.870 0.870 0.871 0.872 0.872 0.873 0.873
EC, RD, LC
in 1.000 0.997 0.989 0.962 0.935 0.925 0.919 0.914 0.909 0.905 0.902 0.902 0.895 0.894 0.891 0.887 0.888 0.884 0.886 0.883 0.885 0.888
out 0.772 0.794 0.808 0.823 0.833 0.836 0.839 0.840 0.843 0.845 0.846 0.847 0.848 0.850 0.851 0.851 0.853 0.851 0.853 0.852 0.855 0.857
EC, RD, SN
in 1.000 0.971 0.957 0.939 0.930 0.922 0.917 0.912 0.909 0.906 0.904 0.902 0.900 0.899 0.898 0.896 0.896 0.895 0.894 0.893 0.893 0.892
out 0.771 0.804 0.827 0.837 0.844 0.849 0.854 0.857 0.860 0.861 0.863 0.865 0.866 0.867 0.868 0.869 0.869 0.870 0.871 0.872 0.872 0.872
EC, LC, SN
in 1.000 0.997 0.980 0.962 0.946 0.938 0.930 0.925 0.920 0.917 0.913 0.911 0.907 0.906 0.904 0.902 0.901 0.900 0.899 0.899 0.899 0.898
out 0.766 0.793 0.818 0.832 0.839 0.841 0.847 0.850 0.852 0.853 0.855 0.857 0.860 0.860 0.863 0.864 0.865 0.866 0.867 0.867 0.868 0.869
IA, RD, LC
in 1.000 0.997 0.981 0.952 0.935 0.930 0.922 0.915 0.911 0.907 0.902 0.899 0.896 0.894 0.892 0.888 0.887 0.884 0.883 0.882 0.882 0.883
out 0.771 0.794 0.803 0.819 0.822 0.830 0.834 0.837 0.841 0.843 0.844 0.846 0.848 0.849 0.850 0.849 0.851 0.850 0.851 0.852 0.852 0.855
IA, RD, SN
in 1.000 0.971 0.957 0.940 0.929 0.920 0.914 0.910 0.905 0.903 0.901 0.898 0.896 0.895 0.894 0.893 0.892 0.891 0.891 0.890 0.890 0.889
out 0.771 0.804 0.827 0.837 0.845 0.850 0.855 0.858 0.861 0.863 0.865 0.866 0.867 0.868 0.869 0.870 0.871 0.872 0.872 0.873 0.873 0.874
IA, LC, SN
in 1.000 0.997 0.980 0.962 0.944 0.936 0.927 0.923 0.917 0.914 0.911 0.907 0.904 0.902 0.900 0.899 0.898 0.897 0.896 0.896 0.896 0.895
out 0.766 0.793 0.817 0.832 0.840 0.843 0.849 0.852 0.854 0.855 0.857 0.858 0.861 0.862 0.864 0.865 0.866 0.867 0.868 0.868 0.869 0.870
RD, LC, SN
in 1.000 0.997 0.980 0.962 0.946 0.938 0.930 0.925 0.920 0.917 0.913 0.911 0.907 0.906 0.904 0.902 0.901 0.900 0.899 0.899 0.899 0.898
out 0.766 0.793 0.819 0.832 0.839 0.841 0.847 0.850 0.852 0.853 0.855 0.857 0.860 0.860 0.863 0.864 0.865 0.866 0.867 0.867 0.868 0.869
4-types
EC, IA, RD, LC
in 1.000 0.997 0.981 0.950 0.931 0.928 0.921 0.914 0.910 0.907 0.902 0.899 0.896 0.894 0.892 0.888 0.887 0.884 0.883 0.882 0.882 0.883
out 0.771 0.794 0.803 0.821 0.824 0.832 0.835 0.838 0.841 0.843 0.844 0.846 0.848 0.849 0.850 0.849 0.851 0.850 0.851 0.852 0.852 0.855
EC, IA, RD, SN
in 1.000 0.971 0.957 0.940 0.929 0.920 0.914 0.910 0.905 0.903 0.901 0.898 0.896 0.895 0.894 0.893 0.892 0.891 0.891 0.890 0.890 0.889
out 0.771 0.804 0.827 0.837 0.845 0.850 0.855 0.858 0.861 0.863 0.865 0.866 0.867 0.868 0.869 0.870 0.871 0.872 0.872 0.873 0.873 0.874
IA, RD, LC, SN
in 1.000 0.997 0.980 0.962 0.944 0.936 0.927 0.923 0.917 0.914 0.911 0.907 0.904 0.902 0.900 0.899 0.898 0.897 0.896 0.896 0.896 0.895
out 0.766 0.793 0.818 0.832 0.840 0.843 0.849 0.852 0.854 0.855 0.857 0.858 0.861 0.862 0.864 0.865 0.866 0.867 0.868 0.868 0.869 0.870
EC, RD, LC, SN
in 1.000 0.997 0.980 0.962 0.946 0.938 0.930 0.925 0.920 0.917 0.913 0.911 0.907 0.906 0.904 0.902 0.901 0.900 0.899 0.899 0.899 0.898
out 0.766 0.793 0.819 0.832 0.839 0.841 0.847 0.850 0.852 0.853 0.855 0.857 0.860 0.860 0.863 0.864 0.865 0.866 0.867 0.867 0.868 0.869
EC, IA, LC, SN
in 1.000 0.997 0.980 0.962 0.944 0.936 0.927 0.923 0.917 0.914 0.911 0.907 0.904 0.902 0.900 0.899 0.898 0.897 0.896 0.896 0.896 0.895
out 0.766 0.793 0.817 0.832 0.840 0.843 0.849 0.852 0.854 0.855 0.857 0.858 0.861 0.862 0.864 0.865 0.866 0.867 0.868 0.868 0.869 0.870
5-types EC, IA, RD, LC, SN
in 1.000 0.997 0.980 0.962 0.944 0.936 0.927 0.923 0.917 0.914 0.911 0.907 0.904 0.902 0.900 0.899 0.898 0.897 0.896 0.896 0.896 0.895
out 0.766 0.793 0.818 0.832 0.840 0.843 0.849 0.852 0.854 0.855 0.857 0.858 0.861 0.862 0.864 0.865 0.866 0.867 0.868 0.868 0.869 0.870
Table 2.D.2: In- and out-of-sample accuracy - Game A (continued)
Decisions used to estimate and classify
(23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44)
1-type
EC
in 0.525 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.525 0.525 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.526
out 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.525 0.525 0.525 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.525 0.525 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.526 0.525 0.524 0.524 0.522 0.521
IA
in 0.840 0.840 0.840 0.839 0.839 0.839 0.838 0.838 0.837 0.837 0.837 0.837 0.836 0.836 0.836 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.834
out 0.819 0.819 0.819 0.819 0.819 0.820 0.820 0.820 0.820 0.821 0.821 0.821 0.821 0.822 0.823 0.823 0.823 0.823 0.823 0.824 0.824 0.824
RD
in 0.826 0.826 0.826 0.826 0.826 0.825 0.825 0.825 0.825 0.825 0.825 0.825 0.824 0.824 0.824 0.824 0.824 0.824 0.824 0.824 0.824 0.824
out 0.815 0.815 0.815 0.815 0.815 0.815 0.815 0.816 0.815 0.816 0.816 0.815 0.816 0.816 0.817 0.818 0.818 0.817 0.817 0.817 0.816 0.812
LC
in 0.891 0.891 0.890 0.890 0.889 0.889 0.888 0.888 0.887 0.887 0.886 0.886 0.886 0.886 0.885 0.885 0.885 0.885 0.884 0.884 0.884 0.884
out 0.857 0.858 0.859 0.859 0.860 0.860 0.861 0.862 0.862 0.863 0.863 0.864 0.865 0.865 0.866 0.866 0.867 0.866 0.867 0.867 0.867 0.869
SN
in 0.892 0.891 0.891 0.891 0.890 0.890 0.890 0.889 0.889 0.889 0.888 0.888 0.888 0.888 0.887 0.887 0.887 0.887 0.887 0.886 0.886 0.886
out 0.872 0.873 0.873 0.873 0.873 0.873 0.874 0.874 0.874 0.874 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.877
2-types
EC, IA
in 0.840 0.840 0.840 0.839 0.839 0.839 0.838 0.838 0.837 0.837 0.837 0.837 0.836 0.836 0.836 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.834
out 0.819 0.819 0.819 0.819 0.819 0.820 0.820 0.820 0.820 0.821 0.821 0.821 0.821 0.822 0.823 0.823 0.823 0.823 0.823 0.824 0.824 0.824
EC, RD
in 0.826 0.826 0.826 0.826 0.826 0.825 0.825 0.825 0.825 0.825 0.825 0.825 0.824 0.824 0.824 0.824 0.824 0.824 0.824 0.824 0.824 0.824
out 0.815 0.815 0.815 0.815 0.815 0.815 0.815 0.816 0.815 0.816 0.816 0.815 0.816 0.816 0.817 0.818 0.818 0.817 0.817 0.817 0.816 0.812
EC, LC
in 0.883 0.883 0.885 0.885 0.884 0.884 0.883 0.883 0.883 0.885 0.885 0.885 0.885 0.885 0.885 0.885 0.885 0.884 0.883 0.883 0.883 0.883
out 0.857 0.857 0.860 0.860 0.860 0.861 0.861 0.861 0.862 0.865 0.865 0.865 0.867 0.867 0.868 0.868 0.869 0.867 0.869 0.868 0.868 0.868
EC, SN
in 0.892 0.891 0.891 0.891 0.890 0.890 0.890 0.889 0.889 0.889 0.888 0.888 0.888 0.888 0.887 0.887 0.887 0.887 0.887 0.886 0.886 0.886
out 0.872 0.873 0.873 0.873 0.873 0.873 0.874 0.874 0.874 0.874 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.877
IA, RD
in 0.841 0.841 0.840 0.840 0.839 0.839 0.839 0.838 0.838 0.837 0.837 0.837 0.836 0.836 0.836 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.834
out 0.821 0.821 0.821 0.821 0.821 0.822 0.822 0.822 0.822 0.822 0.823 0.822 0.823 0.823 0.824 0.824 0.825 0.824 0.824 0.825 0.824 0.824
IA, LC
in 0.881 0.881 0.884 0.884 0.881 0.883 0.882 0.882 0.882 0.884 0.884 0.883 0.884 0.884 0.884 0.883 0.883 0.882 0.881 0.881 0.881 0.881
out 0.854 0.855 0.859 0.859 0.858 0.860 0.861 0.861 0.861 0.865 0.865 0.865 0.867 0.867 0.868 0.868 0.868 0.867 0.868 0.868 0.867 0.868
IA, SN
in 0.889 0.889 0.888 0.888 0.888 0.888 0.887 0.887 0.887 0.887 0.886 0.886 0.886 0.886 0.885 0.885 0.885 0.885 0.884 0.884 0.884 0.884
out 0.873 0.874 0.874 0.874 0.874 0.874 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.877 0.876 0.877
RD, LC
in 0.883 0.883 0.885 0.885 0.884 0.884 0.883 0.883 0.883 0.885 0.885 0.885 0.885 0.885 0.885 0.885 0.885 0.883 0.883 0.883 0.883 0.883
out 0.856 0.856 0.859 0.859 0.860 0.860 0.861 0.861 0.862 0.864 0.865 0.865 0.866 0.867 0.867 0.868 0.868 0.867 0.868 0.868 0.867 0.868
RD, SN
in 0.892 0.891 0.891 0.891 0.890 0.890 0.890 0.889 0.889 0.889 0.888 0.888 0.888 0.888 0.887 0.887 0.887 0.887 0.887 0.886 0.886 0.886
out 0.873 0.873 0.874 0.874 0.874 0.874 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.876 0.875 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.877 0.877 0.877 0.877 0.877 0.877 0.877
LC, SN
in 0.897 0.897 0.896 0.896 0.896 0.895 0.895 0.894 0.894 0.894 0.893 0.893 0.893 0.892 0.892 0.892 0.892 0.892 0.891 0.891 0.890 0.891
out 0.870 0.870 0.871 0.871 0.871 0.872 0.872 0.873 0.873 0.873 0.874 0.874 0.874 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.877
3-types
EC, IA, RD
in 0.841 0.841 0.840 0.840 0.839 0.839 0.839 0.838 0.838 0.837 0.837 0.837 0.836 0.836 0.836 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.834
out 0.821 0.821 0.821 0.821 0.821 0.822 0.822 0.822 0.822 0.822 0.823 0.822 0.823 0.823 0.824 0.824 0.825 0.824 0.824 0.825 0.824 0.824
EC, IA, LC
in 0.881 0.881 0.884 0.884 0.881 0.883 0.882 0.882 0.882 0.884 0.884 0.883 0.884 0.884 0.884 0.883 0.883 0.882 0.881 0.881 0.881 0.881
out 0.854 0.855 0.859 0.859 0.858 0.860 0.861 0.861 0.861 0.865 0.865 0.865 0.867 0.867 0.868 0.868 0.868 0.867 0.868 0.868 0.867 0.868
EC, IA, SN
in 0.889 0.889 0.888 0.888 0.888 0.888 0.887 0.887 0.887 0.887 0.886 0.886 0.886 0.886 0.885 0.885 0.885 0.885 0.884 0.884 0.884 0.884
out 0.873 0.874 0.874 0.874 0.874 0.874 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.877 0.876 0.877
EC, RD, LC
in 0.884 0.885 0.887 0.886 0.886 0.885 0.887 0.887 0.884 0.885 0.887 0.885 0.885 0.885 0.886 0.885 0.885 0.883 0.883 0.883 0.884 0.883
out 0.857 0.856 0.859 0.859 0.860 0.860 0.862 0.863 0.862 0.864 0.865 0.865 0.867 0.867 0.868 0.868 0.868 0.866 0.868 0.868 0.868 0.869
EC, RD, SN
in 0.892 0.891 0.891 0.891 0.890 0.890 0.890 0.889 0.889 0.889 0.888 0.888 0.888 0.888 0.887 0.887 0.887 0.887 0.887 0.886 0.886 0.886
out 0.873 0.873 0.874 0.874 0.874 0.874 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.876 0.875 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.877 0.877 0.877 0.877 0.877 0.877 0.877
EC, LC, SN
in 0.897 0.897 0.896 0.896 0.896 0.895 0.895 0.894 0.894 0.894 0.893 0.893 0.893 0.892 0.892 0.892 0.892 0.892 0.891 0.891 0.890 0.891
out 0.870 0.870 0.871 0.871 0.871 0.872 0.872 0.873 0.873 0.873 0.874 0.874 0.874 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.877
IA, RD, LC
in 0.881 0.881 0.884 0.884 0.881 0.883 0.882 0.882 0.882 0.884 0.884 0.883 0.884 0.884 0.884 0.883 0.883 0.882 0.881 0.881 0.881 0.881
out 0.854 0.855 0.859 0.859 0.858 0.860 0.861 0.861 0.861 0.865 0.865 0.865 0.867 0.867 0.868 0.868 0.868 0.867 0.868 0.868 0.867 0.868
IA, RD, SN
in 0.889 0.889 0.888 0.888 0.888 0.888 0.887 0.887 0.887 0.887 0.886 0.886 0.886 0.886 0.885 0.885 0.885 0.885 0.885 0.884 0.884 0.884
out 0.874 0.874 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.877 0.876 0.877 0.877 0.877 0.877 0.877 0.877 0.877 0.877
IA, LC, SN
in 0.894 0.894 0.893 0.893 0.893 0.893 0.892 0.892 0.892 0.891 0.891 0.891 0.890 0.890 0.890 0.890 0.889 0.889 0.888 0.889 0.888 0.888
out 0.871 0.871 0.872 0.872 0.872 0.873 0.873 0.873 0.874 0.874 0.874 0.874 0.875 0.875 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.875 0.876 0.876 0.875 0.877
RD, LC, SN
in 0.897 0.897 0.896 0.896 0.896 0.895 0.895 0.894 0.894 0.894 0.893 0.893 0.893 0.892 0.892 0.892 0.892 0.892 0.891 0.891 0.890 0.891
out 0.870 0.870 0.871 0.871 0.871 0.872 0.872 0.873 0.873 0.873 0.874 0.874 0.874 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.877
4-types
EC, IA, RD, LC
in 0.881 0.881 0.884 0.884 0.881 0.883 0.882 0.882 0.882 0.884 0.884 0.883 0.884 0.884 0.884 0.883 0.883 0.882 0.881 0.881 0.881 0.881
out 0.854 0.855 0.859 0.859 0.858 0.860 0.861 0.861 0.861 0.865 0.865 0.865 0.867 0.867 0.868 0.868 0.868 0.867 0.868 0.868 0.867 0.868
EC, IA, RD, SN
in 0.889 0.889 0.888 0.888 0.888 0.888 0.887 0.887 0.887 0.887 0.886 0.886 0.886 0.886 0.885 0.885 0.885 0.885 0.885 0.884 0.884 0.884
out 0.874 0.874 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.877 0.876 0.877 0.877 0.877 0.877 0.877 0.877 0.877 0.877
IA, RD, LC, SN
in 0.894 0.894 0.893 0.893 0.893 0.893 0.892 0.892 0.892 0.891 0.891 0.891 0.890 0.890 0.890 0.890 0.889 0.889 0.888 0.889 0.888 0.888
out 0.871 0.871 0.872 0.872 0.872 0.873 0.873 0.873 0.874 0.874 0.874 0.874 0.875 0.875 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.875 0.876 0.876 0.875 0.877
EC, RD, LC, SN
in 0.897 0.897 0.896 0.896 0.896 0.895 0.895 0.894 0.894 0.894 0.893 0.893 0.893 0.892 0.892 0.892 0.892 0.892 0.891 0.891 0.890 0.891
out 0.870 0.870 0.871 0.871 0.871 0.872 0.872 0.873 0.873 0.873 0.874 0.874 0.874 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.877
EC, IA, LC, SN
in 0.894 0.894 0.893 0.893 0.893 0.893 0.892 0.892 0.892 0.891 0.891 0.891 0.890 0.890 0.890 0.890 0.889 0.889 0.888 0.889 0.888 0.888
out 0.871 0.871 0.872 0.872 0.872 0.873 0.873 0.873 0.874 0.874 0.874 0.874 0.875 0.875 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.875 0.876 0.876 0.875 0.877
5-types EC, IA, RD, LC, SN
in 0.894 0.894 0.893 0.893 0.893 0.893 0.892 0.892 0.892 0.891 0.891 0.891 0.890 0.890 0.890 0.890 0.889 0.889 0.888 0.889 0.888 0.888
out 0.871 0.871 0.872 0.872 0.872 0.873 0.873 0.873 0.874 0.874 0.874 0.874 0.875 0.875 0.876 0.876 0.876 0.875 0.876 0.876 0.875 0.877
This table presents the accuracies of the in-sample and out-of-sample fits of all 31 worlds in Game A. The accuracy is derived as the ratio of correctly fitted decisions over the
total number of decisions, whereas M = 1000 random selections were used. We assume Senders’ first-order beliefs to equal one. EC reflects the standard economic model, IA
inequity aversion, RD reference-dependent preferences, LC lying costs, and SN reputation or social norms. Each column corresponds to a specific number of decisions used to
estimate individual parameters, classify participants into types and to compute the in-sample performance. The remaining decisions are used to derive the out-of-sample fit.
Table 2.D.3: In- and out-of-sample accuracy standard errors - Game A
Decisions used to estimate and classify
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22)
1-type
EC
in 1.722 0.258 0.199 0.169 0.153 0.137 0.126 0.115 0.106 0.100 0.093 0.087 0.083 0.078 0.075 0.073 0.069 0.067 0.063 0.060 0.058 0.055
out 0.039 0.012 0.014 0.016 0.019 0.021 0.023 0.025 0.027 0.029 0.030 0.032 0.034 0.035 0.037 0.040 0.042 0.044 0.046 0.048 0.050 0.053
IA
in 2.029 0.210 0.168 0.138 0.121 0.110 0.100 0.091 0.085 0.080 0.075 0.071 0.067 0.062 0.060 0.058 0.055 0.052 0.051 0.049 0.046 0.044
out 1.475 0.161 0.090 0.048 0.043 0.035 0.033 0.031 0.029 0.029 0.030 0.031 0.032 0.033 0.034 0.036 0.037 0.039 0.040 0.041 0.043 0.045
RD
in 2.527 0.235 0.175 0.124 0.103 0.095 0.089 0.080 0.074 0.070 0.066 0.062 0.059 0.056 0.053 0.052 0.050 0.048 0.045 0.043 0.041 0.040
out 1.672 0.218 0.126 0.070 0.035 0.032 0.030 0.030 0.031 0.032 0.034 0.035 0.035 0.037 0.039 0.041 0.042 0.044 0.045 0.047 0.049 0.050
LC
in 0.000 0.050 0.069 0.068 0.060 0.056 0.055 0.052 0.050 0.047 0.044 0.042 0.040 0.038 0.037 0.036 0.034 0.033 0.032 0.031 0.030 0.028
out 0.505 0.127 0.100 0.070 0.062 0.059 0.051 0.046 0.043 0.041 0.039 0.037 0.035 0.035 0.033 0.031 0.031 0.028 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029
SN
in 0.000 0.061 0.066 0.065 0.059 0.055 0.052 0.047 0.044 0.041 0.039 0.036 0.034 0.032 0.031 0.030 0.029 0.028 0.027 0.025 0.024 0.023
out 0.498 0.086 0.059 0.050 0.043 0.038 0.032 0.030 0.026 0.024 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.020 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.022
2-types
EC, IA
in 0.492 0.140 0.166 0.137 0.121 0.110 0.100 0.091 0.086 0.080 0.075 0.071 0.067 0.062 0.060 0.058 0.055 0.053 0.051 0.049 0.046 0.044
out 0.481 0.082 0.090 0.046 0.042 0.034 0.031 0.030 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.030 0.031 0.032 0.033 0.035 0.037 0.039 0.039 0.041 0.043 0.045
EC, RD
in 0.986 0.189 0.178 0.141 0.114 0.099 0.093 0.084 0.077 0.072 0.067 0.062 0.059 0.056 0.053 0.052 0.050 0.048 0.045 0.043 0.041 0.040
out 0.377 0.044 0.111 0.064 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.029 0.031 0.032 0.033 0.034 0.035 0.036 0.038 0.040 0.041 0.043 0.044 0.046 0.048 0.050
EC, LC
in 0.000 0.050 0.068 0.066 0.063 0.058 0.055 0.052 0.050 0.047 0.044 0.041 0.040 0.037 0.036 0.037 0.035 0.035 0.033 0.032 0.029 0.027
out 0.505 0.127 0.092 0.055 0.045 0.041 0.037 0.034 0.032 0.032 0.031 0.030 0.029 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.029 0.028 0.028
EC, SN
in 0.000 0.061 0.066 0.065 0.059 0.055 0.052 0.047 0.044 0.041 0.039 0.036 0.034 0.032 0.031 0.030 0.029 0.028 0.027 0.025 0.024 0.023
out 0.498 0.086 0.059 0.050 0.043 0.038 0.032 0.030 0.026 0.024 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.020 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.022
IA, RD
in 1.956 0.203 0.167 0.138 0.120 0.109 0.099 0.090 0.085 0.079 0.075 0.071 0.066 0.061 0.059 0.057 0.054 0.052 0.050 0.048 0.046 0.044
out 1.488 0.160 0.091 0.047 0.042 0.035 0.033 0.031 0.030 0.029 0.030 0.030 0.032 0.032 0.034 0.035 0.037 0.038 0.039 0.041 0.042 0.044
IA, LC
in 0.000 0.050 0.067 0.074 0.076 0.061 0.058 0.054 0.051 0.047 0.045 0.043 0.041 0.038 0.037 0.037 0.036 0.035 0.034 0.032 0.031 0.029
out 0.509 0.126 0.087 0.054 0.048 0.045 0.039 0.035 0.034 0.033 0.031 0.031 0.030 0.030 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.029 0.029
IA, SN
in 0.000 0.061 0.065 0.065 0.057 0.053 0.050 0.046 0.043 0.041 0.039 0.036 0.034 0.031 0.031 0.029 0.028 0.027 0.026 0.025 0.023 0.023
out 0.498 0.084 0.058 0.046 0.036 0.032 0.029 0.026 0.023 0.022 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.021
RD, LC
in 0.000 0.050 0.068 0.065 0.059 0.054 0.053 0.050 0.048 0.045 0.043 0.041 0.039 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.034 0.034 0.032 0.032 0.029 0.027
out 0.505 0.127 0.080 0.060 0.052 0.046 0.041 0.037 0.034 0.033 0.032 0.031 0.029 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.027 0.026 0.027 0.028 0.028 0.028
RD, SN
in 0.000 0.061 0.066 0.065 0.059 0.055 0.052 0.047 0.044 0.041 0.039 0.036 0.034 0.032 0.032 0.030 0.029 0.028 0.027 0.025 0.024 0.023
out 0.502 0.086 0.059 0.050 0.042 0.038 0.032 0.030 0.026 0.024 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.020 0.021 0.020 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.022
LC, SN
in 0.000 0.049 0.053 0.062 0.056 0.053 0.050 0.048 0.045 0.042 0.040 0.037 0.035 0.033 0.032 0.031 0.030 0.028 0.027 0.026 0.025 0.024
out 0.641 0.129 0.084 0.051 0.044 0.040 0.034 0.031 0.028 0.026 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.025 0.025
3-types
EC, IA, RD
in 0.413 0.135 0.166 0.137 0.120 0.109 0.099 0.091 0.085 0.079 0.075 0.071 0.066 0.061 0.059 0.057 0.054 0.052 0.050 0.048 0.046 0.044
out 0.501 0.082 0.090 0.047 0.041 0.034 0.032 0.030 0.029 0.028 0.029 0.029 0.031 0.032 0.033 0.035 0.037 0.038 0.039 0.041 0.042 0.044
EC, IA, LC
in 0.000 0.050 0.066 0.074 0.077 0.061 0.058 0.054 0.051 0.047 0.046 0.043 0.041 0.038 0.037 0.037 0.036 0.036 0.034 0.033 0.031 0.029
out 0.509 0.126 0.085 0.053 0.047 0.044 0.039 0.034 0.033 0.033 0.031 0.030 0.029 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.029
EC, IA, SN
in 0.000 0.061 0.065 0.065 0.057 0.053 0.050 0.046 0.043 0.041 0.039 0.036 0.034 0.031 0.031 0.029 0.028 0.027 0.026 0.025 0.023 0.023
out 0.498 0.084 0.058 0.046 0.036 0.032 0.029 0.026 0.023 0.022 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.021
EC, RD, LC
in 0.000 0.050 0.067 0.066 0.062 0.057 0.055 0.052 0.050 0.047 0.044 0.041 0.039 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.034 0.033 0.031 0.031 0.029 0.027
out 0.505 0.127 0.079 0.056 0.046 0.041 0.038 0.035 0.032 0.032 0.031 0.030 0.029 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.027 0.026 0.026 0.028 0.028 0.028
EC, RD, SN
in 0.000 0.061 0.066 0.065 0.059 0.055 0.052 0.047 0.044 0.041 0.039 0.036 0.034 0.032 0.032 0.030 0.029 0.028 0.027 0.025 0.024 0.023
out 0.502 0.086 0.059 0.050 0.042 0.038 0.032 0.030 0.026 0.024 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.020 0.021 0.020 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.022
EC, LC, SN
in 0.000 0.049 0.053 0.062 0.056 0.053 0.050 0.048 0.045 0.042 0.040 0.037 0.035 0.033 0.032 0.031 0.030 0.028 0.027 0.026 0.025 0.024
out 0.641 0.129 0.084 0.051 0.044 0.040 0.034 0.031 0.028 0.026 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.025 0.025
IA, RD, LC
in 0.000 0.050 0.066 0.074 0.077 0.061 0.058 0.054 0.051 0.047 0.046 0.043 0.041 0.038 0.037 0.037 0.036 0.036 0.034 0.033 0.031 0.029
out 0.509 0.126 0.070 0.052 0.047 0.043 0.039 0.035 0.034 0.033 0.031 0.030 0.029 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.029
IA, RD, SN
in 0.000 0.061 0.065 0.065 0.057 0.053 0.050 0.046 0.043 0.041 0.039 0.036 0.034 0.031 0.031 0.029 0.028 0.027 0.026 0.025 0.023 0.022
out 0.502 0.084 0.058 0.046 0.036 0.032 0.029 0.026 0.023 0.022 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.021
IA, LC, SN
in 0.000 0.049 0.053 0.062 0.055 0.052 0.049 0.047 0.044 0.042 0.040 0.038 0.035 0.033 0.032 0.031 0.029 0.028 0.027 0.025 0.024 0.023
out 0.641 0.128 0.084 0.048 0.038 0.034 0.031 0.029 0.026 0.025 0.024 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.024
RD, LC, SN
in 0.000 0.049 0.053 0.062 0.056 0.053 0.050 0.048 0.045 0.042 0.040 0.037 0.035 0.033 0.032 0.031 0.030 0.028 0.027 0.026 0.025 0.024
out 0.641 0.129 0.068 0.051 0.044 0.040 0.034 0.031 0.028 0.026 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.025 0.025
4-types
EC, IA, RD, LC
in 0.000 0.050 0.066 0.074 0.077 0.061 0.058 0.054 0.051 0.047 0.046 0.043 0.041 0.038 0.037 0.037 0.036 0.036 0.034 0.033 0.031 0.029
out 0.509 0.126 0.070 0.051 0.047 0.043 0.039 0.034 0.033 0.033 0.031 0.030 0.029 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.029
EC, IA, RD, SN
in 0.000 0.061 0.065 0.065 0.057 0.053 0.050 0.046 0.043 0.041 0.039 0.036 0.034 0.031 0.031 0.029 0.028 0.027 0.026 0.025 0.023 0.022
out 0.502 0.084 0.058 0.046 0.036 0.032 0.029 0.026 0.023 0.022 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.021
IA, RD, LC, SN
in 0.000 0.049 0.053 0.062 0.055 0.052 0.049 0.047 0.044 0.042 0.040 0.038 0.035 0.033 0.032 0.031 0.029 0.028 0.027 0.025 0.024 0.023
out 0.641 0.128 0.068 0.048 0.038 0.034 0.031 0.029 0.026 0.025 0.024 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.024
EC, RD, LC, SN
in 0.000 0.049 0.053 0.062 0.056 0.053 0.050 0.048 0.045 0.042 0.040 0.037 0.035 0.033 0.032 0.031 0.030 0.028 0.027 0.026 0.025 0.024
out 0.641 0.129 0.068 0.051 0.044 0.040 0.034 0.031 0.028 0.026 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.025 0.025
EC, IA, LC, SN
in 0.000 0.049 0.053 0.062 0.055 0.052 0.049 0.047 0.044 0.042 0.040 0.038 0.035 0.033 0.032 0.031 0.029 0.028 0.027 0.025 0.024 0.023
out 0.641 0.128 0.084 0.048 0.038 0.034 0.031 0.029 0.026 0.025 0.024 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.024
5-types EC, IA, RD, LC, SN
in 0.000 0.049 0.053 0.062 0.055 0.052 0.049 0.047 0.044 0.042 0.040 0.038 0.035 0.033 0.032 0.031 0.029 0.028 0.027 0.025 0.024 0.023
out 0.641 0.128 0.068 0.048 0.038 0.034 0.031 0.029 0.026 0.025 0.024 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.024
Table 2.D.3: In- and out-of-sample accuracy standard errors - Game A (continued)
Decisions used to estimate and classify
(23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44)
1-type
EC
in 0.052 0.050 0.048 0.046 0.044 0.042 0.040 0.038 0.036 0.034 0.032 0.030 0.029 0.027 0.025 0.023 0.021 0.019 0.017 0.015 0.012 0.039
out 0.054 0.057 0.060 0.063 0.066 0.069 0.072 0.076 0.080 0.083 0.089 0.094 0.101 0.108 0.116 0.126 0.137 0.155 0.177 0.207 0.256 1.725
IA
in 0.042 0.041 0.040 0.038 0.036 0.034 0.032 0.031 0.029 0.027 0.026 0.025 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.019 0.018 0.016 0.015 0.013 0.011 0.035
out 0.046 0.048 0.050 0.052 0.054 0.057 0.058 0.061 0.064 0.066 0.070 0.074 0.080 0.084 0.091 0.098 0.106 0.120 0.138 0.166 0.210 1.378
RD
in 0.038 0.036 0.035 0.033 0.032 0.030 0.029 0.028 0.026 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.020 0.020 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.030
out 0.051 0.054 0.056 0.059 0.060 0.063 0.064 0.067 0.071 0.072 0.077 0.080 0.085 0.089 0.096 0.102 0.110 0.123 0.139 0.162 0.201 1.319
LC
in 0.027 0.026 0.025 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.008 0.038
out 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.031 0.033 0.034 0.035 0.036 0.037 0.039 0.041 0.043 0.046 0.049 0.053 0.056 0.062 0.068 0.078 0.092 0.119 0.756
SN
in 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.019
out 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.025 0.026 0.027 0.028 0.029 0.031 0.033 0.035 0.037 0.039 0.041 0.045 0.048 0.052 0.057 0.067 0.078 0.102 0.662
2-types
EC, IA
in 0.042 0.041 0.040 0.038 0.036 0.034 0.032 0.031 0.029 0.027 0.026 0.025 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.019 0.018 0.016 0.015 0.013 0.011 0.035
out 0.046 0.048 0.050 0.052 0.054 0.057 0.058 0.061 0.064 0.066 0.070 0.074 0.080 0.084 0.091 0.098 0.106 0.120 0.138 0.166 0.210 1.378
EC, RD
in 0.038 0.036 0.035 0.033 0.032 0.030 0.029 0.028 0.026 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.020 0.020 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.030
out 0.051 0.054 0.056 0.059 0.060 0.063 0.064 0.067 0.071 0.072 0.077 0.080 0.085 0.089 0.096 0.102 0.110 0.123 0.139 0.162 0.201 1.319
EC, LC
in 0.027 0.026 0.024 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.022
out 0.029 0.029 0.030 0.031 0.033 0.034 0.035 0.037 0.037 0.038 0.040 0.043 0.045 0.047 0.052 0.055 0.061 0.067 0.077 0.091 0.119 0.758
EC, SN
in 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.019
out 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.025 0.026 0.027 0.028 0.029 0.031 0.033 0.035 0.037 0.039 0.041 0.045 0.048 0.052 0.057 0.067 0.078 0.102 0.662
IA, RD
in 0.042 0.040 0.039 0.038 0.036 0.034 0.032 0.031 0.029 0.027 0.026 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.019 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.013 0.011 0.035
out 0.045 0.048 0.050 0.052 0.054 0.056 0.058 0.061 0.064 0.066 0.071 0.074 0.080 0.085 0.092 0.099 0.107 0.121 0.139 0.167 0.210 1.378
IA, LC
in 0.028 0.027 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.022
out 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.032 0.034 0.034 0.036 0.038 0.039 0.039 0.042 0.044 0.046 0.049 0.053 0.057 0.062 0.069 0.079 0.093 0.122 0.775
IA, SN
in 0.021 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.019
out 0.022 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.025 0.026 0.027 0.029 0.030 0.032 0.034 0.036 0.038 0.040 0.043 0.046 0.051 0.056 0.065 0.075 0.099 0.626
RD, LC
in 0.026 0.025 0.024 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.023
out 0.029 0.029 0.030 0.031 0.033 0.034 0.035 0.037 0.038 0.038 0.040 0.043 0.045 0.047 0.052 0.055 0.061 0.067 0.077 0.091 0.120 0.762
RD, SN
in 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.019
out 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.025 0.026 0.027 0.028 0.029 0.030 0.033 0.034 0.036 0.039 0.041 0.045 0.047 0.052 0.057 0.067 0.078 0.100 0.662
LC, SN
in 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.022
out 0.026 0.026 0.027 0.028 0.029 0.030 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.036 0.038 0.040 0.043 0.045 0.049 0.052 0.057 0.063 0.072 0.085 0.109 0.710
3-types
EC, IA, RD
in 0.042 0.040 0.039 0.038 0.036 0.034 0.032 0.031 0.029 0.027 0.026 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.019 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.013 0.011 0.035
out 0.045 0.048 0.050 0.052 0.054 0.056 0.058 0.061 0.064 0.066 0.071 0.074 0.080 0.085 0.092 0.099 0.107 0.121 0.139 0.167 0.210 1.378
EC, IA, LC
in 0.028 0.027 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.022
out 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.032 0.034 0.034 0.036 0.038 0.039 0.039 0.041 0.044 0.046 0.049 0.053 0.057 0.062 0.069 0.079 0.093 0.122 0.775
EC, IA, SN
in 0.021 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.019
out 0.022 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.025 0.026 0.027 0.029 0.030 0.032 0.034 0.036 0.038 0.040 0.043 0.046 0.051 0.056 0.065 0.075 0.099 0.626
EC, RD, LC
in 0.026 0.025 0.024 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.024
out 0.028 0.029 0.030 0.031 0.033 0.034 0.035 0.036 0.037 0.039 0.041 0.043 0.045 0.047 0.052 0.056 0.062 0.068 0.077 0.092 0.117 0.744
EC, RD, SN
in 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.019
out 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.025 0.026 0.027 0.028 0.029 0.030 0.033 0.034 0.036 0.039 0.041 0.045 0.047 0.052 0.057 0.067 0.078 0.100 0.662
EC, LC, SN
in 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.022
out 0.026 0.026 0.027 0.028 0.029 0.030 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.036 0.038 0.040 0.043 0.045 0.049 0.052 0.057 0.063 0.072 0.085 0.109 0.710
IA, RD, LC
in 0.028 0.027 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.022
out 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.032 0.034 0.034 0.036 0.038 0.039 0.039 0.041 0.044 0.046 0.049 0.053 0.057 0.062 0.069 0.079 0.093 0.122 0.775
IA, RD, SN
in 0.021 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.019
out 0.022 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.025 0.026 0.027 0.029 0.030 0.032 0.034 0.036 0.038 0.040 0.044 0.047 0.051 0.056 0.066 0.076 0.099 0.626
IA, LC, SN
in 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.022
out 0.026 0.026 0.027 0.027 0.029 0.030 0.031 0.033 0.034 0.036 0.038 0.040 0.042 0.044 0.048 0.051 0.056 0.062 0.071 0.084 0.109 0.691
RD, LC, SN
in 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.022
out 0.026 0.026 0.027 0.028 0.029 0.030 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.036 0.038 0.040 0.043 0.045 0.049 0.052 0.057 0.063 0.072 0.085 0.109 0.710
4-types
EC, IA, RD, LC
in 0.028 0.027 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.022
out 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.032 0.034 0.034 0.036 0.038 0.039 0.039 0.041 0.044 0.046 0.049 0.053 0.057 0.062 0.069 0.079 0.093 0.122 0.775
EC, IA, RD, SN
in 0.021 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.019
out 0.022 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.025 0.026 0.027 0.029 0.030 0.032 0.034 0.036 0.038 0.040 0.044 0.047 0.051 0.056 0.066 0.076 0.099 0.626
IA, RD, LC, SN
in 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.022
out 0.026 0.026 0.027 0.027 0.029 0.030 0.031 0.033 0.034 0.036 0.038 0.040 0.042 0.044 0.048 0.051 0.056 0.062 0.071 0.084 0.109 0.691
EC, RD, LC, SN
in 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.022
out 0.026 0.026 0.027 0.028 0.029 0.030 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.036 0.038 0.040 0.043 0.045 0.049 0.052 0.057 0.063 0.072 0.085 0.109 0.710
EC, IA, LC, SN
in 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.022
out 0.026 0.026 0.027 0.027 0.029 0.030 0.031 0.033 0.034 0.036 0.038 0.040 0.042 0.044 0.048 0.051 0.056 0.062 0.071 0.084 0.109 0.691
5-types EC, IA, RD, LC, SN
in 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.022
out 0.026 0.026 0.027 0.027 0.029 0.030 0.031 0.033 0.034 0.036 0.038 0.040 0.042 0.044 0.048 0.051 0.056 0.062 0.071 0.084 0.109 0.691
This table presents the standard errors of the in-sample and out-of-sample accuracies of all 31 worlds in Game A. Standard errors are derived as se = σµacc/
√
S, where σµacc
refers to the standard deviation of the mean accuracy µacc which equals the average of the M = 1000 computed accuracies. The accuracy itself is derived as the ratio of
correctly fitted decisions over the total number of decisions. We assume Senders’ first-order beliefs to equal one. EC reflects the standard economic model, IA inequity aversion,
RD reference-dependent preferences, LC lying costs, and SN reputation or social norms. Each column corresponds to a specific number of decisions used to estimate individual
parameters, classify participants into types and to compute the in-sample performance. The remaining decisions are used to derive the out-of-sample fit. All standard errors
are multiplied by 100.
Table 2.D.4: In- and out-of-sample accuracy - Game B
Decisions used to estimate and classify
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22)
1-type
EC
in 0.634 0.634 0.637 0.636 0.636 0.636 0.636 0.635 0.636 0.636 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.637
out 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.638 0.637 0.638 0.638 0.638 0.638 0.638 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.637
IA
in 0.955 0.910 0.888 0.864 0.852 0.841 0.834 0.828 0.825 0.821 0.819 0.817 0.815 0.814 0.813 0.812 0.811 0.810 0.809 0.808 0.808 0.807
out 0.686 0.723 0.738 0.747 0.753 0.758 0.762 0.765 0.768 0.770 0.772 0.773 0.774 0.776 0.777 0.778 0.779 0.779 0.780 0.780 0.781 0.781
RD
in 0.924 0.842 0.824 0.816 0.808 0.803 0.798 0.796 0.794 0.793 0.792 0.792 0.791 0.790 0.790 0.789 0.789 0.789 0.788 0.788 0.788 0.787
out 0.678 0.723 0.742 0.750 0.756 0.760 0.763 0.766 0.768 0.769 0.771 0.772 0.774 0.774 0.775 0.776 0.777 0.777 0.778 0.778 0.779 0.779
LC
in 1.000 0.996 0.988 0.967 0.947 0.931 0.917 0.906 0.897 0.889 0.883 0.878 0.874 0.870 0.867 0.864 0.862 0.860 0.858 0.857 0.855 0.854
out 0.704 0.731 0.741 0.748 0.752 0.756 0.761 0.765 0.769 0.773 0.777 0.781 0.784 0.787 0.790 0.792 0.795 0.797 0.799 0.801 0.803 0.804
SN
in 1.000 0.957 0.937 0.913 0.901 0.891 0.884 0.878 0.874 0.870 0.868 0.865 0.864 0.862 0.860 0.859 0.858 0.857 0.856 0.855 0.854 0.854
out 0.715 0.745 0.768 0.780 0.790 0.796 0.802 0.806 0.810 0.812 0.814 0.817 0.818 0.820 0.821 0.822 0.823 0.824 0.825 0.826 0.827 0.828
2-types
EC, IA
in 0.729 0.725 0.852 0.846 0.839 0.832 0.827 0.826 0.823 0.820 0.818 0.816 0.815 0.814 0.813 0.812 0.811 0.810 0.809 0.808 0.808 0.807
out 0.598 0.619 0.751 0.760 0.765 0.768 0.771 0.771 0.774 0.775 0.777 0.778 0.778 0.779 0.780 0.781 0.780 0.780 0.781 0.781 0.781 0.782
EC, RD
in 0.697 0.655 0.744 0.770 0.774 0.784 0.783 0.786 0.788 0.788 0.791 0.791 0.790 0.790 0.789 0.789 0.789 0.789 0.789 0.788 0.788 0.787
out 0.609 0.626 0.730 0.756 0.764 0.772 0.774 0.777 0.777 0.777 0.779 0.779 0.779 0.779 0.780 0.780 0.779 0.779 0.779 0.779 0.779 0.780
EC, LC
in 1.000 0.996 0.986 0.949 0.902 0.895 0.884 0.879 0.874 0.874 0.867 0.866 0.860 0.858 0.856 0.854 0.852 0.851 0.847 0.850 0.849 0.848
out 0.704 0.731 0.743 0.762 0.782 0.787 0.792 0.794 0.794 0.794 0.794 0.795 0.797 0.796 0.799 0.800 0.801 0.803 0.802 0.806 0.805 0.808
EC, SN
in 1.000 0.957 0.937 0.913 0.901 0.891 0.884 0.878 0.874 0.870 0.868 0.865 0.864 0.862 0.860 0.859 0.858 0.857 0.856 0.855 0.854 0.854
out 0.715 0.745 0.768 0.780 0.790 0.796 0.802 0.806 0.810 0.812 0.814 0.817 0.818 0.820 0.821 0.822 0.823 0.824 0.825 0.826 0.827 0.828
IA, RD
in 0.956 0.910 0.887 0.864 0.852 0.841 0.835 0.829 0.826 0.823 0.821 0.819 0.818 0.817 0.816 0.814 0.813 0.813 0.812 0.811 0.811 0.810
out 0.684 0.722 0.738 0.747 0.754 0.759 0.765 0.768 0.771 0.773 0.775 0.777 0.779 0.780 0.781 0.782 0.783 0.784 0.785 0.785 0.786 0.786
IA, LC
in 1.000 0.996 0.982 0.940 0.915 0.900 0.890 0.883 0.875 0.869 0.865 0.862 0.859 0.857 0.854 0.853 0.850 0.850 0.848 0.849 0.847 0.846
out 0.704 0.731 0.740 0.755 0.761 0.770 0.775 0.781 0.784 0.787 0.790 0.792 0.795 0.798 0.799 0.802 0.803 0.804 0.806 0.809 0.808 0.810
IA, SN
in 1.000 0.957 0.936 0.912 0.898 0.889 0.881 0.874 0.870 0.866 0.864 0.861 0.860 0.858 0.857 0.856 0.854 0.853 0.852 0.852 0.851 0.850
out 0.714 0.745 0.768 0.782 0.792 0.798 0.803 0.808 0.812 0.815 0.817 0.819 0.821 0.822 0.824 0.825 0.826 0.827 0.827 0.828 0.829 0.830
RD, LC
in 1.000 0.996 0.986 0.963 0.932 0.919 0.906 0.897 0.886 0.884 0.874 0.871 0.865 0.860 0.857 0.855 0.853 0.851 0.847 0.850 0.849 0.848
out 0.704 0.731 0.743 0.751 0.757 0.763 0.768 0.772 0.776 0.780 0.782 0.785 0.786 0.791 0.794 0.796 0.798 0.801 0.800 0.804 0.804 0.807
RD, SN
in 1.000 0.957 0.937 0.913 0.901 0.891 0.884 0.878 0.874 0.870 0.868 0.865 0.863 0.862 0.860 0.859 0.857 0.856 0.855 0.855 0.854 0.853
out 0.714 0.745 0.768 0.780 0.790 0.796 0.802 0.807 0.810 0.812 0.815 0.817 0.819 0.820 0.821 0.823 0.824 0.825 0.826 0.827 0.828 0.828
LC, SN
in 1.000 0.996 0.979 0.939 0.919 0.906 0.898 0.891 0.886 0.882 0.880 0.876 0.872 0.871 0.868 0.866 0.865 0.863 0.862 0.862 0.861 0.860
out 0.700 0.731 0.754 0.773 0.783 0.789 0.795 0.798 0.801 0.803 0.804 0.806 0.809 0.810 0.813 0.814 0.814 0.816 0.817 0.819 0.819 0.821
3-types
EC, IA, RD
in 0.735 0.725 0.852 0.846 0.840 0.833 0.829 0.827 0.824 0.822 0.820 0.818 0.818 0.816 0.815 0.814 0.813 0.813 0.812 0.811 0.811 0.810
out 0.597 0.619 0.751 0.759 0.766 0.769 0.774 0.774 0.776 0.778 0.780 0.781 0.782 0.784 0.784 0.785 0.784 0.785 0.785 0.786 0.786 0.787
EC, IA, LC
in 1.000 0.996 0.980 0.930 0.897 0.888 0.879 0.877 0.871 0.867 0.864 0.860 0.858 0.857 0.853 0.853 0.850 0.849 0.848 0.849 0.847 0.846
out 0.704 0.731 0.742 0.764 0.775 0.782 0.788 0.790 0.791 0.792 0.795 0.797 0.799 0.800 0.800 0.803 0.804 0.805 0.806 0.809 0.808 0.810
EC, IA, SN
in 1.000 0.957 0.936 0.912 0.898 0.889 0.881 0.874 0.870 0.866 0.864 0.861 0.860 0.858 0.857 0.856 0.854 0.853 0.852 0.852 0.851 0.850
out 0.714 0.745 0.768 0.782 0.792 0.798 0.803 0.808 0.812 0.815 0.817 0.819 0.821 0.822 0.824 0.825 0.826 0.827 0.827 0.828 0.829 0.830
EC, RD, LC
in 1.000 0.996 0.985 0.950 0.903 0.895 0.884 0.879 0.874 0.874 0.868 0.866 0.860 0.858 0.856 0.854 0.852 0.853 0.855 0.854 0.854 0.852
out 0.704 0.731 0.744 0.762 0.781 0.786 0.792 0.794 0.794 0.794 0.794 0.795 0.797 0.796 0.799 0.800 0.801 0.804 0.808 0.809 0.809 0.811
EC, RD, SN
in 1.000 0.957 0.937 0.913 0.901 0.891 0.884 0.878 0.874 0.870 0.868 0.865 0.863 0.862 0.860 0.859 0.857 0.856 0.855 0.855 0.854 0.853
out 0.714 0.745 0.768 0.780 0.790 0.796 0.802 0.807 0.810 0.812 0.815 0.817 0.819 0.820 0.821 0.823 0.824 0.825 0.826 0.827 0.828 0.828
EC, LC, SN
in 1.000 0.996 0.979 0.939 0.919 0.906 0.898 0.891 0.886 0.882 0.880 0.876 0.872 0.871 0.868 0.866 0.865 0.863 0.862 0.862 0.861 0.860
out 0.700 0.731 0.754 0.773 0.783 0.789 0.795 0.798 0.801 0.803 0.804 0.806 0.809 0.810 0.813 0.814 0.814 0.816 0.817 0.819 0.819 0.821
IA, RD, LC
in 1.000 0.996 0.982 0.940 0.914 0.900 0.890 0.883 0.875 0.869 0.865 0.862 0.859 0.857 0.854 0.853 0.850 0.849 0.848 0.849 0.847 0.846
out 0.704 0.731 0.741 0.755 0.762 0.770 0.775 0.781 0.784 0.787 0.790 0.792 0.795 0.798 0.799 0.802 0.803 0.805 0.806 0.809 0.808 0.810
IA, RD, SN
in 1.000 0.957 0.936 0.912 0.898 0.889 0.881 0.874 0.870 0.866 0.864 0.861 0.860 0.858 0.857 0.856 0.854 0.853 0.852 0.851 0.851 0.850
out 0.713 0.745 0.768 0.782 0.792 0.798 0.803 0.808 0.812 0.815 0.818 0.819 0.821 0.822 0.824 0.825 0.826 0.827 0.828 0.829 0.830 0.831
IA, LC, SN
in 1.000 0.996 0.979 0.937 0.916 0.903 0.893 0.887 0.882 0.878 0.876 0.871 0.869 0.867 0.865 0.863 0.861 0.860 0.859 0.858 0.858 0.857
out 0.700 0.731 0.754 0.774 0.785 0.791 0.796 0.801 0.803 0.806 0.807 0.810 0.812 0.813 0.815 0.817 0.818 0.819 0.820 0.821 0.822 0.824
RD, LC, SN
in 1.000 0.996 0.979 0.939 0.919 0.906 0.898 0.891 0.886 0.882 0.880 0.876 0.872 0.871 0.868 0.866 0.865 0.863 0.862 0.862 0.861 0.860
out 0.700 0.731 0.754 0.773 0.783 0.789 0.795 0.798 0.801 0.803 0.804 0.806 0.809 0.810 0.813 0.814 0.814 0.816 0.817 0.819 0.819 0.821
4-types
EC, IA, RD, LC
in 1.000 0.996 0.980 0.930 0.897 0.888 0.879 0.877 0.871 0.867 0.864 0.860 0.858 0.857 0.853 0.853 0.850 0.849 0.848 0.849 0.847 0.846
out 0.704 0.731 0.742 0.765 0.775 0.782 0.788 0.790 0.791 0.792 0.795 0.797 0.799 0.800 0.800 0.803 0.804 0.805 0.806 0.809 0.808 0.810
EC, IA, RD, SN
in 1.000 0.957 0.936 0.912 0.898 0.889 0.881 0.874 0.870 0.866 0.864 0.861 0.860 0.858 0.857 0.856 0.854 0.853 0.852 0.851 0.851 0.850
out 0.713 0.745 0.768 0.782 0.792 0.798 0.803 0.808 0.812 0.815 0.818 0.819 0.821 0.822 0.824 0.825 0.826 0.827 0.828 0.829 0.830 0.831
IA, RD, LC, SN
in 1.000 0.996 0.979 0.937 0.916 0.903 0.893 0.887 0.882 0.878 0.876 0.871 0.869 0.867 0.865 0.863 0.861 0.860 0.859 0.858 0.858 0.857
out 0.700 0.731 0.754 0.774 0.785 0.791 0.796 0.801 0.803 0.806 0.807 0.810 0.812 0.813 0.815 0.817 0.818 0.819 0.820 0.821 0.822 0.824
EC, RD, LC, SN
in 1.000 0.996 0.979 0.939 0.919 0.906 0.898 0.891 0.886 0.882 0.880 0.876 0.872 0.871 0.868 0.866 0.865 0.863 0.862 0.862 0.861 0.860
out 0.700 0.731 0.754 0.773 0.783 0.789 0.795 0.798 0.801 0.803 0.804 0.806 0.809 0.810 0.813 0.814 0.814 0.816 0.817 0.819 0.819 0.821
EC, IA, LC, SN
in 1.000 0.996 0.979 0.937 0.916 0.903 0.893 0.887 0.882 0.878 0.876 0.871 0.869 0.867 0.865 0.863 0.861 0.860 0.859 0.858 0.858 0.857
out 0.700 0.731 0.754 0.774 0.785 0.791 0.796 0.801 0.803 0.806 0.807 0.810 0.812 0.813 0.815 0.817 0.818 0.819 0.820 0.821 0.822 0.824
5-types EC, IA, RD, LC, SN
in 1.000 0.996 0.979 0.937 0.916 0.903 0.893 0.887 0.882 0.878 0.876 0.871 0.869 0.867 0.865 0.863 0.861 0.860 0.859 0.858 0.858 0.857
out 0.700 0.731 0.754 0.774 0.785 0.791 0.796 0.801 0.803 0.806 0.807 0.810 0.812 0.813 0.815 0.817 0.818 0.819 0.820 0.821 0.822 0.824
Table 2.D.4: In- and out-of-sample accuracy - Game B (continued)
Decisions used to estimate and classify
(23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44)
1-type
EC
in 0.637 0.637 0.638 0.637 0.638 0.638 0.638 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.638 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.638 0.637 0.638 0.637
out 0.638 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.638 0.638 0.636 0.635 0.635 0.633 0.632
IA
in 0.806 0.806 0.805 0.805 0.804 0.804 0.804 0.803 0.803 0.802 0.802 0.802 0.801 0.801 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.799 0.799 0.799 0.798
out 0.782 0.782 0.782 0.783 0.783 0.783 0.783 0.783 0.784 0.784 0.784 0.784 0.784 0.784 0.785 0.785 0.785 0.784 0.783 0.784 0.781 0.782
RD
in 0.787 0.787 0.787 0.787 0.787 0.787 0.787 0.787 0.786 0.786 0.786 0.786 0.786 0.786 0.786 0.786 0.786 0.786 0.786 0.786 0.786 0.786
out 0.780 0.780 0.780 0.781 0.781 0.781 0.781 0.782 0.782 0.782 0.782 0.782 0.783 0.783 0.783 0.784 0.784 0.783 0.782 0.783 0.781 0.781
LC
in 0.853 0.852 0.851 0.851 0.850 0.849 0.848 0.848 0.847 0.846 0.846 0.846 0.845 0.845 0.844 0.844 0.844 0.844 0.843 0.843 0.843 0.843
out 0.806 0.808 0.809 0.809 0.810 0.811 0.812 0.813 0.814 0.815 0.816 0.816 0.816 0.817 0.818 0.819 0.819 0.820 0.820 0.821 0.821 0.823
SN
in 0.853 0.853 0.852 0.852 0.851 0.851 0.850 0.850 0.850 0.849 0.849 0.849 0.849 0.849 0.848 0.848 0.848 0.848 0.848 0.848 0.848 0.848
out 0.828 0.829 0.829 0.830 0.830 0.830 0.831 0.832 0.832 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.834 0.834 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.834 0.834
2-types
EC, IA
in 0.806 0.806 0.805 0.805 0.805 0.804 0.804 0.803 0.803 0.802 0.802 0.802 0.801 0.801 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.800 0.799 0.799 0.799 0.798
out 0.782 0.783 0.783 0.783 0.783 0.783 0.784 0.784 0.784 0.784 0.784 0.784 0.784 0.784 0.785 0.785 0.785 0.784 0.783 0.784 0.781 0.782
EC, RD
in 0.787 0.787 0.787 0.787 0.787 0.787 0.787 0.787 0.786 0.786 0.786 0.786 0.786 0.786 0.786 0.786 0.786 0.786 0.786 0.786 0.786 0.786
out 0.780 0.780 0.780 0.781 0.781 0.781 0.781 0.782 0.782 0.782 0.782 0.782 0.783 0.783 0.783 0.784 0.784 0.783 0.782 0.783 0.781 0.781
EC, LC
in 0.847 0.847 0.846 0.846 0.847 0.845 0.844 0.846 0.845 0.843 0.844 0.844 0.843 0.843 0.843 0.843 0.843 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.842
out 0.807 0.808 0.810 0.810 0.812 0.811 0.812 0.814 0.815 0.814 0.816 0.817 0.817 0.818 0.819 0.819 0.820 0.820 0.821 0.822 0.822 0.823
EC, SN
in 0.853 0.853 0.852 0.852 0.851 0.851 0.850 0.850 0.850 0.849 0.849 0.849 0.849 0.849 0.848 0.848 0.848 0.848 0.848 0.848 0.848 0.848
out 0.828 0.829 0.829 0.830 0.830 0.830 0.831 0.832 0.832 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.834 0.834 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.835 0.834 0.834
IA, RD
in 0.809 0.809 0.809 0.808 0.808 0.808 0.807 0.807 0.807 0.806 0.806 0.806 0.806 0.805 0.805 0.805 0.805 0.805 0.805 0.805 0.805 0.804
out 0.787 0.787 0.788 0.789 0.789 0.789 0.790 0.790 0.790 0.791 0.791 0.791 0.791 0.792 0.792 0.793 0.793 0.793 0.793 0.794 0.792 0.794
IA, LC
in 0.847 0.846 0.845 0.845 0.844 0.844 0.844 0.845 0.844 0.842 0.844 0.843 0.843 0.843 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.841 0.841 0.841
out 0.811 0.813 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.815 0.816 0.818 0.819 0.818 0.820 0.820 0.821 0.822 0.823 0.824 0.825 0.825 0.826 0.827 0.827 0.831
IA, SN
in 0.850 0.850 0.849 0.849 0.849 0.848 0.848 0.847 0.847 0.847 0.847 0.846 0.846 0.846 0.846 0.846 0.846 0.846 0.846 0.846 0.846 0.846
out 0.831 0.831 0.831 0.832 0.832 0.832 0.833 0.832 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.834 0.834 0.835 0.835 0.836 0.835 0.835 0.836 0.834 0.836
RD, LC
in 0.847 0.847 0.846 0.846 0.847 0.845 0.844 0.846 0.845 0.842 0.844 0.844 0.843 0.843 0.843 0.843 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.842
out 0.807 0.808 0.809 0.810 0.811 0.810 0.811 0.814 0.814 0.813 0.816 0.816 0.817 0.818 0.818 0.819 0.819 0.820 0.820 0.821 0.821 0.823
RD, SN
in 0.853 0.852 0.852 0.851 0.851 0.851 0.850 0.850 0.850 0.849 0.849 0.849 0.849 0.848 0.848 0.848 0.848 0.848 0.848 0.848 0.848 0.848
out 0.829 0.830 0.830 0.830 0.831 0.831 0.832 0.832 0.833 0.833 0.834 0.834 0.834 0.835 0.835 0.836 0.836 0.836 0.836 0.837 0.836 0.835
LC, SN
in 0.860 0.859 0.859 0.858 0.858 0.857 0.857 0.856 0.856 0.855 0.855 0.855 0.855 0.854 0.854 0.854 0.854 0.854 0.853 0.853 0.853 0.853
out 0.821 0.823 0.824 0.825 0.826 0.826 0.828 0.829 0.830 0.830 0.831 0.831 0.832 0.832 0.833 0.834 0.835 0.835 0.836 0.837 0.838 0.837
3-types
EC, IA, RD
in 0.809 0.809 0.809 0.808 0.808 0.808 0.807 0.807 0.807 0.807 0.806 0.806 0.806 0.805 0.805 0.805 0.805 0.805 0.805 0.805 0.805 0.804
out 0.787 0.788 0.789 0.789 0.789 0.789 0.790 0.790 0.790 0.791 0.791 0.791 0.791 0.792 0.792 0.793 0.793 0.793 0.793 0.794 0.792 0.794
EC, IA, LC
in 0.847 0.846 0.845 0.845 0.844 0.844 0.844 0.845 0.844 0.842 0.844 0.843 0.843 0.843 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.841 0.841 0.841
out 0.812 0.813 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.815 0.816 0.818 0.819 0.818 0.820 0.820 0.821 0.822 0.823 0.824 0.825 0.825 0.826 0.827 0.827 0.831
EC, IA, SN
in 0.850 0.850 0.849 0.849 0.849 0.848 0.848 0.847 0.847 0.847 0.847 0.846 0.846 0.846 0.846 0.846 0.846 0.846 0.846 0.846 0.846 0.846
out 0.831 0.831 0.831 0.832 0.832 0.832 0.833 0.832 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.834 0.834 0.835 0.835 0.836 0.835 0.835 0.836 0.834 0.836
EC, RD, LC
in 0.852 0.852 0.849 0.849 0.848 0.847 0.847 0.846 0.846 0.845 0.844 0.844 0.843 0.843 0.843 0.843 0.843 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.842
out 0.810 0.812 0.811 0.811 0.811 0.812 0.812 0.813 0.814 0.816 0.816 0.816 0.817 0.818 0.818 0.819 0.819 0.819 0.820 0.821 0.822 0.823
EC, RD, SN
in 0.853 0.852 0.852 0.851 0.851 0.851 0.850 0.850 0.850 0.849 0.849 0.849 0.849 0.848 0.848 0.848 0.848 0.848 0.848 0.848 0.848 0.848
out 0.829 0.830 0.830 0.830 0.831 0.831 0.832 0.832 0.833 0.833 0.834 0.834 0.834 0.835 0.835 0.836 0.836 0.836 0.836 0.837 0.836 0.835
EC, LC, SN
in 0.860 0.859 0.859 0.858 0.858 0.857 0.857 0.856 0.856 0.855 0.855 0.855 0.855 0.854 0.854 0.854 0.854 0.854 0.853 0.853 0.853 0.853
out 0.821 0.823 0.824 0.825 0.826 0.826 0.828 0.829 0.830 0.830 0.831 0.831 0.832 0.832 0.833 0.834 0.835 0.835 0.836 0.837 0.838 0.837
IA, RD, LC
in 0.847 0.846 0.845 0.845 0.844 0.844 0.844 0.845 0.844 0.842 0.844 0.843 0.843 0.843 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.841 0.841 0.841
out 0.812 0.813 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.815 0.816 0.818 0.819 0.818 0.820 0.820 0.821 0.822 0.823 0.824 0.825 0.825 0.826 0.827 0.827 0.831
IA, RD, SN
in 0.850 0.850 0.849 0.849 0.849 0.848 0.848 0.847 0.847 0.847 0.847 0.846 0.846 0.846 0.846 0.846 0.846 0.846 0.846 0.846 0.846 0.846
out 0.831 0.831 0.832 0.832 0.832 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.834 0.834 0.834 0.834 0.835 0.836 0.836 0.837 0.837 0.837 0.837 0.837 0.836
IA, LC, SN
in 0.856 0.856 0.855 0.855 0.855 0.854 0.854 0.853 0.853 0.852 0.852 0.852 0.851 0.851 0.852 0.852 0.852 0.851 0.851 0.851 0.851 0.851
out 0.823 0.825 0.826 0.827 0.827 0.828 0.829 0.829 0.830 0.830 0.831 0.831 0.831 0.832 0.834 0.834 0.835 0.835 0.836 0.837 0.838 0.838
RD, LC, SN
in 0.860 0.859 0.859 0.858 0.858 0.857 0.857 0.856 0.856 0.855 0.855 0.855 0.855 0.854 0.854 0.854 0.854 0.854 0.853 0.853 0.853 0.853
out 0.821 0.823 0.824 0.825 0.826 0.826 0.828 0.829 0.830 0.830 0.831 0.831 0.832 0.832 0.833 0.834 0.835 0.835 0.836 0.837 0.838 0.837
4-types
EC, IA, RD, LC
in 0.847 0.846 0.845 0.845 0.844 0.844 0.844 0.845 0.844 0.842 0.844 0.843 0.843 0.843 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.842 0.841 0.841 0.841
out 0.812 0.813 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.815 0.816 0.818 0.819 0.818 0.820 0.820 0.821 0.822 0.823 0.824 0.825 0.825 0.826 0.827 0.827 0.831
EC, IA, RD, SN
in 0.850 0.850 0.849 0.849 0.849 0.848 0.848 0.847 0.847 0.847 0.847 0.846 0.846 0.846 0.846 0.846 0.846 0.846 0.846 0.846 0.846 0.846
out 0.831 0.831 0.832 0.832 0.832 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.833 0.834 0.834 0.834 0.834 0.835 0.836 0.836 0.837 0.837 0.837 0.837 0.837 0.836
IA, RD, LC, SN
in 0.856 0.856 0.855 0.855 0.855 0.854 0.854 0.853 0.853 0.852 0.852 0.852 0.851 0.851 0.852 0.852 0.852 0.851 0.851 0.851 0.851 0.851
out 0.823 0.825 0.826 0.827 0.827 0.828 0.829 0.829 0.830 0.830 0.831 0.831 0.831 0.832 0.834 0.834 0.835 0.835 0.836 0.837 0.838 0.838
EC, RD, LC, SN
in 0.860 0.859 0.859 0.858 0.858 0.857 0.857 0.856 0.856 0.855 0.855 0.855 0.855 0.854 0.854 0.854 0.854 0.854 0.853 0.853 0.853 0.853
out 0.821 0.823 0.824 0.825 0.826 0.826 0.828 0.829 0.830 0.830 0.831 0.831 0.832 0.832 0.833 0.834 0.835 0.835 0.836 0.837 0.838 0.837
EC, IA, LC, SN
in 0.856 0.856 0.855 0.855 0.855 0.854 0.854 0.853 0.853 0.852 0.852 0.852 0.851 0.851 0.852 0.852 0.852 0.851 0.851 0.851 0.851 0.851
out 0.823 0.825 0.826 0.827 0.827 0.828 0.829 0.829 0.830 0.830 0.831 0.831 0.831 0.832 0.834 0.834 0.835 0.835 0.836 0.837 0.838 0.838
5-types EC, IA, RD, LC, SN
in 0.856 0.856 0.855 0.855 0.855 0.854 0.854 0.853 0.853 0.852 0.852 0.852 0.851 0.851 0.852 0.852 0.852 0.851 0.851 0.851 0.851 0.851
out 0.823 0.825 0.826 0.827 0.827 0.828 0.829 0.829 0.830 0.830 0.831 0.831 0.831 0.832 0.834 0.834 0.835 0.835 0.836 0.837 0.838 0.838
This table presents the accuracies of the in-sample and out-of-sample fits of all 31 worlds in Game B. The accuracy is derived as the ratio of correctly fitted decisions over the
total number of decisions, whereas M = 1000 random selections were used. We assume Senders’ first-order beliefs to equal one. EC reflects the standard economic model, IA
inequity aversion, RD reference-dependent preferences, LC lying costs, and SN reputation or social norms. Each column corresponds to a specific number of decisions used to
estimate individual parameters, classify participants into types and to compute the in-sample performance. The remaining decisions are used to derive the out-of-sample fit.
Table 2.D.5: In- and out-of-sample accuracy standard errors - Game B
Decisions used to estimate and classify
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22)
1-type
EC
in 1.852 0.276 0.216 0.186 0.167 0.151 0.137 0.125 0.116 0.108 0.100 0.093 0.089 0.085 0.080 0.078 0.075 0.072 0.067 0.064 0.062 0.060
out 0.042 0.013 0.015 0.018 0.021 0.023 0.025 0.027 0.029 0.031 0.032 0.034 0.036 0.038 0.040 0.043 0.045 0.048 0.049 0.052 0.054 0.057
IA
in 1.464 0.185 0.172 0.152 0.135 0.125 0.116 0.106 0.099 0.094 0.087 0.082 0.079 0.073 0.071 0.069 0.065 0.063 0.060 0.058 0.056 0.053
out 0.747 0.122 0.083 0.063 0.055 0.048 0.043 0.039 0.036 0.034 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.036 0.037 0.039 0.041 0.042 0.043 0.045 0.048 0.050
RD
in 1.889 0.176 0.179 0.141 0.130 0.122 0.113 0.103 0.096 0.091 0.086 0.081 0.077 0.073 0.070 0.068 0.065 0.063 0.059 0.057 0.055 0.054
out 0.764 0.118 0.083 0.055 0.040 0.035 0.031 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.030 0.031 0.032 0.033 0.035 0.037 0.039 0.041 0.042 0.045 0.048 0.051
LC
in 0.000 0.068 0.087 0.079 0.071 0.064 0.060 0.055 0.053 0.050 0.047 0.043 0.042 0.039 0.038 0.036 0.035 0.033 0.032 0.030 0.030 0.029
out 0.700 0.142 0.102 0.070 0.064 0.061 0.055 0.052 0.048 0.045 0.043 0.042 0.041 0.041 0.038 0.037 0.036 0.033 0.033 0.032 0.032 0.032
SN
in 0.000 0.064 0.063 0.068 0.062 0.058 0.054 0.050 0.045 0.043 0.041 0.038 0.036 0.035 0.034 0.033 0.031 0.030 0.028 0.027 0.026 0.025
out 0.478 0.089 0.073 0.064 0.054 0.050 0.043 0.036 0.034 0.031 0.029 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.027 0.028
2-types
EC, IA
in 0.592 0.152 0.160 0.149 0.133 0.125 0.116 0.106 0.098 0.094 0.087 0.082 0.079 0.073 0.071 0.069 0.065 0.063 0.060 0.058 0.056 0.053
out 0.619 0.099 0.075 0.056 0.049 0.042 0.036 0.033 0.031 0.030 0.031 0.031 0.032 0.033 0.035 0.038 0.040 0.042 0.042 0.045 0.047 0.050
EC, RD
in 0.906 0.203 0.188 0.162 0.149 0.130 0.121 0.109 0.101 0.093 0.087 0.082 0.077 0.073 0.071 0.069 0.065 0.063 0.059 0.057 0.055 0.054
out 0.507 0.058 0.055 0.039 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.028 0.029 0.029 0.030 0.032 0.033 0.034 0.036 0.039 0.040 0.042 0.043 0.045 0.048 0.051
EC, LC
in 0.000 0.068 0.087 0.070 0.070 0.065 0.061 0.056 0.053 0.050 0.048 0.044 0.043 0.041 0.039 0.038 0.037 0.035 0.034 0.032 0.030 0.029
out 0.700 0.142 0.098 0.065 0.047 0.044 0.039 0.039 0.036 0.037 0.036 0.035 0.033 0.034 0.033 0.032 0.032 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030
EC, SN
in 0.000 0.064 0.063 0.068 0.062 0.058 0.054 0.050 0.045 0.043 0.041 0.038 0.036 0.035 0.034 0.033 0.031 0.030 0.028 0.027 0.026 0.025
out 0.478 0.089 0.073 0.064 0.054 0.050 0.043 0.036 0.034 0.031 0.029 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.027 0.028
IA, RD
in 1.430 0.184 0.172 0.152 0.134 0.124 0.113 0.104 0.097 0.093 0.086 0.081 0.077 0.072 0.070 0.068 0.064 0.062 0.059 0.057 0.055 0.053
out 0.779 0.122 0.083 0.063 0.055 0.047 0.043 0.040 0.036 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.036 0.037 0.039 0.040 0.041 0.042 0.044 0.046 0.049
IA, LC
in 0.000 0.068 0.084 0.085 0.085 0.074 0.067 0.061 0.059 0.057 0.054 0.049 0.048 0.044 0.044 0.041 0.040 0.037 0.036 0.033 0.032 0.031
out 0.700 0.142 0.095 0.057 0.053 0.047 0.042 0.041 0.038 0.036 0.035 0.034 0.034 0.035 0.034 0.034 0.033 0.032 0.032 0.031 0.032 0.033
IA, SN
in 0.000 0.064 0.063 0.065 0.060 0.056 0.053 0.050 0.046 0.044 0.042 0.040 0.038 0.035 0.034 0.033 0.031 0.031 0.029 0.028 0.026 0.025
out 0.491 0.088 0.071 0.059 0.050 0.047 0.041 0.036 0.034 0.031 0.029 0.027 0.026 0.027 0.026 0.027 0.027 0.026 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.028
RD, LC
in 0.000 0.068 0.086 0.077 0.069 0.062 0.059 0.054 0.052 0.049 0.047 0.044 0.043 0.040 0.039 0.038 0.036 0.035 0.034 0.032 0.030 0.029
out 0.700 0.142 0.091 0.068 0.057 0.054 0.049 0.047 0.043 0.042 0.039 0.038 0.037 0.037 0.035 0.034 0.034 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031
RD, SN
in 0.000 0.064 0.063 0.068 0.062 0.058 0.054 0.050 0.045 0.043 0.041 0.038 0.036 0.035 0.034 0.033 0.031 0.030 0.028 0.027 0.026 0.025
out 0.493 0.089 0.073 0.063 0.054 0.050 0.043 0.036 0.034 0.031 0.029 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.027 0.028
LC, SN
in 0.000 0.067 0.066 0.062 0.060 0.056 0.053 0.049 0.046 0.043 0.041 0.038 0.037 0.036 0.035 0.033 0.031 0.030 0.029 0.027 0.026 0.025
out 0.769 0.143 0.079 0.066 0.057 0.052 0.046 0.039 0.037 0.034 0.031 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.028 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.027 0.028
3-types
EC, IA, RD
in 0.557 0.152 0.160 0.149 0.132 0.124 0.114 0.104 0.097 0.092 0.085 0.081 0.077 0.072 0.069 0.067 0.064 0.062 0.059 0.057 0.055 0.052
out 0.641 0.099 0.075 0.055 0.048 0.041 0.037 0.034 0.032 0.031 0.031 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.035 0.037 0.039 0.041 0.042 0.044 0.046 0.049
EC, IA, LC
in 0.000 0.068 0.083 0.079 0.084 0.075 0.067 0.060 0.058 0.056 0.054 0.049 0.048 0.044 0.044 0.041 0.040 0.037 0.036 0.033 0.033 0.031
out 0.700 0.142 0.095 0.055 0.050 0.043 0.038 0.038 0.035 0.034 0.033 0.033 0.032 0.034 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.032 0.031 0.031 0.032 0.033
EC, IA, SN
in 0.000 0.064 0.063 0.065 0.060 0.056 0.053 0.050 0.046 0.044 0.042 0.040 0.038 0.035 0.034 0.033 0.031 0.031 0.029 0.028 0.026 0.025
out 0.491 0.088 0.071 0.059 0.050 0.047 0.041 0.036 0.034 0.031 0.029 0.027 0.026 0.027 0.026 0.027 0.027 0.026 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.028
EC, RD, LC
in 0.000 0.068 0.085 0.070 0.069 0.065 0.061 0.056 0.053 0.050 0.048 0.044 0.043 0.041 0.039 0.037 0.036 0.034 0.032 0.031 0.029 0.028
out 0.700 0.142 0.088 0.064 0.048 0.044 0.040 0.039 0.036 0.037 0.036 0.035 0.033 0.034 0.033 0.032 0.032 0.030 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029
EC, RD, SN
in 0.000 0.064 0.063 0.068 0.062 0.058 0.054 0.050 0.045 0.043 0.041 0.038 0.036 0.035 0.034 0.033 0.031 0.030 0.028 0.027 0.026 0.025
out 0.493 0.089 0.073 0.063 0.054 0.050 0.043 0.036 0.034 0.031 0.029 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.027 0.028
EC, LC, SN
in 0.000 0.067 0.066 0.062 0.060 0.056 0.053 0.049 0.046 0.043 0.041 0.038 0.037 0.036 0.035 0.033 0.031 0.030 0.029 0.027 0.026 0.025
out 0.769 0.143 0.079 0.066 0.057 0.052 0.046 0.039 0.037 0.034 0.031 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.028 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.027 0.028
IA, RD, LC
in 0.000 0.068 0.084 0.085 0.085 0.074 0.067 0.061 0.059 0.057 0.054 0.049 0.048 0.044 0.044 0.041 0.040 0.037 0.036 0.033 0.033 0.031
out 0.700 0.142 0.086 0.056 0.053 0.047 0.042 0.041 0.038 0.036 0.035 0.034 0.034 0.035 0.034 0.034 0.033 0.032 0.031 0.031 0.032 0.033
IA, RD, SN
in 0.000 0.064 0.063 0.065 0.060 0.056 0.053 0.050 0.046 0.044 0.042 0.040 0.037 0.035 0.034 0.033 0.031 0.030 0.029 0.028 0.026 0.025
out 0.505 0.088 0.071 0.059 0.050 0.047 0.041 0.036 0.034 0.031 0.028 0.027 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.027 0.027 0.026 0.026 0.027 0.027 0.028
IA, LC, SN
in 0.000 0.067 0.066 0.061 0.058 0.054 0.052 0.049 0.046 0.044 0.042 0.040 0.038 0.036 0.035 0.033 0.031 0.031 0.029 0.028 0.027 0.025
out 0.776 0.143 0.079 0.063 0.054 0.049 0.043 0.038 0.035 0.033 0.030 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.029
RD, LC, SN
in 0.000 0.067 0.066 0.062 0.060 0.056 0.053 0.049 0.046 0.043 0.041 0.038 0.037 0.036 0.035 0.033 0.031 0.030 0.029 0.027 0.026 0.025
out 0.769 0.143 0.079 0.065 0.057 0.052 0.046 0.039 0.037 0.034 0.031 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.028 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.027 0.028
4-types
EC, IA, RD, LC
in 0.000 0.068 0.083 0.079 0.084 0.075 0.067 0.060 0.058 0.056 0.054 0.049 0.048 0.044 0.044 0.041 0.040 0.037 0.036 0.033 0.033 0.031
out 0.700 0.142 0.086 0.054 0.050 0.043 0.038 0.038 0.035 0.034 0.033 0.033 0.032 0.034 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.032 0.031 0.031 0.032 0.033
EC, IA, RD, SN
in 0.000 0.064 0.063 0.065 0.060 0.056 0.053 0.050 0.046 0.044 0.042 0.040 0.037 0.035 0.034 0.033 0.031 0.030 0.029 0.028 0.026 0.025
out 0.505 0.088 0.071 0.059 0.050 0.047 0.041 0.036 0.034 0.031 0.028 0.027 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.027 0.027 0.026 0.026 0.027 0.027 0.028
IA, RD, LC, SN
in 0.000 0.067 0.066 0.061 0.058 0.054 0.052 0.049 0.046 0.044 0.042 0.040 0.038 0.036 0.035 0.033 0.031 0.031 0.029 0.028 0.027 0.025
out 0.776 0.143 0.079 0.062 0.054 0.049 0.043 0.038 0.035 0.033 0.030 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.029
EC, RD, LC, SN
in 0.000 0.067 0.066 0.062 0.060 0.056 0.053 0.049 0.046 0.043 0.041 0.038 0.037 0.036 0.035 0.033 0.031 0.030 0.029 0.027 0.026 0.025
out 0.769 0.143 0.079 0.065 0.057 0.052 0.046 0.039 0.037 0.034 0.031 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.028 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.027 0.028
EC, IA, LC, SN
in 0.000 0.067 0.066 0.061 0.058 0.054 0.052 0.049 0.046 0.044 0.042 0.040 0.038 0.036 0.035 0.033 0.031 0.031 0.029 0.028 0.027 0.025
out 0.776 0.143 0.079 0.063 0.054 0.049 0.043 0.038 0.035 0.033 0.030 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.029
5-types EC, IA, RD, LC, SN
in 0.000 0.067 0.066 0.061 0.058 0.054 0.052 0.049 0.046 0.044 0.042 0.040 0.038 0.036 0.035 0.033 0.031 0.031 0.029 0.028 0.027 0.025
out 0.776 0.143 0.079 0.062 0.054 0.049 0.043 0.038 0.035 0.033 0.030 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.029
Table 2.D.5: In- and out-of-sample accuracy standard errors - Game B (continued)
Decisions used to estimate and classify
(23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44)
1-type
EC
in 0.057 0.055 0.052 0.050 0.048 0.045 0.043 0.040 0.038 0.036 0.034 0.032 0.030 0.029 0.027 0.025 0.022 0.020 0.018 0.016 0.013 0.042
out 0.059 0.062 0.065 0.069 0.072 0.075 0.077 0.081 0.085 0.088 0.094 0.100 0.106 0.115 0.123 0.135 0.146 0.163 0.185 0.221 0.272 1.847
IA
in 0.051 0.049 0.047 0.045 0.043 0.041 0.039 0.037 0.035 0.032 0.031 0.029 0.028 0.026 0.024 0.022 0.020 0.018 0.016 0.014 0.011 0.040
out 0.052 0.054 0.056 0.060 0.062 0.065 0.067 0.070 0.075 0.078 0.083 0.087 0.094 0.101 0.107 0.116 0.127 0.141 0.158 0.188 0.231 1.524
RD
in 0.051 0.049 0.047 0.045 0.043 0.041 0.039 0.037 0.036 0.033 0.032 0.030 0.029 0.027 0.025 0.023 0.021 0.020 0.017 0.015 0.012 0.040
out 0.053 0.055 0.058 0.061 0.064 0.067 0.070 0.074 0.078 0.082 0.088 0.093 0.100 0.109 0.116 0.127 0.138 0.156 0.175 0.207 0.256 1.745
LC
in 0.028 0.026 0.025 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.026
out 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.035 0.036 0.037 0.039 0.041 0.043 0.046 0.048 0.050 0.054 0.058 0.062 0.066 0.073 0.081 0.088 0.108 0.138 0.921
SN
in 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.022
out 0.028 0.029 0.030 0.032 0.033 0.034 0.035 0.037 0.038 0.041 0.043 0.045 0.048 0.052 0.056 0.059 0.064 0.071 0.079 0.092 0.118 0.787
2-types
EC, IA
in 0.051 0.049 0.047 0.045 0.043 0.041 0.039 0.037 0.035 0.032 0.031 0.029 0.028 0.026 0.024 0.022 0.020 0.018 0.016 0.014 0.011 0.040
out 0.051 0.054 0.056 0.060 0.062 0.064 0.067 0.070 0.074 0.078 0.083 0.087 0.094 0.101 0.107 0.116 0.127 0.141 0.158 0.188 0.231 1.524
EC, RD
in 0.051 0.049 0.047 0.045 0.043 0.041 0.039 0.037 0.036 0.033 0.032 0.030 0.029 0.027 0.025 0.023 0.021 0.020 0.017 0.015 0.012 0.040
out 0.053 0.055 0.058 0.061 0.064 0.067 0.070 0.074 0.078 0.082 0.088 0.093 0.100 0.109 0.116 0.127 0.138 0.156 0.175 0.207 0.256 1.745
EC, LC
in 0.028 0.027 0.025 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.025
out 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.035 0.035 0.037 0.039 0.041 0.043 0.046 0.048 0.050 0.054 0.058 0.062 0.066 0.072 0.080 0.088 0.106 0.135 0.917
EC, SN
in 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.022
out 0.028 0.029 0.030 0.032 0.033 0.034 0.035 0.037 0.038 0.041 0.043 0.045 0.048 0.052 0.056 0.059 0.064 0.071 0.079 0.092 0.118 0.787
IA, RD
in 0.050 0.048 0.046 0.044 0.042 0.040 0.038 0.036 0.034 0.032 0.031 0.029 0.027 0.026 0.023 0.021 0.019 0.018 0.016 0.014 0.011 0.039
out 0.050 0.053 0.055 0.058 0.060 0.063 0.065 0.069 0.073 0.076 0.081 0.086 0.092 0.099 0.105 0.113 0.125 0.139 0.156 0.186 0.229 1.521
IA, LC
in 0.029 0.028 0.026 0.026 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.006 0.022
out 0.034 0.034 0.036 0.037 0.038 0.040 0.041 0.043 0.045 0.048 0.050 0.053 0.057 0.061 0.065 0.069 0.076 0.083 0.091 0.109 0.138 0.914
IA, SN
in 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.020
out 0.028 0.029 0.030 0.031 0.032 0.034 0.035 0.037 0.039 0.041 0.043 0.045 0.049 0.052 0.055 0.058 0.063 0.070 0.078 0.093 0.118 0.778
RD, LC
in 0.028 0.027 0.025 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.025
out 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.035 0.036 0.038 0.040 0.041 0.043 0.047 0.048 0.051 0.055 0.058 0.062 0.066 0.073 0.081 0.089 0.108 0.136 0.929
RD, SN
in 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.020 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.022
out 0.029 0.030 0.031 0.032 0.033 0.034 0.035 0.037 0.039 0.041 0.043 0.045 0.048 0.052 0.056 0.059 0.064 0.072 0.079 0.093 0.118 0.784
LC, SN
in 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.021
out 0.028 0.030 0.030 0.032 0.032 0.033 0.034 0.036 0.037 0.039 0.041 0.043 0.046 0.050 0.053 0.057 0.062 0.069 0.076 0.090 0.114 0.743
3-types
EC, IA, RD
in 0.050 0.048 0.046 0.044 0.042 0.040 0.038 0.036 0.034 0.032 0.031 0.029 0.027 0.025 0.023 0.021 0.019 0.018 0.016 0.014 0.011 0.039
out 0.050 0.053 0.055 0.058 0.060 0.063 0.065 0.069 0.073 0.076 0.081 0.086 0.092 0.099 0.105 0.113 0.125 0.139 0.156 0.186 0.229 1.521
EC, IA, LC
in 0.029 0.028 0.026 0.026 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.006 0.022
out 0.034 0.034 0.036 0.037 0.038 0.040 0.041 0.043 0.045 0.048 0.050 0.053 0.057 0.061 0.065 0.069 0.076 0.083 0.091 0.109 0.138 0.914
EC, IA, SN
in 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.020
out 0.028 0.029 0.030 0.031 0.032 0.034 0.035 0.037 0.039 0.041 0.043 0.045 0.049 0.052 0.055 0.058 0.063 0.070 0.078 0.093 0.118 0.778
EC, RD, LC
in 0.027 0.025 0.025 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.025
out 0.031 0.032 0.032 0.035 0.035 0.037 0.039 0.041 0.043 0.046 0.048 0.050 0.054 0.058 0.062 0.066 0.073 0.082 0.089 0.108 0.135 0.917
EC, RD, SN
in 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.020 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.022
out 0.029 0.030 0.031 0.032 0.033 0.034 0.035 0.037 0.039 0.041 0.043 0.045 0.048 0.052 0.056 0.059 0.064 0.072 0.079 0.093 0.118 0.784
EC, LC, SN
in 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.021
out 0.028 0.030 0.030 0.032 0.032 0.033 0.034 0.036 0.037 0.039 0.041 0.043 0.046 0.050 0.053 0.057 0.062 0.069 0.076 0.090 0.114 0.743
IA, RD, LC
in 0.029 0.028 0.026 0.026 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.006 0.022
out 0.034 0.034 0.036 0.037 0.038 0.040 0.041 0.043 0.045 0.048 0.050 0.053 0.057 0.061 0.065 0.069 0.076 0.083 0.091 0.109 0.138 0.914
IA, RD, SN
in 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.020
out 0.028 0.029 0.030 0.031 0.032 0.033 0.034 0.037 0.039 0.041 0.043 0.045 0.049 0.052 0.055 0.058 0.064 0.070 0.078 0.093 0.117 0.778
IA, LC, SN
in 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.019
out 0.030 0.031 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.035 0.036 0.038 0.040 0.041 0.044 0.046 0.050 0.053 0.056 0.060 0.065 0.072 0.079 0.095 0.119 0.783
RD, LC, SN
in 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.021
out 0.028 0.030 0.030 0.032 0.032 0.033 0.034 0.036 0.037 0.039 0.041 0.043 0.046 0.050 0.053 0.057 0.062 0.069 0.076 0.090 0.114 0.743
4-types
EC, IA, RD, LC
in 0.029 0.028 0.026 0.026 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.006 0.022
out 0.034 0.034 0.036 0.037 0.038 0.040 0.041 0.043 0.045 0.048 0.050 0.053 0.057 0.061 0.065 0.069 0.076 0.083 0.091 0.109 0.138 0.914
EC, IA, RD, SN
in 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.020
out 0.028 0.029 0.030 0.031 0.032 0.033 0.034 0.037 0.039 0.041 0.043 0.045 0.049 0.052 0.055 0.058 0.064 0.070 0.078 0.093 0.117 0.778
IA, RD, LC, SN
in 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.019
out 0.030 0.031 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.035 0.036 0.038 0.040 0.041 0.044 0.046 0.050 0.053 0.056 0.060 0.065 0.072 0.079 0.095 0.119 0.783
EC, RD, LC, SN
in 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.021
out 0.028 0.030 0.030 0.032 0.032 0.033 0.034 0.036 0.037 0.039 0.041 0.043 0.046 0.050 0.053 0.057 0.062 0.069 0.076 0.090 0.114 0.743
EC, IA, LC, SN
in 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.019
out 0.030 0.031 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.035 0.036 0.038 0.040 0.041 0.044 0.046 0.050 0.053 0.056 0.060 0.065 0.072 0.079 0.095 0.119 0.783
5-types EC, IA, RD, LC, SN
in 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.019
out 0.030 0.031 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.035 0.036 0.038 0.040 0.041 0.044 0.046 0.050 0.053 0.056 0.060 0.065 0.072 0.079 0.095 0.119 0.783
This table presents the standard errors of the in-sample and out-of-sample accuracies of all 31 worlds in Game A. Standard errors are derived as se = σµacc/
√
S, where σµacc
refers to the standard deviation of the mean accuracy µacc which equals the average of the M = 1000 computed accuracies. The accuracy itself is derived as the ratio of
correctly fitted decisions over the total number of decisions. We assume Senders’ first-order beliefs to equal one. EC reflects the standard economic model, IA inequity aversion,
RD reference-dependent preferences, LC lying costs, and SN reputation or social norms. Each column corresponds to a specific number of decisions used to estimate individual
parameters, classify participants into types and to compute the in-sample performance. The remaining decisions are used to derive the out-of-sample fit. All standard errors
are multiplied by 100.


3 Indebtedness, Interests, and Incentives: State-
contingent Sovereign Debt Revisited∗
with Felix Fattinger
3.1 Introduction
Even though the most acute symptoms of the Eurozone’s sovereign debt crisis have abated,
the necessary precondition for its recrudescence still persists to date: massive debt-to-
GDP levels in many European countries. Surging public debt burdens arguably pose
substantial refinancing risks, if perceived default probabilities should shift upwards again
(Calvo (1988)). This has led both the press as well as renowned macroeconomists to
recently rediscover the benefits of state-contingent bonds as an alternative refinancing
instrument,1 but this time for the pre-restructured debt of advanced economies.2
This paper investigates the welfare implications of state-contingent debt as a tempo-
rary device against swelling refinancing costs of highly indebted sovereigns. Our focus lies
on governments whose economically required deleveraging efforts under standard sover-
eign debt are so immense that they have to be considered politically infeasible. We de-
monstrate state-contingent debt’s virtue of providing more space for mitigating sovereign
default risk. If sovereign borrowing is contractible—a requirement whose practicability is
∗ We would like to thank Markus Brunnermeier, Marc Chesney, Sebastian Dörr, Lucas Fuhrer, Seraina
Grünewald, Michel Habib, David Hémous, Andreas Müller, Steven Ongena, Jean-Charles Rochet,
Alexander Wagner, Jiri Woschitz, Alexandre Ziegler, Fabrizio Zilibotti, and participants at the UZH
Finance Poster Workshop 2015, the Zurich Workshop on Economics 2015, the MFA 2016, the Spring
Meeting of Young Economists 2016, and the URPP Financial Market Regulation doctoral colloquium
at the University of Zurich for very helpful comments and suggestions. A version of this paper is being
circulated as a working paper.
1 For example, ‘The Economist’ referred to suggestions from Morgan Stanley to allow governments
to issue GDP-linked bonds (source: A chronic problem, The Economist, May 14, 2016, http://
www.economist.com/node/21698669). Blanchard et al. (2016) argue for a large scale issuance of
growth-indexed bonds in advanced economies during normal times. They show for several Eurozone
countries how GDP-indexed bonds could significantly reduce the upper-tail risk of excessive sovereign
indebtedness, thereby attenuating implied default probabilities.
2 Historically, securities linked to national growth have only been issued during the process of debt
restructuring. More recently, Argentina (2005), Greece (2012), and Ukraine (2015) issued warrant-
like instruments, where payments are conditional on realized growth rates.
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discussed—this even holds true in the presence of low growth expectations, i.e., when the
issuance of standard GDP-indexed bonds is particularly difficult.
In light of the European Central Bank (ECB)’s most effective crisis response, i.e.,
its ‘Outright Monetary Transactions’ program (OMT), we consider two types of state-
contingent debt instruments: (i) puttable debt and (ii) GDP-to-debt-linked bonds, hen-
ceforth simply GDR (GDP-to-debt ratio) bonds. Investors in puttable debt receive the
right to put their claims with a third party in return for a fixed payment and are thus
insured against sovereign default. GDR bonds offer state-contingent interests that are in-
versely related to sovereign indebtedness. Hence, conditionally on sufficient deleveraging,
their interest payments can still be positive under zero or even negative growth.
We find that, in the presence of non-negligible default costs, state-contingent bonds
generally lead to substantial welfare gains. In terms of relative welfare improvements for
risk-averse consumers, the counter-cyclical fiscal spending allowed for by GDR bonds’
cyclical interest charges (as a function of GDP) proves superior to puttable bonds’ simple
insurance mechanism. For both instruments, governments deleveraging incentives as well
as practical implementation issues are discussed.
The ECB’s crisis mitigation efforts covered a wide range of non-standard monetary
policy measures: from expanding volume and maturities of lending operations to adjusting
collateral requirements for repo transactions, followed by direct interventions in securities
markets. Whereas the effects of the first such direct intervention, i.e., the ‘Securities
Markets Program’ (SMP), remained limited, the sole announcement of its successor OMT
in July 2012 significantly calmed sovereign bond markets. In essence, OMT allows the
ECB to buy unlimited amounts of distressed government bonds (with maturities up to
three years) on the secondary market, as long as the issuing government agrees to comply
with certain coercive measures.3
Following Merton (1977), OMT’s conditional guarantee to buy traded sovereign bonds
to reduce distressed yields can be interpreted as a written put option: The issuing go-
vernment has the right to initiate purchases of its own bonds, once their price has fallen
below a certain threshold. Since its first announcement, this ex-ante free option indirectly
offered to OMT eligible countries received considerable opposition among Eurozone coun-
tries, particularly from Germany.4 Concerns were raised that OMT’s free option results in
substantial risk redistribution among member countries and fails to sufficiently reinforce
3 For an overview of the ECB’s non-standard measures up to and including OMT see, e.g., the speech
by Peter Praet, member of the executive board of the ECB, on April 17, 2013 (source: https:
//www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2013/html/sp130417.en.html).
4 The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany questioned OMT’s compliance with EU law. It was
finally declared to be in line with the ECB’s official mandate of price stability and thus considered legal
by the European Court of Justice on June 16, 2015 (source: judgment of the court in case C-62/14,
June 16, 2015, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/).
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fiscal discipline of candidate governments.
In the context of OMT, state-contingency is achieved through lower interest rates
during times of high perceived default probabilities. The closest incentive-compatible al-
ternative to OMT are puttable bonds, where an intergovernmental organization insures
investors against default, thereby substantially lowering interest payable by the issuing go-
vernment. Importantly, contrary to OMT, the issuing government has to ex-ante compen-
sate the insurance provider by paying the insurance premium in return.5 Thus, puttable
bonds internalize the risk-sharing costs which remain non-remunerated under OMT.
First, motivated by OMT’s inherent insurance mechanism, we start our analysis with
puttable debt in the absence of default costs other than investors’ foregone repayments,
and relate our results to the seminal corporate debt valuation model by Merton (1974).
The rationale underlying puttable sovereign debt is simple. Newly issued puttable bonds
contain an embedded put option which serves as default protection for investors. If the
sovereign is unable to refinance its liabilities at maturity, i.e., whenever the government
defaults on its puttable debt, the writer of the embedded put option repays investors in
full (principal and accrued interests) and acquires the initial claim against the issuing
sovereign.
Abstracting from any credit risk on the insurance guarantor’s side, puttable bonds cor-
respond to a risk-free investment and therefore only pay the risk-free rate. In the context
of OMT, default protection is provided by the ECB, i.e., more precisely by its stake-
holders. In sharp contrast to OMT, in order to issue puttable debt, the sovereign would
have to ex-ante compensate the ECB or another sufficiently capitalized intergovernmental
agency for writing the embedded option.
Merton (1974) shows that the spread between risky debt and otherwise similar but
credit risk-free debt can be interpreted as the value of a put option on total assets. In the
absence of default costs, we demonstrate the validity of Merton’s (1974) equivalence result
within the sustainable sovereign debt model of Collard et al. (2015). They model sovereign
borrowing to be solely constrained by credit markets’ willingness to lend. Relying on
uniformly distributed GDP growth rates, which allow for closed-form solutions, we show
that a risk-neutral government is exactly indifferent between paying for protection against
increased refinancing pressure today versus accepting lower publicly financed consumption
or even the risk of default tomorrow. However, as soon as default imposes additional costs
on the defaulting government, the lower default probability under puttable debt’s reduced
financing costs becomes welfare improving.
Second, we introduce costs incurred in case of sovereign default. As soon as default
5 In contrast to credit default swaps (CDS) on sovereign debt, the embedded default insurance of
puttable bonds can not be disentangled from the underlying default exposure. Moreover, the insurance
premium is paid in full at issuance, rather then periodically over the bonds’ lifetime.
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imposes significant disutility on the defaulting government,6 it has incentives not to over-
borrow. Based on actual country-specific yield spreads, we calibrate these costs such
that the implied default probabilities are consistent with Merton’s (1974) equivalence re-
sult. Hence, in the presence of non-negligible default costs, instead of following Collard
et al. (2015), we adopt a one-shot perspective, where a risk-neutral government trades
off publicly financed private consumption against expected default costs when choosing
its optimal borrowing rate. In particular, our starting point is an already highly indeb-
ted government whose outstanding debt contains considerable default risk and therefore
imposes high refinancing costs.7
Within this new setting, we compare utilities between alternative state-contingent refi-
nancing instruments. In the spirit of Blanchard et al.’s (2016) current analysis for various
Eurozone countries, we additionally consider GDP-linked debt. To allow state-contingent
debt instruments to be welfare improving, we introduce a risk-averse consumer, who op-
timizes her utility from publicly financed consumption conditional on the government’s
borrowing policy. In order to account for the different frequencies between private con-
sumption decisions and the passage of public budgets, the former is modeled in continuous
time, whereas public borrowing remains constant over the considered period.
In contrast to standard GDP-linked debt, GDR bonds’ interest payments inversely
depend on a government’s relative indebtedness, i.e., whenever its GDP-to-debt ratio
rises, the payable interests increase. In addition to imposing state-contingent financing
costs, GDR bonds provide a new signaling device for the issuing government. Even
if credit markets have very pessimistic growth projections, GDR bonds can still offer
competitive risk-return profiles to reluctant investors, given that the issuing government
can credibly commit itself to a sustainable deleveraging. In case of insurmountable limited
commitment concerns by potential investors, equipping GDR bonds with an embedded
put option written by a third counterparty, i.e., similar to puttable bonds, could foster
the enforceability of previous deleveraging commitments. The assertiveness of the former
6 Examples comprise trade disruption or reputational costs for the defaulting government (see
Section 3.3).
7 In contrast to the analysis of puttable debt within the model of Collard et al. (2015), increased
refinancing pressure here occurs due to high perceived default probabilities, instead of tighter cre-
dit market conditions. Lane (2012) provides an intuitive explanation, how—in the presence of high
indebtedness—sudden shifts in sentiments can cause a multicountry currency union to jump from
a sustainable equilibrium to one with highly increased yields and unsustainable debt levels. In the
context of the Eurozone, such effects were likely amplified by internal flights-to-safety. Indeed, the em-
pirical evidence of De Grauwe and Ji (2012) suggests a significant effect of negative market sentiments
on the spreads of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain between 2010 and 2011. Up to the introduction
of OMT, the severe effects of market sentiments were also pointed out by both the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) (source: IMF Global Financial Stability Report, April 2012, http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2012/01/) and the ECB (source: Draghi, M., ECB press conference, Sep-
tember 6, 2012, http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2012/html/is120906.en.html).
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European Troika in the Eurozone’s recent debt renegotiations provides some evidence for
such a supranational party’s potential enforcement power (see discussion in Section 3.5).
We conduct a sensitivity analysis of optimal government borrowing under (i) standard
sovereign debt, (ii) puttable debt, and (iii) GDR bonds. In the context of all three instru-
ments, we confirm the model’s capability to deliver intuitive results with respect to its
parameters. For instance, we find the government’s optimal borrowing rate to be incre-
asing in GDP growth, U-shaped in growth volatility (manageable versus unmanageably
high growth risk), and to decrease in consumer risk aversion and default costs. Moreover,
GDR bonds’ state-contingency reduces the interest burden during times of low growth.
This allows the issuing government to deleverage less dramatically than under standard
or puttable debt, while keeping its default probability constant.
Third, in order to evaluate the welfare implications of state-contingent debt in the
presence of default costs, we run a case study calibrating our model to the five Eurozone
countries whose bond yields were most heavily affected by the debt crisis: Portugal,
Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain. We calibrate country-specific default costs to match
historical default probabilities implied by sovereign credit ratings prior to the ECB’s
OMT announcement. We find that, across growth scenarios, switching from standard to
puttable debt leads to welfare improvements.
In comparison to puttable debt, GDR bonds consistently yield superior utility le-
vels. Contrary to former’s simple insurance mechanism, GDR bonds’ state-contingent
interest charges allow the risk-averse representative agent to considerably smooth her
within-period consumption path. Hence, in our calibration, GDR bonds’ consumption
smoothing effect outweighs puttable debt’s more substantial reduction in expected de-
fault costs. Moreover, we show that even for very pessimistic growth projections (i.e., the
fifth percentile of historical growth rates), GDR bonds’ expected Sharpe ratios are around
unity (or even higher) for all five countries.
Our paper relates to the literature on state-contingent sovereign bonds. Emerging
economies regularly face the risk of exogenous and undiversifiable income shocks that may
cause capital flow reversals and potentially lead to severe contractions. In order to provide
developing countries the possibility to hedge themselves against non-contractible shocks,
Caballero (2003) proposes the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to supply a market for
state-contingent bonds. Such bonds would reduce refinancing pressure in case of a severe
income shock by, e.g., relating interest payments to income flows or by offering state-
contingent insurance payments. As an example for the latter, Caballero (2003) argues
that “Chile could eliminate most, if not all, of its deep recessions by embedding into its
external bonds a long-term put option, yielding US$ 6-8 billions when the price of copper
[its main export commodity] falls by more than two standard deviations” (Caballero,
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2003, p. 34).8 Caballero’s (2003) proposal can be viewed as an alternative to the IMF’s
already existing contingent credit lines for emerging economies. The potentially stabilizing
properties of puttable sovereign bonds for emerging countries without access to interest
rate derivative markets are pointed out by Neftci and Santos (2003).
GDP-linked securities represent the most prominent example of state-contingent so-
vereign debt discussed in the literature. Shiller (1994, 2003) argues for macro markets to
trade GDP-linked perpetual claims on fractions of countries’ respective GDP. Borensztein
et al. (2004) identify four major benefits of GDP-linked bonds over standard sovereign
bonds: (i) lower likelihood of sovereign defaults, (ii) fewer damaging pro-cyclical fiscal
policy implementations, (iii) the opportunity for a smoother intertemporal tax path, and
(iv) lower likelihood of government overspending during booms.9 In the context of the
Eurozone’s recent debt crisis, the stabilizing effects of GDP-linked bonds on the public
finances of advanced economies have repeatedly been emphasized by Barr et al. (2014)
and Blanchard et al. (2016), among others.
Naturally, our paper also relates to the numerous alternative proposals brought forward
in response to the currency union’s vulnerability to surging public debt levels. The so-
called ‘Eurobonds’, probably the most prominently discussed of all suggestions, refer to
government bonds jointly issued by all Eurozone member countries. Since their credit risk
relies on the solvency of the Eurozone as a whole, the associated reduction in the risk of
destabilizing attacks on national government bond markets would be substantial (Favero
and Missale (2012)).
The general concern among fiscally stronger member states (Germany in particular)
has been that Eurobonds could incentivize less disciplined member states to overborrow.
Hellwig and Philippon (2011) share this concern and consequently propose the intro-
duction of common senior debt with maturity of less than one year called ‘Eurobills’
aiming at easening debt rollover for Eurozone countries. Eurobills would be introduced
permanently and participation in the market tied to compliance with certain governance
criteria. Brunnermeier et al. (2011) suggest the creation of a ‘European Debt Agency’
that would buy national sovereign bonds up to 60% of GDP for each member country.
By securitization and the re-issuance of different tranches of bonds, it could satisfy the
demand for a safe asset which should also be used as main collateral in central bank
liquidity operations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 analyzes the effects of
puttable debt for a shortsighted risk-neutral government in the absence of default costs.
8 In the context of private corporations, Chidambaran et al. (2001) discuss how the gold-mining company
Freeport McMoRan’s usage of gold-linked depository shares helped to reduce its financing costs.
9 For a detailed literature overview on GDP-linked bonds see, e.g., Barr et al. (2014).
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While allowing for default costs, Section 3.3 additionally introduces GDR bonds in the
context of a continuously consuming risk-averse agent. In Section 3.4, relative welfare
effects of both puttable and GDR bonds relative to standard sovereign debt are estimated
based on an empirical case study. Section 3.5 discusses potential implementation issues
of GDR bonds and presents our concluding remarks.
3.2 Puttable Debt in the Absence of Default Costs
Motivated by OMT’s implicitly written put option, we begin our analysis of state-contingent
debt by introducing puttable bonds into a stylized model of sovereign borrowing, where
default does not cause any costs to the defaulting government. We deliberately choose this
starting point, as the absence of default costs allows for a useful benchmark assessment
of puttable bonds’ potential welfare effects.
In summary, if costs of default are negligible, Merton’s (1974) reinterpretation of risk-
adjusted spreads as put options can be explicitly verified within Collard et al.’s (2015)
closed model of endogenous government borrowing. This insight proves valuable when
evaluating puttable debt’s welfare enhancing reduction in default risk in the presence of
nonzero default costs as introduced in Section 3.3.
Abstracting from any kind of default costs is similar to the assumption of a short-
sighted government discussed in Rochet (2006) and Collard et al. (2015).10 Shortsighted
governments always borrow as much as possible, since they do not take future repayments
into account. Under this extreme assumption, sovereign debt levels are capped only by
credit markets’ willingness to lend.
Furthermore, we start by assuming lenders to be shortsighted as well, i.e., in the sense
that interest spikes from the distant past do not make them anticipate any potential
tightening of credit availability in the future. In other words, until confronted by a credit
shock, they regard the risk-free interest rate as constant. This assumption is not crucial,
but considerably simplifies the model’s introduction, and is subsequently relaxed when
we analyze puttable debt as response to increasing refinancing costs.
3.2.1 Government Borrowing
Relying on Collard et al.’s (2015) notation, we denote by Yt the country’s GDP at period
t, by bt the incumbent government’s date-t proceeds from issuing zero-coupon debt with
face value dt maturing at t+ 1, both expressed as fractions (denoted in lowercase) of Yt,
10 Collard et al. (2016) argue that the therefrom deduced concept of ‘excusable default’—governments
only default on maturing debt if their budget constraint does not allow them to repay—better explains
empirically observed sovereign debt levels than the more familiar concept of ‘strategic default’.
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and by α the government’s primary surplus, also expressed as a fraction of Yt and assumed
to be constant over time. At any given date t, publicly financed consumption ct is given
by
ct = ((1 − α) + bt)Yt − dt−1Yt−1, (3.1)
i.e., private consumers receive the sum of their income net of the government’s surplus
and new borrowing proceeds net of expenses from repaying maturing government debt.
Intuitively, sovereign default then occurs at t+ 1 if
(α+ bt+1)Yt+1 < dtYt, (3.2)
i.e., if the sum of primary surplus and proceeds from newly issued debt are insufficient to
repay its current creditors.11 We assume that even in case of default, publicly financed
consumption is never negative, i.e., ct ≥ 0.
Collard et al. (2015) assume zero recovery in default.12 Given its shortsightedness, the
government aims to maximize the proceeds from borrowing at every date t. Hence, its





P((α+ bt+1)Yt+1 ≥ dtYt), (3.3)
where Rt denotes the market-implied risk-adjusted discount rate prevailing at t. Eq. (3.3)
simply states that investors are only willing to lend the discounted expected repayment
value of the newly issued zero-coupon bond. Assuming risk-neutral and shortsighted





P((α+ bt+1)Yt+1 ≥ dtYt), (3.4)
where r refers to the risk-free interest rate, initially regarded as time-invariant by lenders.
The right-hand side of Eq. (3.4) exhibits a ‘Laffer curve property’. At the maximum,
the effects of increasing debt levels and default probabilities offset each other. Cond. (3.2)
is equivalent to
(α+ bt+1)gt+1 < dt,
where gt+1 ≡ Yt+1/Yt denotes the continuous growth rate between date t and t+1 assumed
11 This condition of sovereign default is different from Eaton and Gersovitz’ (1981) concept of strategic
default. Collard et al. (2015) refer to mounting empricial evidence that most sovereigns do not default
voluntarily. Moreover, Collard et al. (2016) show that calibrated ‘excusable’ default models, i.e., in
the spirit of Cond. (3.2), yield much more realistic debt-levels than models of strategic default.
12 Alternatively, one could assume that creditors can (partially) claim the government’s primary surplus
upon default. However, even if creditors receive the entire primary surplus, the maximum sustainable
debt in Collard et al. (2015) only increases slightly, due to its very low associated default probability.
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rt−2 = rL rt−1 = rL
rt = rH
πH rt+1 = rH
πL
rt+1 = rL
Figure 3.1: Unexpected rise in risk-free interest rates
Notes: This figure illustrates a rare and unanticipated tightening of credit market
conditions at t, modeled by an increase in the risk-free interest rate rt from rL to
rH . Thereafter, credit markets become aware of interest rates’ stochastic nature
and form beliefs about future risk-free rates at t+ 1: either rt+1 stays at rH with
probability πH , or it decreases to rL with probability πL = 1 − πH .
to be i.i.d. with cdf F (·). Thus, relying on future borrowing proceeds bt+1, the government
avoids default at t+ 1 with probability
















gM(1 − F (gM)), (3.5)
where
(α+ bM)gM ≡ dM
identifies maximum sustainable debt dM and gM satisfies
gM = arg max
g
g(1 − F (g)). (3.6)
We now introduce a credit shock scenario as presented in Figure 3.1. After many
consecutive periods with low risk-free rates rL, an unanticipated shock at t tightens credit
availability. This has two immediate effects: First, the risk-free rate rises from rL to rH .
Second, shortsighted lenders are reminded of interests’ time variability, which directly





P((α+ bt+1)Yt+1 ≥ dtYt), (3.7)
i.e., the discount rate increases to rH .
Given the present interest rate shock, lenders now consider interest rates to be random
but stationary, i.e.,
rs
i.i.d.∼ r ∼ rL +B(1, πH)(rH − rL) ∀s ≥ t+ 1, (3.8)
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where B(1, πH) denotes a Bernoulli distribution with ‘success’ probability πH . Defining
βt ≡ (1 + rt)bt and recalling the stationarity of the country’s growth rate, i.e., gs i.i.d.∼












With stochastic interest rates as defined in Eq. (3.8), maximum sustainable debt dM
becomes a function of βM given by























given d if r = rH

, (3.9)
where maximum sustainable borrowing bM(t) = βM/(1 + rt) is state-dependent and βM


















Due to the uncertainty about future interest rates, maximum sustainable debt in Eq. (3.9)
is no longer indirectly implied by gM in Eq. (3.6), but instead needs to take into account
r’s binomial distribution and the state-dependent default thresholds.
As demonstrated by Rochet (2006), assuming g to be uniformly distributed on [1 +
µg − σg, 1 + µg + σg], Eq. (3.9) and Eq. (3.10) then imply
dM =

























The following lemma gives the closed form solution to Eq. (3.12), on which we rely for
our analysis of puttable debt below.
Lemma 1. If (rL, rH) ∈ [0, 1) × [0, 1), g ∼ U[1 + µg − σg, 1 + µg + σg], and (1 + µg +










(1 + µg + σg)2
8σ
− E[1 + r]
B := α
(
(1 + µg + σg)2
8σ
(2 + rL + rH) − (1 + rL)(1 + rH)
)
C := α2
(1 + µg + σg)2
8σ
(1 + rL)(1 + rH).
Proof. For proof see Appendix 3.A.
3.2.2 Refinancing Costs During Credit Shock: Standard versus
Puttable Debt
Suppose now that the government is given the possibility to buy protection against increa-
sed refinancing costs at t by issuing puttable instead of standard debt. The main difference
between puttable and standard debt is that the former insures investors against sovereign
default, i.e., in case of default at t + 1, a third party guarantees to repay them in full.
From investors’ perspective, assuming the insurance writer to be sufficiently solvent, such
puttable bonds correspond to a risk-free investment. We impose the following conditions
for issuing puttable debt at t:
C1. The government’s date-t proceeds may not surpass bM(t), i.e., they may not be
higher than in the absence of puttable bonds.
C2. The government is required to ex-ante compensate the guarantor for the initial
default risk taken over, i.e., for the default risk in absence of puttable bonds.
C3. The government is only allowed to issue puttable bonds, if the payment of the
ex-ante insurance premium does not cause it to already default at t.
Condition C1 is intuitive given the intended risk managing character of puttable debt.
Hence, it would be counterproductive, if sovereigns would be allowed to borrow more in
the presence of high interest rates than available under low refinancing costs. In fact,
C1 prevents higher borrowing due to a risk-shifting effect. C2 directly manifests itself
in the ex-ante payable insurance premium (see below). Finally, C3 is simply imposed by
the government’s budget constraint which does not allow for negative consumption after
borrowing proceeds.
Table 3.1 contrasts the government’s two refinancing options at date t in more detail.
For the issuing government, the refinancing costs of standard and puttable debt differ
in two dimensions: on the one hand, the issuance of puttable bonds requires an ex-ante
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Table 3.1: Standard vs. puttable debt
Standard debt Puttable debt
Type zero-coupon zero-coupon
Insurance no yes
Ex-ante premium none put price pt
Spread Rt ≡ dMbM (t) − 1 risk-free rate rt
Notes: This table compares standard and puttable debt available to the govern-
ment to refinance its debt at t. Rt denotes the spread on date-t borrowing proceeds
bM (t) to be paid to investors at t+ 1, if the government chooses standard debt. In
case it chooses to issue puttable debt, pt denotes the ex-ante premium to be paid
by the issuing government to the insurance provider at t.
payment to the insurance guarantor at t. This premium compensates the third party
for providing investors with insurance against sovereign default. The date-t value of the
insurance pt corresponds to the price of an European put option on sovereign debt with
maturity t+ 1 and a strike price equal to the debt’s face value plus accrued interests. On
the other hand, the issuing government is in return protected against higher interests on
its date-t borrowing proceeds due at t+1. Since investors are insured against default risk,
the payable interests on bM(t)Yt are reduced from the default-adjusted spread RH to the





and bM |RH denotes maximum sustainable borrowing under high (default adjusted) inte-
rest rates.
Moving to an intertemporal perspective, the discounted expected sum of current and








where δ is the discount factor and cs is given by Eq. (3.1). Note that, for δ < 1, the
borrowing policy in Eq. (3.10) is consistent with the maximization of Eq. (3.13) by a risk-
neutral government who is indifferent towards variations in private consumption. A risk-
averse government, in contrast, might have an incentive to smooth private consumption
across time by borrowing less if production is very high in order to avoid future default.
In Section 3.3, we account for such consumption smoothing benefits by introducing a
risk-averse consumer.
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Table 3.2: Consumption under standard vs. puttable debt (no default costs)
Standard debt Puttable debt ∆
(1) (2) (1)−(2)
Consumption at t ct ct − pt pt
Discounted expected
δE[ct+1|RH ] δE[ct+1|rH ] δbM(t) (rH −RH)Yt
consumption at t+ 1
Notes: This table compares current and future publicly financed consumption
levels under the issuance of standard and puttable debt, given an increase in the
risk-free rate from rL to rH at t. The third column lists the differences at t and
t+ 1 from the perspective of a risk-neutral government. pt denotes the date-t put
price, δ the government’s discount factor, bM (t) date-t maximum borrowing under
stochastic interest rates, and RH the default-adjusted spread based on rH .
Consistent with the above analysis, we can rewrite date-t private consumption as
ct = ((1 − α) + bM(t))Yt − dt−1Yt−1,
and at t+ 1, given a preceding refinancing with standard debt, as
ct+1|RH = ((1 − α) + bM(t+ 1))Yt+1 − bM(t)(1 +RH)Yt,
where we rely on the identity bt(1 + Rt) ≡ dt with R ∈ {RL, RH} denoting the state-
dependent spread to be paid by the government on its borrowing proceeds.
In the presence of puttable debt, refinancing public debt with puttable bonds reduces
date-t private consumption by the put option premium, i.e.,
ct − pt,
where at t+1 the put option either pays bM(t)(1+RH)Yt in case of default (zero recovery)
or nothing otherwise. Note that the put option’s strike price is set equal to the borrowing
proceeds’ face value plus accrued interests in absence of puttable debt (see C2 above). At
t+1, due to the lower spread charged by insured investors, private consumption increases
to
ct+1|rH = ((1 − α) + bM(t+ 1))Yt+1 − bM(t)(1 + rH)Yt,
where it holds that ct+1|rH ≥ ct+1|RH . The (discounted) differences in (expected) private
consumption from issuing either standard or puttable debt are summarized in Table 3.2.
Lemma 2. If g ∼ U[1 + µg − σg, 1 + µg + σg], then a risk-neutral government facing no
default costs is indifferent between issuing standard or puttable debt in response to a credit
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shock.
Proof. For proof see Appendix 3.A.
Lemma 2 is in line with Merton (1974), implying that the put option price pt is equal to
the discounted spread δ(RH − rH) to be paid on the borrowing proceeds bM(t)Yt financed
by puttable bonds. In other words, a risk-neutral government’s disutility from having to
pay the insurance premium at t is exactly offset by higher private consumption due to
lower interest payments at t + 1. Hence, as long as there are no default costs, a risk-
neutral government is indifferent between issuing standard or puttable debt in response
to an increase in interest rates.
Proposition 1. If RH > rH and the probability of default under standard debt with spread
RH is nonzero, then the issuance of puttable debt always decreases the risk of sovereign
default. In particular, if g ∼ U[1+µg −σg, 1+µg +σg] and bM(t)(1+RH)/(α+bM(t+1)) >




 bM(t)(RH − rH)








where the first (second) term applies in case of a nonzero (zero) default probability under
rH .
Proof. For proof see Appendix 3.A.
So far we have been abstracting from any costs to be borne by a defaulting sovereign.
However, as soon as we introduce such sovereign default costs, Proposition 1 has important
implications: reducing a government’s default probability attenuates expected disutilities
from default and, therefore, enhances social welfare. Hence, facing non-negligible default
costs, even a risk-neutral government may be better off provided access to puttable bonds
when facing increasing refinancing costs.
Furthermore, in the presence of a risk-averse consumer, a comparison to the consumption-
smoothing benefits from GDP-linked bonds springs to mind. How puttable debt’s re-
duction in expected default costs compares to GDP-linked debt’s decrease in consumption
variability is the focus of the following two sections.
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3.3 State-contingent Borrowing in the Presence of
Default Costs
Our previous working assumption of zero default costs incurred by a defaulting sovereign
is arguably unrealistic. Borensztein and Panizza (2009) distinguish among four different
types of sovereign default costs: (i) reputational costs, (ii) international trade exclusion
costs, (iii) costs due to negative shocks on the domestic banking system, and (iv) poli-
tical costs borne by the incumbent government. They find that the economic costs are
generally significant, but short-lived. However, sovereign defaults often bring far-reaching
consequences for elected officials. The authors document that in 18 out of 19 cases studied,
the ruling coalition lost votes following the default and their electoral support declined
on average by 16%.
Probably more meaningful to our case is the indirect measure of default costs given by
the sheer amount of fiscal tightening that has been accepted by the Hellenic government
during its ongoing debt negotiations in return for numerous bailout packages. In March
2012, the Greek government and its counter parties, i.e., the European Commission,
Eurogroup, ECB, and IMF, signed the ‘Second Economic Adjustment Programme for
Greece’.13 The austerity measures imposed by this second bailout package revised the
total amount of fiscal cost reductions to approximately 65 billion Euros between 2010 and
2014, which corresponded to more than 30% of Greece’s then GDP.14
As soon as default imposes significant disutility on the defaulting government, the
latter has incentives not to overborrow. Based on actual country-specific yield spreads,
we calibrate these costs such that the implied default probabilities are in line with Merton’s
(1974) equivalence result. Instead of following Collard et al. (2015), we adopt a simpler
one-shot perspective, where a risk-neutral government trades off publicly financed private
consumption against expected default costs when choosing its optimal borrowing rate.
Given the intended temporary nature of the hereafter considered refinancing instruments,
we deem such a one-period view appropriate.15 In particular, our starting point is an
already highly indebted government whose bonds contain a considerable default risk and
therefore impose high refinancing costs. In contrast to the analysis of puttable debt within
the model of Collard et al. (2015), increased refinancing pressure here occurs due to high
13 The second package was followed by a third bailout package signed in 2015.
14 Source: Excessive austerity killing Greece, Kathimerini (English edition), Septem-
ber 30, 2012, http://www.ekathimerini.com/145032/article/ekathimerini/business/
excessive-austerity-killing-greece.
15 In addition, it allows us to calibrate the model to data from highly indebted Eurozone countries in
Section 3.4. A model based on Collard et al. (2015) could not account for realistic default probabilities
given the historically low GDP growth volatilities.
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perceived default probabilities, instead of tighter credit market conditions.
Within this new setting, we compare utility gains from state-contingent refinancing
instruments. In particular, similar to Blanchard et al. (2016), we now also consider GDP-
linked debt. To allow such debt instruments to be welfare improving, we introduce a
risk-averse consumer who optimizes her utility from publicly financed consumption condi-
tional on the government’s borrowing policy. In order to account for the time discrepancy
between private consumption decisions and changes to public budget plans, the former
are modeled continuously. Solving for private consumption in continuous time also al-
lows us to consider the imperfect foreseeability of future debt levels due to deviations
of private consumption from expectations, while fully accounting for GDP-linked debt’s
intertemporal consumption smoothing effect.
In contrast to standard GDP-linked bonds, we introduce bonds linked to a country’s
GDP-to-debt ratio, referred to as GDR bonds, where interest payments inversely depend
on a government’s relative indebtedness, i.e., implying counter-cyclical interest rate dyna-
mics with respect to relative indebtedness. If a country’s relative indebtedness increases,
interest payments on GDR bonds decrease and vice versa. Thanks to GDR bonds’ va-
riable interest rates, negative shocks in GDP lead to a lower interest burden, relaxing
the sovereign’s refinancing pressure. In addition to imposing state-contingent financing
costs, GDR bonds provide a new signaling device for the issuing government. Even if
credit markets have very pessimistic growth projections, GDR bonds can still offer com-
petitive risk-return profiles to reluctant investors, assuming that the issuing government
can credibly commit itself to a sufficient deleveraging.16
Figure 3.2 summarizes the timing of our model where the government chooses its
borrowing rate at t0 which then remains fixed until t0 + 1. During the period, a risk-
averse consumer continuously maximizes her utility from publicly financed consumption,
conditional on the government’s fixed borrowing policy. At t0 + 1, the government either
refinances its debt (and sets a new borrowing rate) or defaults.
t
t0 t0 + 1
after debt roll-over
gov’t chooses borrowing rate
gov’t rolls over debt
or defaults
GDP realization Yt0 GDP realization Yt0+1
continuous consumption
Figure 3.2: Timing of debt refinancing with continuous consumption
16 In case of irreconcilable limited commitment concerns of potential investors, equipping the GDR bonds
with a puttable component could foster the enforceability of initial deleveraging commitments. See
also Section 3.5.
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3.3.1 Dynamics - Indebtedness and GDP
The state variable of interest is a sovereign’s annual GDP in relation to its accumulated
public debt.17 More specifically, we assume the following dynamics
dYt = Yt (µY dt+ σY dBt) , (3.14)
where Yt denotes the country’s rolling annual GDP and Bt a standard Brownian motion.
In addition, we model the dynamics of sovereign debt as
dDt = DtµDdt, (3.15)
where Dt corresponds to government date-t debt. Since we are considering a short-term
decision problem (one-period borrowing under the risk of default), we consider it sensible
to model the sovereign’s real GDP growth rate µY and GDP volatility σY to be exogenous
and constant over the considered time period. The proposed dynamics are consistent with
Collard et al. (2015), who assume log-normally distributed growth rates. At the beginning
of the period, i.e., at t0, a country’s government chooses its borrowing rate µD subject to
its budget constraint.
We assume a country’s short-term wealth Wt disposable for consumption to be additive
in Yt and Dt,18 i.e.,
dWt := (1 − α) dYt + (µD −R)Dtdt− ctdt, Wt0 := (1 − α)Yt0 +Dt0 . (3.16)
Here, ct denotes the risk-averse consumer’s continuous consumption and, as in Section 3.2,
α indicates the country’s primary surplus. Interest payments on government debt are
given by RDt, where R denotes the risk-adjusted interest rate, which is assumed constant
over one period. Note that, in contrast to Section 3.2, R is now exogenous.
Under puttable government debt as described in Section 3.2, investors possess the op-
tion to put their bonds in case the country’s debt-to-GDP level exceeds a certain threshold,
i.e., if the country defaults. This credit insurance is provided by an intergovernmental
agency which, in return, is compensated with the corresponding insurance premium (pa-
yable ex-ante). As a result, the issuing government only pays the risk-free interest on
its debt but has to pay a fixed fee to the insurance guarantor at issuance. The budget
17 This is in analogy to the third criterion of the euro convergence criteria (also known as the Maastricht
criteria) which were established in 1992.
18 As in Section 3.2, we deliberately abstract from consumption financed by issuing private debt.
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constraint then reads
dWt := (1 − α) dYt + (µD − r)Dtdt− ctdt, Wt0 := (1 − α)Yt0 +Dt0 − pt0 , (3.17)
where r denotes the constant risk-free interest rate and pt0 corresponds to the put price at
t0, i.e., the ex-ante payable insurance premium, which lowers the initial wealth available
for consumption.
The put price corresponds to the discounted value of the issued government debt
multiplied by the probability of default. Assuming the insurance guarantor to be risk-
neutral, the corresponding discount rate equals the risk-free rate.19 The resulting put











where we impose, consistent with Section 3.2, zero recovery in default. For simplifica-
tion, we assume that the country defaults whenever sovereign debt minus the change in
disposable wealth relative to GDP is larger than the initial debt-to-GDP ratio. However,
this somewhat strict default condition only has a small level effect and does not change
our qualitative results. Moreover, in Section 3.4, we calibrate default costs such that the
thereby induced default probability under the optimal borrowing rate is consistent with
credit-rating-implied default risk. Since the debt-to-GDP ratio itself neglects changes in
Wt between t0 and t0 +1, we have to account for potential differences in disposable wealth
due to the consumer’s actual consumption. If she overconsumes, i.e., if she consumes more
than production growth and public borrowing allows for, disposable wealth is reduced,
which in turn increases the probability of sovereign default. We implicitly assume that
all produced goods need to be consumed within one period and cannot be stored for later
times.20
3.3.2 Government Borrowing with GDR Bonds and Default Costs
The government chooses its optimal borrowing rate subject to maximizing expected uti-
lity from consumption of its risk-averse consumer, while simultaneously accounting for
19 Note that, in order to compute the put price, we consider that the government needs to pay the
ex-ante risk-adjusted interest rate on its debt and neglect a lower interest rate’s decreasing effect on
the ex-post default probability. This is consistent with condition C2 in Section 3.2. Consequently, our
estimated put price reflects a conservatively high estimate, as issuing puttable debt arguably reduces
the chance that the put is exercised. Hence, a lower put price could possibly be negotiated, unless the
intergovernmental agency has full bargaining power.
20 In addition, we neglect investments which Gali et al. (2007) have shown to remain unaffected by a
shock in government spending.
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default risk. We solve the government’s optimization problem by backward induction.
First, following Merton’s (1969) lifetime portfolio allocation approach, we determine the
consumer’s optimal consumption over time for a given constant borrowing rate µD set
by the government. We model the risk-averse consumer as a representative agent with
CRRA-utility. Given the borrowing rate µD, our representative agent chooses her opti-
mal consumption plan c⋆t over a finite horizon, i.e., ∀t ∈ (t0, t0 + 1), subject to her budget
constraint. While doing so, she may consume more or less aggressively, depending on her
time preference as well as the relative value she assigns to her end of period wealth. In
addition, we assume that the representative agent, in contrast to the government, does
not incorporate any default costs into her consumption decisions.
Let the dynamics of short-term wealth Wt disposable for consumption under GDR
bonds be






Dt − ctdt, Wt0 := (1 − α)Yt0 +Dt0 , (3.19)
where d (Yt/Dt) / (Yt/Dt) reflects the interest payments on GDR bonds, indicating the link
between interest rates and relative indebtedness. The interest payments are increasing in
changes in Yt and decreasing in Dt. Note that our approach connects interest payments
to the inverse of relative indebtedness, whereas only µD can be set by the government.
We require the representative agent’s budget constraint to be of multiplicative form of
disposable wealth in order to ensure a closed-form solution to her optimal consumption
problem. Therefore, we rewrite the budget constraint by substituting Eq. (3.14) and
Eq. (3.15) in Eq. (3.19) as
dWt = ((1 − α)Yt −Dt) (µY dt+ σY dBt) + 2µDDtdt− ctdt,
and restate
dW̃t = W̃t (µY dt+ σY dBt) − c̃tdt, W̃t0 := (1 − α)Yt0 −Dt0 , (3.20)
where W̃t denotes the adjusted disposable wealth and c̃t := ct −2µDDt adjusted consump-
tion.21
We apply dynamic programming (see, e.g., Merton (1969)) to solve for the CRRA-
21 Under standard as well as puttable debt, the necessary restatement of the corresponding budget
constraints in Eq. (3.16) and Eq. (3.17) is achieved by setting W̃t0 := (1 − α)Yt0 and c̃t := ct − (µD −
R)Dt. The resulting (restated) budget constraint is equal to Eq. (3.20).
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representative agent’s optimal consumption path





u(c̃s, s)ds + ū(W̃t0+1, t0 + 1)
]
, (3.21)
subject to the budget constraint in Eq. (3.20). It follows from CRRA-preferences that




1 − γ ,
and utility of bequest
ū(W̃t0+1, t0 + 1) = e
−ρ(t+1)I(t0 + 1)
W̃ 1−γt0+1
1 − γ ,
for time preference ρ ≥ 0 and risk aversion γ > 0, where I(t0 + 1) denotes the relative
weight the consumer assigns to her end of period wealth.
Lemma 3. The solution to the dynamic programming problem in Eq. (3.21) subject to
























Proof. For proof see Appendix 3.A.













The variable ct reflects the consumer’s excess consumption and might take on negative
values. In order to derive the utility of consumption, we add a base consumption level c̄,
assumed to be fixed in the short term (over one period). Adding c̄ ensures that utility is
derived from total consumption which itself is positive.
Second, having computed the optimal consumption path of the representative agent,
we solve the government’s optimization problem in terms of its optimal borrowing decision.
The government aims to pick the optimal borrowing rate µ⋆D that maximizes the expected
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utility of its risk-averse consumer while accounting for possible default costs.22
Once the government has chosen the optimal borrowing rate at t0, the same cannot
be changed until t0 + 1. Hence, the government chooses µ⋆D such that










u(c⋆s + c̄, s)ds + ū(Wt0+1, t0 + 1)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
utility of consumption and bequest
− e−ρΨ1{η>Dt0 /Yt0}︸ ︷︷ ︸





Dt0+1 − (Wt0+1 −Wt0)
Yt0+1
.
In Eq. (3.23), c⋆s denotes the representative agent’s optimal time-dependent excess con-
sumption at time s. Wt0+1 reflects the wealth at the end of the period as computed by
Wt0+1 = Wt0 +
∫ t0+1
t0
dW̃s. The last term in Eq. (3.23) corresponds to a risk-neutral go-
vernment’s expected default costs discounted to time t0, imposing equal time preferences
as for the representative consumer.
Proposition 2. If expected default costs under GDR bonds are sufficiently high to incen-
tivize the government to choose a bounded µ⋆D, then this µ
⋆
D is unique.
Proof. For proof see Appendix 3.A.
In summary, when choosing its optimal borrowing rate, a heavily indebted government
needs to optimally trade off higher accumulated consumption versus an increasing proba-
bility of default. GDR bonds might provide more space to reduce sovereign borrowing,
while not too severely limiting consumption. Therefore, GDR bonds could potentially
allow for more sustainable deleveraging policies.
3.3.3 Comparative Statics
The comparative statics analysis of the above refinancing instruments requires an analo-
gous result as in Proposition 2 but for standard and puttable debt.
Corollary 1. If expected default costs under standard debt and puttable debt are suffi-
ciently high to incentivize the government to choose a bounded µ⋆D, then this µ
⋆
D is unique.
Proof. For proof see Appendix 3.A.
22 Similar to Müller et al. (2016), we also model welfare to be additively separable in the utility of
consumption and a linear default costs component.










































Figure 3.3: Comparative statics of the optimal borrowing rate
Notes: This figure shows the government’s optimal borrowing rate µ⋆D under the
three refinancing instruments, i.e., standard sovereign debt (solid, circles), puttable
debt (dotted, crosses), and GDR bonds (dashed, asterisks), with respect to model
parameters. Initial values: µY = 0.02, σY = 0.03, Y0 = 1, D0 = 0.95, α = 0.03,
ρ = 0.03, γ = 0.5, I(t0 + 1) = 10, Ψ = 0.1. Note that, for GDP volatility, µ
⋆
D
under puttable bonds is depicted on the right axis.
Figure 3.3 presents the comparative statics of a government’s optimal borrowing rate
µ⋆D under standard sovereign debt, puttable debt, and GDR bonds.
23 Similarly, Figure 3.4
displays the comparative statics of the corresponding default probabilities given the go-
vernment’s optimal borrowing rate µ⋆D. By referring to the various plots in Figure 3.3 and
Figure 3.4, we are able to make several interesting statements regarding the sensitivity of
µ⋆D and the implied default probability with respect to changes of model parameters:
1. Unsurprisingly, the optimal borrowing rate is increasing in GDP growth. This is
intuitive since a higher GDP growth rate allows to accelerate debt-financed con-
sumption without increasing relative indebtedness. Thanks to lower interest expen-
ses under low growth, relying on GDR bonds enables the government to borrow
23 Theoretically, by applying the implicit function theorem, one can derive the sensitivity of the optimal
borrowing rate with respect to model parameters. However, since the optimal borrowing rate depends
on intertemporal utility of consumption, we cannot compute closed-form solutions as, to the best of
our knowledge, its integral over time can only be solved numerically. This prevents us from applying
the implicit function theorem with respect to most parameters. There is one important exception:
We can compute the sensitivity of the optimal borrowing rate with respect to default costs under all
three refinancing instruments, as they only influence the expected default costs but not intertemporal
































Figure 3.4: Comparative statics of the probability of default given optimal borro-
wing
Notes: This figure shows the government’s probability of default given given the
optimal borrowing rate µ⋆D under the three refinancing instruments, i.e., standard
sovereign debt (solid, circles), puttable debt (dotted, crosses), and GDR bonds
(dashed, asterisks), with respect to model parameters. Initial values: µY = 0.02,
σY = 0.03, Y0 = 1, D0 = 0.95, α = 0.03, ρ = 0.03, γ = 0.5, I(t0 +1) = 10, Ψ = 0.1.
more than under standard or puttable debt without increasing the implied default
probability. Regardless of the level of µY , the probability of default remains very
low under standard debt and GDR bonds, and close to zero under puttable debt. A
change in the GDP growth rate has a negligible impact on the default probability
under all three refinancing instruments.
2. The uncertainty of future GDP growth and the optimal borrowing rate under stan-
dard and GDR bonds feature a U-shaped relationship. For very low levels of σY ,
i.e., in an almost deterministic model, we observe an optimal borrowing rate that
induces the debt-to-GDP ratio to approach but not to cross the default threshold.
However, once the growth shocks become non-negligible, the government’s optimal
borrowing rate decreases significantly. In order to prevent the risk of large enough
negative shocks that could trigger default, it is optimal to preemptively smooth out
the potential destabilizing effects on relative indebtedness by borrowing less. Ho-
wever, GDR bonds’ variable interest rates alleviate the risk of such shocks, thereby
lowering the government’s need to further reduce borrowing.
Once GDP volatility exceeds a certain level, the risk that the country ends up in
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default starts to increase significantly. If the government wanted to further limit the
probability of default, massive and costly (in terms of foregone consumption) cuts
in the optimal borrowing rate were needed. As a result, the government’s optimal
borrowing level starts increasing again when the chance to enter default becomes
substantial (i.e., more than > 20% for the given parameters). Under puttable debt,
the optimal borrowing rate is decreasing in growth volatility since higher uncertainty
leads to a higher payable put price. As a result, the government chooses a very low
borrowing rate in order to sustain a tiny default probability, thereby minimizing its
insurance costs.
3. Regardless of the refinancing instrument, the implied optimal borrowing rate is
decreasing in the imposed default costs. The higher these costs, the higher are the
incentives not to enter default. As a consequence, the government borrows less if
the costs of default are high. Similarly, the probability of default is decreasing in the
associated costs, hence the country minimizes its default risk once the corresponding
costs are substantial enough.
4. The initial debt-to-GDP ratio’s effect on optimal borrowing is slightly positive. The
higher this ratio, the smaller is the impact of a negative growth shock. As a con-
sequence, the government can marginally increase borrowing as the default risk
becomes less sensitive to growth uncertainty. In addition, the marginal return on
borrowing is increasing in the initial debt level, which motivates, ceteris paribus,
higher borrowing costs. Both effects seem counterproductive, as countries with hig-
her indebtedness borrow more. However, the first effect is only due to our simplified
definition of sovereign default. Moreover, the optimal borrowing rate is negative for
all levels of the initial debt-to-GDP ratio. The relative indebtedness is hence even
decreasing for high levels of debt, just at a slower pace. The effect of the initial
debt-to-GDP ratio on the probability of default is tiny.
5. The consumer’s risk aversion inversely affects the optimal borrowing rate. If less risk
averse, she prefers higher (debt-financed) consumption today at the cost of a higher
default probability tomorrow. For a strongly risk-averse consumer, by contrast, the
government decreases its borrowing rate in order to reduce the implied default risk.
Puttable debt’s inherent insurance mechanism as well as GDR bonds’ interst rate
structure both alleviate the optimal borrowing rate’s sensitivity to the consumer’s
risk aversion.
6. Under standard sovereign debt, the optimal borrowing rate is slightly increasing in
the interest rate. The higher the interest payments, the more does the government
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need to borrow in order to maintain consumption. Under puttable debt, the go-
vernment pays the risk-free rate on its bonds. Hence, R only affects the value of the
put as we assume that the government has to compensate the insurance guarantor
for its initial default risk (see Section 3.2), thereby conservatively neglecting a lower
interest rate’s decreasing effect on the ex-post default probability. However, the ef-
fect of the interest rate on the government’s optimal borrowing rate under puttable
debt is negligible.24
In summary, we find two persistent patterns across all parameter variations. First,
optimal borrowing is highest under GDR and lowest under puttable bonds. GDR bonds
allow the government to borrow more without substantially increasing its default proba-
bility compared to standard debt, thereby making the deleveraging committment more
feasible. Under puttable debt, by contrast, the government extends its deleveraging effort
in order to reduce the imposed insurance costs. Second, we observe the default probabi-
lity to be almost equal for standard and GDR bonds but substantially lower for puttable
bonds. This indicates that the latter’s ex-ante payable insurance premium incentivizes
the government to choose very low borrowing rates which in turn almost completely elimi-
nate its default risk. Specifically, the reduction in borrowing further amplifies the default
probability decreasing effect of puttable bonds’ per se lower interest rates.
3.4 Case Study: Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and
Spain
We now investigate GDR bonds’ potential virtue of mitigating the risk of swelling refinan-
cing costs in the presence of high indebtedness by analyzing the cases of Portugal, Ireland,
Italy, Greece and Spain at the time of the OMT announcement on July 26, 2012. We base
our analysis on a comparison of the model predicted effectiveness of the following three
refinancing instruments: (i) the status quo with standard debt, (ii) puttable (risk-free)
debt in return for an ex-ante insurance premium in the spirit of Section 3.2, and (iii) GDR
bonds as introduced in Section 3.3. Like in Section 3.3, we analyze those three refinancing
instruments in an environment with continuous consumption and existing default costs.
In 2010, under the status quo, highly indebted Eurozone countries raised concerns
regarding sovereign default after having reportedly been targeted by speculative attacks
24 Similarly, the effect of the consumer’s time-preference is rather weak and only plays a minor role
in determining µ⋆D and the corresponding default probability. Marginally, the lower the consumer’s
patience, i.e., the higher ρ, the more she wants to consume today, leaving the government to prefer a
higher optimal borrowing rate.
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Figure 3.5: 10-year yields on selected government bonds
Notes: This figure shows 10-year yields on government bonds for Portugal, Ireland,
Italy, Greece, and Spain based on ECB data.
on their bond yields.25 Such attacks, that ultimately resulted in an upwards shift of
the country’s perceived default risk, lead to higher demanded yields, which ultimately
increase—likely amplified by the currency union’s internal flight-to-safety—its actual de-
fault probability. Indeed, the empirical evidence of De Grauwe and Ji (2012) suggests a
significant effect of negative market sentiments on the spreads of Greece, Ireland, Portu-
gal, and Spain. In particular, the sovereign bond yields of Portugal, Ireland, and Greece
soared to unprecedented levels due to fears of imminent sovereign default. By the end of
2011, as shown in Figure 3.5, long-term bond yields had climbed to 13.08% for Portugal,
8.70% for Ireland, and even 21.14% for Greece, respectively.26 At these levels, refinancing
became very expensive, which finally led the ECB to announce its OMT program in the
summer of 2012.
Table 3.3 provides an overview of the calibrated parameters for the five countries.27
25 As highlighted by both the IMF (source: IMF Global Financial Stability Report, April 2012,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2012/01/) and the ECB (source: Draghi, M., ECB
press conference, September 6, 2012, http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2012/html/
is120906.en.html).
26 Despite the rise in yields, the governments of Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain increased
sovereign borrowing over the same time period, indicating that higher refinancing costs force countries
to borrow more in order to finance consumption (source: Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/
en/web/government-finance-statistics/statistics-illustrated).
27 Our results are robust to changes in the standard values of parameters ρ, γ, and I(t0 + 1).
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Since there is a monotone one-to-one relation between a country’s optimal borrowing rate
and its default costs (see Footnote 23), we calibrate the latter such that its respective de-
fault probability under the status quo is equal to one implied by its actual sovereign credit
rating prior to the OMT announcement. We therefore borrow Moody’s historical default
probabilities, implying a default probability of 1.9% for a Baa rating (Italy and Spain),
6.3% for a Ba rating (Portugal and Ireland), and 33.3% for a C rating (Greece), respecti-
vely.28 Unfortunately, historical default probabilities are not available for subgroups. For
instance, we cannot distinguish between the default probabilities of Portugal (Ba3) and
Ireland (Ba1). Clearly, Portugal’s higher interest rate (10.2% versus 5.2%) indicates a
higher default probability.29 Except for Greece, we use 4-year generic government bond
yields in order to be in line with Collard et al. (2015), who rely on an average duration
of sovereign debt equal to four years. For Greece, due to limited data availability, we rely
on its 10-year government bond yield.
We set I(t0 + 1) = 7, as we find this level to provide sufficient incentives to save a sig-
nificant part of disposable wealth for future periods. Given this weight on the consumer’s
end of period wealth, the expected disposable wealth is slightly increasing (on average
0.04% under the status quo). In addition, a comparative statics analysis with respect
to I(t0 + 1) reveals that the sensitivity of the optimal borrowing rate to changes in the
former is very small and negligible for levels of I(t0 +1) around seven. This is desirable as
we do not want this parameter choice to influence our results with respect to the optimal
borrowing policies.
In addition, under (iii) GDR bonds, we need to ensure that the initial value W̃t0 is non-
negative. A negative initial value of the process W̃t would imply that higher GDP growth
and more borrowing decrease disposable wealth for consumption. As a consequence, we
limit GDR debt issuance to the maximum value such that W̃t0 is nonnegative.
In order to test the three different sovereign borrowing policies for different GDP
growth realizations, we introduce a scenario analysis with respect to the realizations of
µY . We consider three realizations of the GDP growth rate: (i) the best out of the 5%
worst realizations of µY , i.e., the fifth historical percentile,30 (ii) zero-growth, and (iii) the
historical average growth rate. We then compare overall utility of the three refinancing
instruments under these three scenarios. Figure 3.6 displays the resulting differences in
utility for Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain.
28 Source: Moody’s, Sovereign Default and Recovery Rates, 1983-2008, March 2009, https://www.
moodys.com/sites/products/DefaultResearch/2007400000587968.pdf.
29 We additionally analyze the three refinancing instruments’ effectiveness for probabilities of default as
implied by traded CDS-spreads and find similar results.
30 We again assume a normally distributed growth rate, implying the fifth percentile to equal µY −
1.645σY , where µY and σY denote the historical average GDP growth rate and volatility based on
yearly OECD data (http://stats.oecd.org).
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Table 3.3: Parameters
Parameter Variable Portugal Ireland Italy Greece Spain
GDP growth µY 2.29% 3.35% 1.68% 1.57% 2.01%
GDP volatility σY 3.46% 3.50% 2.31% 3.68% 2.23%
Debt-to-GDP ratio D0/Y0 102.41% 110.55% 108.35% 111.11% 61.83%
Interest rate R 10.22% 5.19% 5.85% 27.82% 6.95%
MPS α 0.23% 6.74% 6.51% 4.37% 4.01%
Consumption c̄ 65.82% 45.57% 61.51% 69.88% 57.82%
Risk aversion γ 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Time preference ρ 5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00%
Default costs Ψ 0.13 0.21 0.42 0.02 0.28
Risk free rate r 1.30% 1.30% 1.30% 1.30% 1.30%
Notes: This table presents the calibrated parameters for Portugal, Ireland, Italy,
Greece, and Spain. We use yearly OECD (http://stats.oecd.org) GDP data
for the years 1970-2011 to compute µY and σY . D0/Y0 corresponds to relative
indebtedness as of the end of 2011 and is based on World Bank data (http://data.
worldbank.org). We use yield data of 4-year generic government bonds per July
26, 2012 from Bloomberg for all countries except Greece. As there is no data on
traded government bonds with maturity less than ten years for Greece at that time,
we use 10-year government bond yields provided by the Bank of Greece (http:
//www.bankofgreece.gr). MPS corresponds to the maximum primary surplus
based on OECD data. Consumption denotes national consumption in the year
2011 based on World Bank data. Standard values are assumed for γ and ρ. Default
costs are set such that the default probability under the status quo and historical
GDP growth matches the sovereign default probability according to Moody’s credit
rating at the time of OMT announcement. The continuously compounded yield
on a German 4-year government bond as of July 26, 2012 serves as a proxy for the
risk-free interest rate r.
We find that, across growth scenarios, switching from standard to puttable debt leads
to welfare improvements. The savings from lower interest payments more than compen-
sate the government for its ex-ante insurance payment. Due to countries’ low borrowing
rates, the value of the put option is relatively low considering prevailing interest rate
levels, ranging from 0.18% (Spain) to 0.76% (Ireland) of GDP. The effect of the three
different GDP growth scenarios on the insurance premium is small. In addition, default
probabilities under puttable debt (0.48% on average) are substantially lower than under
the status quo (11.05%). This finding is consistent with the result from Section 3.2, i.e.,
that, under the presence of default costs, puttable debt’s default risk mitigation is welfare
improving. Only Ireland, due to its comparably low interest rate, does not experience a














Figure 3.6: Utility comparison between puttable and normal bonds (left) as well as
GDR and puttable bonds (right)
Notes: The left-hand side plot provides the relative utility differences between
puttable and standard debt. The right-hand side plot displays relative utility
differences between GDR bonds and puttable debt.
Moreover, Figure 3.6 highlights that GDR bonds consistently outperform puttable
bonds. The welfare improvements induced by the former are especially pronounced for
the case of zero or negative GDP growth, where GDR bonds imply significantly lower
interest payments. Thus, contrary to puttable debt’s simple insurance mechanism, GDR
bonds’ state-contingent interest charges allow the risk-averse consumer to considerably
smooth her within-period consumption path, without increasing associated default risks
too heavily. On average, optimal borrowing rates are approximately twice as low under
standard debt than under GDR bonds, and even two times lower for puttable relative to
standard debt. In summary, the data-implied default costs are not high enough such that
puttable debt’s reduction in default risk would keep up with GDR bonds’ capability to
smooth consumption.
If one instead considers more pessimistic (risk-neutral) default probabilities implied by
historical CDS spreads, the price of puttable debt’s embedded put option becomes larger.
This can change the relation between puttable and standard debt: As the ex-ante payable
insurance premium increases, wealth disposable for consumption is reduced, making stan-
dard debt relatively more attractive. However, GDR bonds are still outperforming both
normal and puttable bonds, leaving the above results robust to changes in the calibration
















Figure 3.7: Optimal borrowing rate (left) and default probability (right) under
GDR bonds
Notes: The left-hand side plot shows the optimal borrowing rate of Portugal,
Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain under GDR bonds. The right-hand side plot
displays the respective probabilities of sovereign default.
of default probabilities.31
To sum up, it hardly depends on the realization of the GDP growth rates which in-
strument is most beneficial. We find the status quo with standard debt to be inferior
to puttable debt. Furthermore, GDR bonds which are inversely linked to relative indeb-
tedness, provide even higher utility than the issuance of puttable debt. Retrospectively,
issuing GDR bonds might have been an expedient refinancing alternative for the herein
considered countries.
Having selected our preferred refinancing instrument, we plot the optimal borrowing
rates under GDR bonds as well as the corresponding default probabilities for the three
GDP growth scenarios in Figure 3.7. We find the optimal borrowing rates to lie between
−10.90% (Spain with µY = −1.66%) and −1.07% (Greece with µY = 1.57%). Hence,
GDR bonds’ incentive structure appears sufficient in inducing the issuing government to
31 On average, imposing CDS-implied default probabilities, i.e., lowering Ψ, increases utility under nor-
mal and GDR bonds by 0.13% and under puttable bonds by 0.01%. As a consequence, puttable bonds
are relatively less attractive under CDS-implied default probabilities. This discrepancy to Section 3.2
arises due to the significantly lower default costs and the high weight on the consumer’s reduced utility
of bequest, which is absent in Section 3.2’s analysis of puttable debt. More importantly, under lower
values of Ψ, GDR bonds still allow for higher utility levels relative to normal and puttable debt.
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Table 3.4: Sharpe ratios under GDR bonds: Scenario analysis
Negative GDP growth Zero GDP growth Positive GDP growth
Portugal 1.48 1.50 1.51
Ireland 1.42 1.48 1.51
Italy 2.03 1.99 1.99
Greece 0.61 0.68 0.68
Spain 4.09 3.70 3.14
Notes: This table displays the Sharpe ratios of GDR bonds as computed by SR =
(µY −µ⋆D−rf )/σY , where µ⋆D reflects the optimal borrowing rate of the government.
The negative GDP growth scenario features the best out of the 5% worst historical
realizations of µY , i.e., the fifth historical percentile, zero GDP growth implies
µY = 0, and positive GDP growth corresponds to the historical average growth
rate. We use yearly GDP growth and volatility data from the OECD (http:
//stats.oecd.org).
choose a deleveraging borrowing rate. Figure 3.7 shows that neither the absolute level of
the probability of default nor the order of the five countries depend on the GDP growth
rate.
Finally, we compute the Sharpe ratio of GDR bonds in order to evaluate their potential
attractiveness to risk-averse investors. The Sharpe ratios equal (µY − µ⋆D − rf ) /σY , where
µY − µ⋆D reflects GDR bonds’ expected interest rate. If the Sharpe ratio of such an
investment instrument was below a minimum threshold, investors would not be willing to
provide funds, as their expected compensation would be too small given the associated
risk level. Table 3.4 presents the computed Sharpe ratios for the three growth scenarios
considered above.
Overall, the Sharpe ratios are high, i.e., between 0.61 and 4.09. Regardless of the
realization of the GDP growth rate, GDR bonds appear to be an attractive investment
instrument, since the optimal borrowing rates are always negative. In sharp contrast to
standard GDP-indexed bonds, GDR bonds’ Sharpe ratios remain competitive even for
negative growth rates.
However, if governments possibly deviated from their initial optimal borrowing rate
after having issued GDR bonds, their actual risk-return profile could deteriorate.32 If
markets deem this risk unacceptable, establishing an intergovernmental agency as coun-
terparty (writer) of GDR embedded put options could foster the credibility of initially
proclaimed deleveraging intentions. Buying such a put option would give hesitant inves-
tors the right to hand over their GDR bonds to the option writer for a fixed amount, in
32 This, in fact, could happen if Ψ decreases or if default costs are not enforceable (see discussion in
Section 3.5).
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case prices fell sharply due to a too high µD. Hence, the put option would insure investors
against overborrowing by the GDR bonds issuing government.
In addition, the put premium would fairly compensate the option writing counterparty
for guaranteeing credit insurance. Importantly, the latter nevertheless had to maintain
the enforceability of Ψ upon option exercise. The case of Greece provides indicative
evidence that such intergovernmental institutions, i.e., the European Commission, Eu-
rogroup, ECB, and IMF, indeed possess enough power to conditionally force Eurozone
debtor countries to massive cuts in fiscal spending. In Section 3.5 below, potential risks
associated with the implementation of GDR bonds are addressed more generally.
3.5 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
In summary, our analysis indicates considerable virtues of GDR over puttable bonds in
terms of welfare improvements. Naturally, the introduction of a novel financial contract
such as GDR bonds brings about many new factors, which all need to be considered in
detail. In this final section, we address the most apparent points. We argue that—albeit
justified—they can be dealt with in reasonable manner.
Risk of Limited Commitment
Given the inverse relation between interests paid on GDR bonds and a country’s cur-
rent GDP-to-debt ratio, a natural concern is that issuing governments simply keep on
increasing their debt to lower payable interests on outstanding GDRs. From an ex-ante
perspective, this is no problem since investors are only willing to purchase GDRs, if the go-
vernment can credibly commit itself to a deleveraging borrowing rate. Ex-post, however,
a limited commitment problem due to a lack of enforceability may arise.
The enforceability of non-positive borrowing rates could, e.g., be achieved by contrac-
tually forbidding the issuing government to auction any non-authorized debt during the
GDRs’ lifetime. For this purpose, an intergovernmental organization would have to be
established, similar to, e.g., the former European Troika (recently renamed as ‘European
Quadriga’), who enforces compliance with such contractual agreements. To be itself cre-
dible, it needs to be empowered to impose sanctions, e.g., predefined coercive measures,
in case of contravention.
Alternatively, similar to puttable debt, GDR bonds could be complemented by an
embedded put option. Whenever the government’s GDP-to-debt ratio at GDRs’ maturity
falls below a certain threshold, investors could put their bonds with the above mentioned
organization and receive a fixed payment in return. In case their GDR bonds get put,
sanctions are imposed on the issuing government. Note that, contrary to puttable debt
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discussed above, the writer of the embedded put option would be compensated with the
insurance premium paid by investors instead of the issuing government.
Growth Risk
By construction, returns to GDR bonds are pro-cyclical, i.e., if growth rates are positive
(negative), interests increase (decrease). Hence, similar to GDP-linked bonds (see Blan-
chard et al. (2016)), GDRs represent so-called ‘high beta’ instruments, for which investors
demand higher expected returns per unit of risk.
In light of the above calibrated Sharpe ratios, we argue that GDRs easily exceed the
necessary return-for-risk profile usually demanded by investors for ‘high beta’ securities.
Particularly, GDRs’ Sharpe ratios are generally high due to the relatively low levels of
growth volatility. Moreover, growth rates are only imperfectly correlated across countries.
Hence, making GDRs available to a widely dispersed foreign investor base further reduces
country-specific growth risks borne by investors.
Novelty and Liquidity Risk
Newly introduced GDR bonds would entail substantial novelty and liquidity risks. Histo-
rically, GDP-linked bonds have been mainly issued by developing countries, often during
debt restructuring. In the context of the potential isssuers we have in mind, Blanchard
et al. (2016) conclude: “With relatively strong institutions and an independent statistical
agency, advanced economies are in a better position to give confidence to investors that
data on economic growth will remain untampered and reliable.” (Blanchard et al., 2016,
p.3)
The absence of a reasonably liquid secondary market usually complicates the intro-
duction of novel financial securities, such as GDP-linked bonds (Barr et al. (2014)). A
minimum scale and sufficient standardization would therefore facilitate the successful im-
plementation of GDRs. The Sharpe ratios calibrated for Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece,
and Spain firmly appear high enough to compensate for GDRs’ potential novelty and li-
quidity risks. In case of unexpectedly high initial liquidity concerns and novelty aversion,
making GDRs puttable, as discussed above, jointly decreases both types of risks.
In conclusion, we believe GDP-to-debt-index bonds to constitute a promising alternative
for managing the risk of future spikes in government yields for highly indebted Eurozone
countries, of whom there still are many. If implemented appropriately, they could be an
effective state-contingent debt instrument, temporary mitigating refinancing pressure and
smoothing private consumption, thereby creating space and time for a less painful, but
more sustainable sovereign deleveraging.
198 State-contingent Sovereign Debt Revisited
3.A Appendix: Proofs
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which leads us to the following quadratic equation
β2M
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Whenever A ≥ 0, it must be that
(1 + µg + σg)
2
8σg
≥ E[1 + r] ≥ 1,
where the second inequality holds since 0 ≤ r < 1. Hence, A ≥ 0 directly implies B > 0.
However, if both A and B are nonnegative, there exists no nonnegative solution βM to
Eq. (3.A.1). A nonnegative βM therefore requires that A < 0, i.e.,
E[1 + r] >











This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2. We prove Lemma 2 in two steps. First, we compute the date-t put
option value. A standard European put option with strike price x, underlying S, and
maturity t+ 1 yields the following payoff at expiration
max (x− St+1, 0).
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In the context of puttable bonds, this payoff can be written as
max (bM(t)(1 +RH)Yt − αYt+1, 0) .
In the following, we denote by g the growth-rate threshold below which the put option
yields a positive payoff at maturity, i.e., the minimum growth rate necessary to prevent
government default:




Since g is state-dependent, we write it as a function of rt+1. Given risk-neutrality and
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where the conditional expectation can be calculated in closed form by relying on the
uniform distribution of g. Recalling the assumption of zero recovery in default from
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Second, we show that the government is indeed indifferent between issuing normal and




bM(t)(RH − rH)Yt. (3.A.4)
Plugging Eq. (3.A.3) into Eq. (3.A.4) and after some tedious but simple algebra wet get
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− 1 = dM
βM/(1 + rH)
− 1 = 4σg(1 + rH)
1 + µg + σg
− 1. (3.A.6)
Plugging Eq. (3.A.6) into Eq. (3.A.5) and simplifying finally yields
βM =













This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1. In the absence of puttable bonds, if rt = rH , the government
defaults at t+ 1 whenever
















− (1 + µg − σg)
2σg
. (3.A.7)
We have to distinguish between two cases: First, if bM(t)(1 + rH)/(α + bM(t + 1)) >
1 + µg − σg, Eq. (3.A.7) implies that issuing puttable instead of standard debt reduces
the default probability by
P|RH − P|rH =
bM(t)(RH − rH)
2σg (α+ bM(t+ 1))
.
Second, in the complementary case, i.e., if P|rH = 0, puttable bonds eliminate the whole
default risk imposed by standard bonds. This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 3. In order to solve for optimal consumption, we apply standard dynamic
programing techniques as described in, e.g., Merton (1969). We want to solve for
c̃⋆t = arg max
c̃t





u(c̃t, t)dt + ū(W̃t0+1, t0 + 1)
]
Chapter 3 201
subject to the budget constraint
dW̃t = W̃t (µY dt+ σY dBt) − c̃tdt,
where u(c̃t, W̃t) = e−ρtc̃
1−γ
t (1−γ)−1 and ū(W̃t0+1, t0 +1) = e−ρ(t0+1)I(t0 +1)W̃ 1−γt0+1(1−γ)−1
for ρ ≥ 0 and γ > 0.
The conjectured solution is of the form
J(W̃t, t) = e
−ρtI(t)
W̃ 1−γt
1 − γ ,



















1 − γ = 0 (3.A.8)
subject to the following boundary condition
J(W̃t0+1, t0 + 1) = e
−ρ(t0+1)I(t0 + 1)
W̃ 1−γt0+1
1 − γ .




−γ = 0 ⇔ c̃⋆t = I(t)−
1
γ W̃t. (3.A.9)
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W̃ 1−γt = 0,
which can be simplified to the following ODE
I(t)
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γ I ′(t) = I(t)
1
γ ξ − γ.
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If we set Z(t) := I(t)
1




γ I ′(t), hence we get the following ODE




with boundary condition Z(t0 + 1) = I(t0 + 1)
1
γ . The corresponding homogenous ODE is
Z ′(t) = Z(t)φ ⇒ Z(t) = eφtC,
where C ∈ R is some integration constant.
We can solve the non-homogenous equation in Eq. (3.A.10) by applying the variation
of constants, i.e.,
Z ′(t) = φeφtC(t) + eφtC ′(t). (3.A.11)
Plugging Eq. (3.A.11) into Eq. (3.A.10) yields
φeφtC(t) + eφtC ′(t) = eφtC(t)φ− 1 ⇔ C ′(t) = −e−φt,
which has the solution C(t) = 1
φ
e−φt + C̃, i.e., we get Z(t) = 1
φ
+ eφtC̃ and recalling the
respective boundary condition yields
Z(t0 + 1) =
1
φ
+ eφ(t0+1)C̃ = I(t0 + 1)
1

















, which by the above





































This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2. We first note that due to the definition of c̃t in Eq. (3.20), Wt0+1
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does not depend on µD since additional borrowings are immediately consumed by the
representative agent.
For u(·) in Eq. (3.23), we get
∂
∂µD
u(c⋆s, s) = u(c
⋆
s + c̄, s) = e
−ρs 2Ds
(c⋆s + c̄)
γ > 0. (3.A.12)



















where ∆W := Wt0+1 − Wt0 . Rewriting the probability of default and taking the first





























µD ≥ 0, (3.A.14)
where G(·) denotes the cdf of Yt0+1
Yt0
Dt0
+ ∆W , and we have relied on µD ⊥ ∆W .
Let µ⋆D denote a bounded solution to Eq. (3.20). At µ
⋆
D it then has to hold that
Eq. (3.A.14) is strictly positive. Thus, for a bounded solution to Eq. (3.20), the strictly
positive marginal utility from higher consumption between t0 and t0 + 1 needs to be
offset by the effect of a strictly increasing default probability. In addition, we have to
ensure that the derivative of the power utility in Eq. (3.A.12) and the part in Eq. (3.A.14)
can maximally interesect twice (at the maximum and (local) minimum). For this to
hold, Eq. (3.A.14) needs to converge faster to zero than Eq. (3.A.12) which is true as
Eq. (3.A.14) converges exponentially. Hence, there can be only one interior µ⋆D. This
completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 1. Analogous to the proof of Proposition 2, we note that due to the
definition of c̃t in the restatement of Eq. (3.16) under standard debt, i.e., ct = c̃t−(µD−R),
and Eq. (3.17) under puttable debt, i.e., ct = c̃t − (µD − r), Wt0+1 does not depend on µD
since additional borrowings are immediately consumed by the representative agent.
For u(·) in Eq. (3.23), we get
∂
∂µD
u(c⋆s + c̄, s) = e
−ρs Ds
(c⋆s + c̄)
γ > 0. (3.A.15)
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The discounted expected default costs in Eq. (3.20) are given in Eq. (3.A.13) and the first
partial derivative with respect to µD is positive as shown in Eq. (3.A.14).
Let µ⋆D denote a bounded solution to Eq. (3.20). At µ
⋆
D it then has to hold that
Eq. (3.A.14) is strictly positive. Thus, for a bounded solution to Eq. (3.20), the strictly
positive marginal utility from higher consumption between t0 and t0 + 1 needs to be
offset by the effect of a strictly increasing default probability. In addition, we have to
ensure that the derivative of the power utility in Eq. (3.A.15) and the part in Eq. (3.A.14)
can maximally interesect twice (at the maximum and (local) minimum). For this to
hold, Eq. (3.A.14) needs to converge faster to zero than Eq. (3.A.15) which is true as









Abeler, J., A. Becker, and A. Falk (2014). Representative evidence on lying costs. Journal
of Public Economics 113, 96–104.
Abeler, J., D. Nosenzo, and C. Raymond (2016). Preferences for Truth-telling. Working
Paper .
Akerlof, G. A. (1983). Loyalty Filters. American Economic Review 73 (1), 54–63.
Akerlof, G. A. (1989). The Economics of Illusions. Economics & Politics 1 (1), 1–15.
Akerlof, G. A. and R. E. Kranton (2000). Economics and Identity. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 115 (3), 715–753.
Amir, O., D. G. Rand, and Y. K. Gal (2012). Economic Games on the Internet: The
Effect of $1 Stakes. PLoS ONE 7 (2), 1–4.
Andreoni, J. and D. B. Bernheim (2009). Social Image and the 50-50 Norm: A Theoretical
and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects. Econometrica 77 (5), 1607–1636.
Andreoni, J. and A. L. Sanchez (2014). Do Beliefs Justify Actions or Do Actions Justify
Beliefs? An Experiment on Stated Beliefs, Revealed Beliefs, and Social-Image Motiva-
tion. NBER Working Paper .
Arlot, S. and A. Celisse (2010). A survey of cross-validation procedures for model selection.
Statistics Surveys 4, 40–79.
Babcock, L. and G. Loewenstein (1997). Explaining bargaining impasse: The role of
self-serving biases. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 11 (1), 109–126.
Barr, D., O. Bush, and A. Pienkowski (2014). GDP-linked Bonds and Sovereign Default.
In Life After Debt, pp. 246–275. Springer.
209
210 Bibliography
Bénabou, R. and J. Tirole (2011). Identity, morals, and Taboos: Beliefs as Assets.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 126 (2), 805–855.
Blanchard, O., P. Mauro, and J. Acalin (2016). The Case for Growth-Indexed Bonds in
Advanced Economies Today. Policy Brief Peterson Institute for International Econo-
mics.
Blanco, M., D. Engelmann, A. K. Koch, and H.-T. Normann (2010). Belief elicitation in
experiments: is there a hedging problem? Experimental Economics 13 (4), 412–438.
Blume, A., D. V. DeJong, Y.-G. Kim, and G. B. Sprinkle (1998). Experimental Evi-
dence on the Evolution of Meaning of Messages in Sender-Receiver Games. American
Economic Review 88 (5), 1323–1340.
Bögli, A., J. Sobel, and A. F. Wagner (2017). Model Selection from Experimental Data:
Evidence from Individual Lying Behavior. Working Paper .
Bohannon, J. (2016). Mechanical Turk upends social sciences. Science 352 (6291), 1263–
1264.
Bolton, G. E. and A. Ockenfels (2000). ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and
Competition. American Economic Review 90 (1), 166–193.
Borensztein, E., P. Mauro, M. Ottaviani, and S. Claessens (2004). The Case for GDP-
Indexed Bonds. Economic Policy 19 (38), 165–216.
Borensztein, E. and U. Panizza (2009). The Costs of Sovereign Default. IMF Economic
Review 56 (4), 683–741.
Breig, Z. (2017). Prediction and Model Selection in Experiments. Working Paper .
Brunnermeier, M., L. Garicano, P. R. Lane, M. Pagano, R. Reis, T. Santos, D. Thesmar,
S. V. Neiuwerburgh, and D. Vayanos (2011). ESBies: A realistic reform of Europe’s
financial architecture. VoxEU.org 25. October.
211
Bucciol, A., F. Landini, and M. Piovesan (2013). Unethical behavior in the field: De-
mographic characteristics and beliefs of the cheater. Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization 93, 248–257.
Caballero, R. J. (2003). The Future of the IMF. American Economic Review 93 (2),
31–38.
Cai, H. and J. T. Wang (2006). Overcommunication in Strategic Information Transmission
Games. Games and Economic Behavior 56 (1), 7–36.
Calvo, G. (1988). Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations. American
Economic Review 78 (4), 647–661.
Chance, Z., M. I. Norton, F. Gino, and D. Ariely (2011). Temporal view of the costs and
benefits of self-deception. PNAS 108 (3), 15655–15659.
Charness, G. and M. Dufwenberg (2006). Promises and Partnership. Econometrica 74 (6),
1579–1601.
Chen, D. L., M. Schonger, and C. Wickens (2015). oTree - An Open-Source Platform for
Laboratory, Online, and Field Experiments. Working Paper .
Chidambaran, N., C. S. Fernando, and P. A. Spindt (2001). Credit Enhancement through
Financial Engineering: Freeport McMoRan’s Gold-Denominated Depositary Shares.
Journal of Financial Economics 60 (2), 487–528.
Collard, F., M. Habib, and J.-C. Rochet (2015). Sovereign Debt Sustainability in Advan-
ced Economies. Journal of the European Economic Association 13, 381–420.
Collard, F., M. Habib, and J.-C. Rochet (2016). The Reluctant Defaulter: A Tale of High
Government Debt. Working Paper .
Crawford, V. P. and J. Sobel (1982). Strategic Information Transmission. Econome-
trica 50 (6), 1431–1451.
De Grauwe, P. and Y. Ji (2012). Mispricing of Sovereign Risk and Multiple Equilibria in
the Eurozone. CEPS Working Paper .
212 Bibliography
Di Tella, R., R. Perez-Truglia, A. Babino, and M. Sigman (2015). Conveniently Upset:
Avoiding Altruism by Distorting Beliefs about Others’ Altruism. American Economic
Review 105 (11), 3416–3442.
Dickhaut, J. W., K. A. McCabe, and A. Mukherji (1995). An experimental study of
strategic information transmission. Economic Theory 6, 389–403.
Dufwenberg, M. and M. Dufwenberg (2016). Lies in Disguise - A Theoretical Analysis of
Cheating. Working Paper .
Dufwenberg, M. and U. Gneezy (2000). Measuring Beliefs in an Experimental Lost Wallet
Game. Games and Economic Behavior 30 (2), 163–182.
Eaton, J. and M. Gersovitz (1981). Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis. Review of Economic Studies 48 (2), 289–309.
Egan, M., G. Matvos, and A. Seru (2017). The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct.
Working Paper .
Ellingsen, T. and M. Johannesson (2008). Pride and prejudice: The human side of incen-
tive theory. American Economic Review 98 (3), 990–1008.
Erat, S. and U. Gneezy (2012). White Lies. Management Science 58 (4), 723–733.
Ericson, K. M. M., J. M. White, D. Laibson, and J. D. Cohen (2015). Money earlier
or later? Simple heuristics explain intertemporal choice better than delay discounting
does. Psychological Science 26 (6), 826–833.
Favero, C. and A. Missale (2012). Sovereign Spreads in the Euro Area: Which Prospects
for a Eurobond? Economic Policy 27 (70), 231–273.
Fehr, E. and K. M. Schmidt (1999). A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (3), 817–868.
Fischbacher, U. and F. Heusi (2013). Lies in Disguise: An Experimental Study on Chea-
ting. Journal of the European Economic Association 11 (3), 525–547.
213
Freud, S. (1933). New Introductory Lectures on Psycho Analysis. W.W. Norton & Com-
pany.
Gali, J., J. D. Lopez-Salido, and J. Vallés (2007). Understanding The Effects of Govern-
ment Spending on Consumption. Journal of the European Economic Association 5(1),
227–270.
Garbarino, E., R. Slonim, and M. C. Villeval (2017). Loss Aversion and Lying Behavior:
Theory, Estimation and Empirical Evidence. Working Paper .
Gibson, R., C. Tanner, and A. F. Wagner (2013). Preferences for Truthfulness: Hetero-
geneity among and within Individuals. American Economic Review 103 (1), 532–548.
Gneezy, U. (2005). Deception: The Role of Consequences. American Economic Re-
view 95 (1), 384–394.
Gneezy, U., A. Kajackaite, and J. Sobel (2016). Lying Aversion and the Size of the Lie.
Working Paper .
Gneezy, U., B. Rockenbach, and M. Serra-Garcia (2013). Measuring lying aversion. Jour-
nal of Economic Behavior & Organization 93, 293–300.
Gneezy, U., S. Saccardo, M. Serra-Garcia, and R. van Veldhuizen (2015). Motivated
Self-deception and Unethical Behavior. Working Paper .
Hellwig, C. and T. Philippon (2011). Eurobills, not Eurobonds. VoxEU.org 02 December.
Horton, J. J., D. G. Rand, and R. J. Zeckhauser (2011). The online laboratory: conducting
experiments in a real labor market. Experimental Economics 14 (3), 399–425.
Hutton, A. P., L. F. Lee, and S. Z. Shu (2012). Do Managers Always Know Better?
The Relative Accuracy of Management and Analyst Forecasts. Journal of Accounting
Research 50 (5), 1217–1244.
Kartik, N. (2009). Strategic Communication with Lying Costs. Review of Economic
Studies 76 (4), 1359–1395.
214 Bibliography
Kerschbamer, R. and M. Sutter (2017). The Economics of Credence Goods - a Survey of
Recent Lab and Field Experiments. CESifo Economic Studies 63 (1), 1–23.
Khalmetski, K. and D. Sliwka (2017). Disguising Lies - Image Concerns and Partial Lying
in Cheating Games. CESifo Working Paper No. 6347 .
Kohavi, R. (1995). A Study of Cross-Validation and Bootstrap for Accuracy Estimation
and Model Selection. International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence 14, 1137–
1145.
Köszegi, B. and M. Rabin (2006). A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 121 (4), 1133–1165.
Lane, P. R. (2012). The European Sovereign Debt Crisis. Journal of Economic Perspecti-
ves 26 (3), 49–68.
López-Pérez, R. and E. Spiegelman (2013). Why do people tell the truth? Experimental
evidence for pure lie aversion. Experimental Economics 16 (3), 233–247.
Mazar, N., O. Amir, and D. Ariely (2008). The Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory
of Self-Concept Maintenance. Journal of Marketing Research 45, 633–644.
Mele, A. R. (1997). Real self-deception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20, 91–136.
Merton, R. C. (1969). Lifetime Portfolio Selection under Uncertainty: The Continuous-
Time Case. The Review of Economics and Statistics 51, 247–257.
Merton, R. C. (1974). On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of Interest
Rates. The Journal of Finance 29 (2), 449–470.
Merton, R. C. (1977). An Analytic Derivation of the Cost of Deposit Insurance and Loan
Guarantees. Journal of Banking and Finance 1, 3–11.
Müller, A., K. Storesletten, and F. Zilibotti (2016). Sovereign Debt and Structural Re-
forms. Working Paper .
Neftci, S. N. and A. O. Santos (2003). Puttable and Extendible Bonds: Developing
Interest Rate Derivatives for Emerging Markets. IMF Working Paper .
215
Paolacci, G., J. Chandler, and P. G. Ipeirotis (2010). Running experiments on Amazon
Mechanical Turk. Judgment and Decision Making 5 (5), 411–419.
Peysakhovich, A. and J. Naecker (2017). Using Methods from Machine Learning to Eva-
luate Behavioral Models of Choice Under Risk and Ambiguity. Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization 133, 373–384.
Plato (1953). Cratylus. In: The dialogues of Plato, trans. B. Jowett. Clarendon Press.
Rabin, M. (1995). Moral Preferences, Moral Constraints, and Self-Serving Biases. Working
Paper .
Rochet, J.-C. (2006). Why do Countries Default? Working Paper .
Rode, J. (2010). Truth and trust in communication: Experiments on the effect of a
competitive context. Games and Economic Behavior 68 (1), 325–338.
Sánchez-Pagés, S. and M. Vorsatz (2007). An Experimental Study of Truth-Telling in a
Sender-Receiver Game. Games and Economic Behavior 61 (1), 86–112.
Schwardmann, P. and J. van der Weele (2016). Deception and Self-Deception. Working
Paper .
Schweitzer, M. E. and C. K. Hsee (2002). Stretching the Truth: Elastic Justification
and Motivated Communication of Uncertain Information. Journal of Risk and Uncer-
tainty 25 (2), 185–201.
Shalvi, S., F. Gino, R. Barkan, and S. Ayal (2015). Self-serving Justifications: Doing
Wrong and Feeling Moral. Current Directions in Psychological Science 24 (2), 125–130.
Shiller, R. J. (1994). Macro Markets: Creating Institutions for Managing Society’s Largest
Economic Risks. Oxford University Press.
Shiller, R. J. (2003). The New Financial Order: Risk in the 21st Century. Princeton
University Press.
Sutter, M. (2009). Deception through Telling the Truth?! Experimental Evidence from
Individuals and Teams. Economic Journal 119 (534), 47–60.
216 Bibliography
Tanner, C., B. Ryf, and M. Hanselmann (2009). Geschützte Werte Skala: Konstruktion
und erste Validierung eines Messinstrumentes (Protected Values Measure: Construction
and First Validation of an Instrument to Assess Protected Values). Diagnostica 55 (3),
174–183.
Van Lange, P. A. M., W. Otten, E. M. N. D. Bruin, and J. A. Joireman (1997). Develop-
ment of Prosocial, IndIndividual, and Competitive Orientations: Theory and Prelimi-
nary Evidence. Journal of Personality and Social 73 (4), 733–746.
Vanberg, C. (2008). Why Do People Keep Their Promises? An Experimental Test of
Two Explanations. Econometrica 76 (6), 1467–1480.
Wang, J. T., M. Spezio, and C. F. Camerer (2010). Pinocchio’s Pupil: Using Eyetracking
and Pupil Dilation to Understand Truth Telling and Deception in Sender-Receiver
Games. American Economic Review 100 (3), 984–1007.










Name: Andrin T. Bögli
Date of Birth: January 19, 1989
Nationality: Swiss
Education
09/2011 – 10/2017 PhD Program in Finance at the Swiss Finance Institute
University of Zurich (Zurich, Switzerland)
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Alexander F. Wagner
07/2016 – 12/2016 Visiting PhD Student
Harvard University (Cambridge MA, USA)
04/2016 – 07/2016 Visiting PhD Student
University of California, San Diego (La Jolla CA, USA)
09/2010 – 04/2016 MSc Banking and Finance
University of Zurich (Zurich, Switzerland)
09/2007 – 10/2010 BA Banking and Finance
University of Zurich (Zurich, Switzerland)
Professional Experience
09/2012 – 10/2017 Research and Teaching Assistant at the University of Zurich
(Zurich, Switzerland)
01/2010 – 08/2010 Internship at UBS Investment Bank (Opfikon, Switzerland)
221
